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2 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
In this research I surface the epistemological assumptions underpinning thinking on 
the apparent high numbers of people with mental illness in Africa not receiving 
care, known as the ‘treatment gap’. I thus prise open the ‘black box’ of this 
knowledge, scrutinising its underlying meaning codes and capillaries of power. 
 
 
I explore knowledge produced on the ‘treatment gap’ at three different sites: 1) 
Mental health research in Africa published over the last decade; 2) National mental 
health policies of 14 African countries; 3) Narratives of 28 psychiatrists all working 
in public mental health care provision in South Africa, Uganda, Ethiopia or Nigeria. 
For my analysis I develop a theoretical toolbox which draws on concepts from two 
broad and multidisciplinary fields, namely Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
and Postcolonial Studies. 
 
 
What emerged was that knowledge on the ‘gap’ in mental health care is deeply 
inserted within the episteme of European Colonial Modernity, and thus saturated 
with Eurocentric tendencies. In particular, two paradigms are playing a fundamental 
role, those of evidence-based science (including biomedicine) and human rights. I 
destabilise the inevitability of these paradigms by putting them in historical 
perspective, and shedding light on the many questionable certainties and binary 
oppositions upon which they are based. I show how they have become the 
gatekeepers of knowledge, ultimately occluding ‘other’ ways of knowing which are 
based upon alternative epistemological codes. The somewhat singular voice of 
scholarly authority was, however, at times softened by certain quieter and more 
marginalised voices. These suggested avenues out of which more decolonised, 
 
‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship might potentially grow. To sum up, I surface 
particular tensions and hold them up to the light, with the hope of disturbing certain 
intellectual reflexes and creating a space for potential alternatives. Ultimately, this 
might help foster different sorts of conversations on the ‘treatment gap’ from those 
created by current seats of power. 
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Chains of Science 
 
Stand back, and see 
These carefully white-free walls 
 
Meticulous choice of musky peach 
A cheery colour, studies show Yet 
still your right-angled walls Reveal 
the white-coat thoughts That frown 
upon my mind 
 
My scattered, torn, disordered 
mind That, drug-filled, 
subdues 
 
To fit your plan. 
But think 
This mind 
That sees the curves in City Hall 
Transforming it to Gaudi’s shrine  
This mind 
That plucks stars from rainy skies 
And hears the drumbeats in beetles’ wings 
This mind 
Turns the world on its head 
Soaks it in life’s pleasures and its pains 
 
And wrings them 
Dripping 
 
Onto the page 
You avidly read 
To fill your glass 
 
With Ophelia drowning 
Dido burning. 
 
So when you discuss my 
diagnosis And debate my coping 
skills Remember 
 
That the sprinkled glass 
On which I walk through life 
 
Is the story you race home to 
read To free you  
From your mind in chains of science. 
 
(Stewart, 2014) 
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1. INTRODUCTION: A KNOWLEDGE PROJECT ON THE MENTAL 
 
HEALTH ‘TREATMENT GAP’ IN AFRICA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“One of the things a scientific community acquires with a paradigm is a criterion for choosing 
problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great 
extent these are the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its 
members to undertake”. 
 
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 37) 
 
 
This research is an exploration into the knowledge assumptions and politics 
underpinning contemporary thinking around the ‘gap’ in mental health care in 
Africa. The apparent high numbers of people with mental illness in Africa who are 
not receiving care, now formally referred to as the ‘treatment gap’, has become an 
issue of major concern within the global public health community (Demyttenaere et 
al. 2004; Dua et al. 2011; Kohn et al 2004; Kessler et al. 2009; Ormel et al. 2008; 
Patel et al. 2010; Thornicroft, 2007; Wang et al. 2007a,b). This research seeks to 
prise-open the black box of thinking on this ‘gap’, unearthing and scrutinizing the 
silent meaning-codes and conventions mediating the knowledge outcomes. It is thus 
a knowledge project, an intellectual engagement with the themes of epistemology 
and power. Contrary to what one might assume, however, such a meta-focus project 
is not an abstract or merely conceptual endeavour. What and how we know 
fundamentally shape the kinds of questions that we ask and in turn the sorts of 
solutions we propose. Struggles over meaning are therefore profoundly practical, 
with very real and material significance. 
 
 
The idea for this research came out of, frankly, frustration. Prior to beginning this 
research, I worked as a research officer for the Mental Health and Poverty Project 
(MHaPP), based in the Psychiatry Department at the University of Cape Town
1
. This 
project, at the time the largest mental health research programme in Africa, sought to 
develop and evaluate mental health policy, legislation and services within a range of 
African countries. My main role was to extend the qualitative component of MHaPP. 
 
1
 http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/development/mhapp/en/ 
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This involved working with researchers primarily in South Africa, Ghana, Uganda 
and Zambia to conduct and analyse interviews with a range of mental health care 
stakeholders, and to produce publications and policy briefs based upon our findings. 
As part of my work, I was also tasked with spending time in the various mental 
health care facilities of these four countries so as to develop a ‘feel’ for the situation 
and associated challenges. Whilst working on this project, I was increasingly 
frustrated with the representational politics of a region that repeatedly gets 
misunderstood, misrepresented, pathologised, and intervened upon. I became more 
and more concerned with the processes of knowledge production, and the power 
dynamics that myself and others were (albeit unintentionally) perpetuating. And I 
developed a growing sense of dis-ease with the kinds of conceptual paradigms, both 
in the mental and social sciences, which have outlived their usefulness, and yet still 
remained central to mental healthcare research and policy-making on the African 
continent. I realised that my own experiences and practices were being conditioned 
by these research processes and knowledge systems. So, it felt like it was time, if not 
already overdue, to start a conversation. And that is what this research is: a step 
towards opening-up a new kind of dialogue on mental health care in Africa. 
 
 
Since beginning my PhD research in 2010, projects such as the Mental Health and 
Poverty Project have multiplied on the African continent, and in other low-and-
middle-income regions. We are indeed currently witnessing a strong international 
crusade to transform the mental health situation in the developing world, a situation 
which is increasingly being considered an issue of major global health concern 
(Global Mental Health Group, 2007; Patel et al, 2011). This drive has in turn given 
rise to a new field of research and practice, known as ‘Global Mental Health’, which 
is being led by the international psychiatric community, but incorporating a broad 
coalition of actors and agencies. This field has engendered a new institutional and 
research landscape, one which is focused primarily on reducing the ‘gap’ in mental 
health care globally, but particularly in low-and-middle-income countries. Alongside 
this, there is growing controversy over the conceptualisation, goals and imagined 
outcomes of this new field of study. There has recently been an explosion of 
criticism of the Global Mental Health agenda, particularly from the ranks of 
transcultural psychiatrists and medical anthropologists. In order to contextualise my 
current research project, and help delineate where I wish to position it, what follows 
is a brief outline of the terrain of Global Mental Health and associated critiques. 
15 
Thereafter, I will describe the broad aims, objectives and scope of my research, 
 
followed by a description of the structure of this thesis. 
 
 
The rise of Global Mental Health 
 
 
“We have presented the knowledge base and the strategies to improve mental health. Now we need 
political will and solidarity, from the global health community, to put this knowledge to use. The time 
to act is now”. 
 
(Global Mental Health Group, 2007, p. 1250). 
 
 
Over the last decade, the global psychiatric community has increasingly stressed the 
dire mental health situation globally, and particularly in Africa, highlighting what it 
perceives to be a number of disquieting features of the current state of affairs (See 
Cooper et al., 2011 for a comprehensive summary; also see Global Mental Health 
Group, 2007; Patel et al, 2011). The size of the burden of mental disorders is 
generating growing alarm (Collins et al, 2011; WHO 2001, 2008). Estimates 
commonly cited are that more than 13% of the global burden of disease is due to 
neuropsychiatric disorders, with 70% of this burden understood to lie within low-
and-middle-income countries (Lopez, 2006). It is suggested that this burden is likely 
to rise dramatically in the next decade, with predictions, for example, that depression 
will become the leading cause of disability worldwide by 2030 (WHO, 2013). 
Similarly, the insufficient visibility, policy attention and funding available to address 
this burden is increasingly being highlighted by a range of scholars (for example 
Jacob et al. 2007; Kohn et al. 2004; Saxena et al. 2007; Horton 2007; Kakuma et al, 
2011, WHO, 2011). There is growing documentation of the meagre financial and 
human resources dedicated to mental health care, especially in Africa. Common 
statistics mentioned include, for example, that on average African countries spend 
less than 1% of their national health budgets on mental health (WHO, 2005); that 
there is one psychiatrist per 2.5 million people, one psychologist per 2 million people 
and one psychiatric nurse per 500 000 people in Africa (Saxena et al., 2007); that as 
many as 44% of African countries do not have a mental health policy while 33% do 
not have a mental health plan (WHO, 2011). 
 
 
Amongst the various issues being raised, one matter that has received particular 
attention is what is seen as the exceptionally high levels of people with mental illness 
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globally, but particularly in low-and-middle-income countries, who are not receiving 
mental health care (Demyttenaere et al. 2004; Dua et al. 2011; Kohn et al 2004; 
Kessler et al. 2009; Ormel et al. 2008; Patel et al. 2010; Thornicroft, 2007; Wang et 
al. 2007a,b). According to the international psychiatric community, despite robust 
evidence testifying to the effectiveness of a range of interventions for mental illness, 
the majority of the world’s population has no access to these (Patel et al., 2013). This 
issue is now referred to as the “treatment gap”, formally defined as “the difference 
between the true prevalence rate of mental illness and the proportion who receive any 
kind of treatment” (Thornicroft & Tansella, 2013, p. 849 see also Chisholm et al. 
2007; Patel et al. 2007; Prince et al. 2007; Saxena et al. 2007 for similar definitions 
of this ‘treatment gap’). Startling statistics have been provided in this regard. For 
example, it is estimated that between 70% and 90% of people in low-and-middle-
income countries who need mental health care do not receive it, a figure which is 
estimated to be closer to 98% in low income countries in Africa (Collins et al, 2011; 
Lopez, 2006; WHO 2001, 2008). For the global psychiatric community, this ‘gap’ in 
mental health care is seen as particularly worrying, given the significant individual 
and social costs of untreated mental illness. This community suggests, for example, 
that the global economic costs of mental disorders were $2.5 trillion in 2010 and 
project that this is likely to reach $6.0 trillion by 2030 (Bloom et al, 2011). The large 
majority of this cost is being attributed to untreated mental health problems. 
 
 
Moreover, it is commonly asserted that in the absence of sufficient and supposedly 
appropriate mental health care services, people with mental illness in Africa are 
experiencing some of the most severe human rights violations. Indeed, disturbing 
accounts of the maltreatment of people with mental health problems are increasingly 
being reported, accompanied by graphic images of such individuals being, for 
example, tied to trees, chained to beds and caged in small cells in the community 
(Botha et al. 2006; Drew et al, 2011; Hugo et al. 2007; Shibre et al. 2001; 
Thornicroft, 2006 are examples of these kinds of human rights’ reports). Ultimately, 
psychiatrists are calling this current ‘gap’ in mental health care a “global health 
scandal” (Patel & Thornicroft, 2009, p. 1), a “crisis” (Patel et al., 2011, p. 1441) and 
a “failure of humanity” (Kleinman, 2009, p. 603). 
 
 
These growing concerns about the mental health situation in low-and-middle-income 
 
countries, including those in Africa, crystalized in 2007 with the publication of 
the 17 
first Lancet series on mental health (Global Mental Health Group, 2007). Comprising 
six articles, this series aimed to bring together the evidence pertaining to the burden 
and impact of mental disorders, the level of resources dedicated to mental health, and 
known effective treatments and the barriers to scaling them up. The last article of the 
series made a “call to action” to reduce the gap in mental health care in low-and-
middle-income countries, urging people to join “the broad new social movement” to 
strengthen mental health care in such regions (Global Mental Health Group, 2007, p. 
1241). This series coincided with the launch of the Movement for Global Mental 
Health (MGMH), an international coalition of mental health professionals, civil 
society activists and global health advocates which has two aims: to close the gap in 
mental health care for people living with mental disorders and to promote their 
human rights
2
. As Vikram Patel (2012, p. 9), one of the key architects of the 
Movement suggests, the Movement seeks to provide a “platform for people to cast 
aside their differences, to stand shoulder to shoulder, and to advocate for a shared 
cause”. Today, the Movement has grown to over 3,000 organisations and individuals 
from more than 100 countries around the world (Clark, 2014). 
 
 
Since the Lancet series and launch of the MGMH, there has been a strong 
international push to focus the public health spotlight on mental disorders globally, 
and particularly in low-and-middle-income countries. This has consolidated around 
what is now referred to as the field of Global Mental Health (GMH) (Patel, 2014; 
Patel & Prince, 2010). Aligning itself with the wider area of Global Health, Global 
Mental Health has been described as an “Area of study, research and practice that 
places a priority on improving mental health and achieving equity in mental health 
for all people worldwide” (Patel & Prince, 2010, p. 1976). Led by the international 
psychiatric community, but incorporating a broad coalition of actors and agencies, 
Global Mental Health has engendered a new institutional landscape. The field has 
recently established a number of its own research centres, academic units and clinical 
training programs. Moreover, under the banner of this field, a plethora of journal 
articles, special series and reports have been published which have inter alia 
identified global strategies for mental health research (Becker & Kleinman, 2012; 
Collins et al., 2011; Mari & Thornicroft, 2010; Patel, et al., 2011; Patel & Prince, 
2010) and international guidelines and interventions for scaling-up mental health 
 
2
 http://www.globalmentalhealth.org 
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services (Mental Health Working Group, 2013; Patel & Thornicroft, 2009; PLOS 
Medicine Editors, 2013; Patel & Saxena, 2014; Petersen et al., 2011). 
 
 
We have also witnessed an explosion of Global Mental Health intervention 
programmes, initiatives which have received significant financial backing from a 
range of prestigious international funding bodies and governments
3
. For example, 
the field has gained the backing of the World Health Organization, which has 
published two world health reports dedicated to Global Mental Health (WHO, 2001, 
2010), commenced its Mental Health Gap Action Programme (mhGap) to close the 
 
‘gap’ in mental health care (WHO, 2008), and most recently launched its 
Comprehensive Mental Health Action Plan as a framework for scaling-up access to 
mental health services globally and particularly in low-and-middle-income countries 
(Saxena, Funk & Chisholm, 2013). The latter has been adopted recently by 194 
ministers of health globally, who have formally recognised mental health as a global 
health priority and made a common pledge for action. 
 
 
Similarly, the US government-funded National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) 
has recently launched its Grand Challenges in Mental Health (GCC) initiative. This 
initiative has inter alia brought together over 400 ‘global experts’ to identify key 
research concerns and themes for the next ten years which will help reduce the ‘gap’ 
in mental health care in low-and-middle-income countries (Collins et al, 2011; Patel, 
2012). Based on the priorities pinpointed, the Government of Canada has provided 
$32 million to over 60 projects in Africa, Asia and South and Latin America to 
expand access to mental health care
4
. 
 
 
Ultimately, Global Mental Health has increasingly captured the imagination of a 
wide range of stakeholders, from consumer and civil society groups, to national 
policy makers to international donors and development agencies. Indeed, a recent 
google search for ‘Global Mental Health’ on November 1st 2009 identified 
approximately 62300 related sites, of which over 85% of them were registered since 
 
 
3
 Large funding organizations and governments include, amongst others, the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the US National Institutes of Mental Health, the UK’s Department for  
International Development, the Welcome Trust and Grand Challenges Canada. See 
http://www.centreforglobalmentalhealth.org/projects for a summary of the kinds of research projects 
and interventions being funded. 
4
 www.grandchallengesgmh.nimh.nih.gov 
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2008 (Patel & Prince, 2010). This increasingly powerful field has, however, also 
caught the attention of a number of critical scholars, who are raising strong concerns 
about this growing area of research and practice. 
 
 
The rise of critique 
 
 
“We need to challenge the relentless self-aggrandisement of the Western mental health industry, 
forever claiming that yet more funding is required to tackle ‘massive’ unmet mental health needs. This 
is an industry out of control, risking hubris and arguably deserving it. Not just ‘mental health’ but the 
whole industry and its pharmaceutical motor is being globalised…” 
 
(Summerfield, 2012, p. 528) 
 
 
Thus, alongside the development of Global Mental Health, we are also witnessing 
growing controversy over the conceptualisation, goals and imagined outcomes of this 
field. Indeed, a range of critical views have recently been expressed, particularly 
from the ranks of transcultural psychiatrists and anthropologists. These have been 
articulated in a number of recent published articles, along with the publication of 
three special issues dedicated to ‘critical perspectives on Global Mental Health’- two 
in Transcultural Psychiatry in 2012 (Campbell and Burgess, 2012) and another in 
2014 (Kirmayer and Pedersen, 2014), and one in Disability and the Global South in 
2014 (Mills and Fernando, 2014). As will be touched upon below, the kinds of 
arguments being made have strong remnants of earlier critiques of psychiatry itself, 
particularly those associated with Britain’s ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s (e.g. Crossley 1998; Rogers & Pilgrim, 2005 for overviews of this 
movement) and the Mental Health Users/Survivor Movement of the 1970s and 1980s 
(Crossley & Crossley, 2001; Rogers and Pilgrim, 1991 for summaries of this 
movement). Although diverse and varied, the critiques being made about Global 
Mental Health can usefully be divided into two major and interrelated clusters of 
critique. I refer to these as the biomedical and cultural critiques. 
 
 
The first major constellation of critique of Global Mental Health pertains to what is 
seen as the biomedical framework in which the field is situated, and associated 
biological determinism. This kind of critique is being made by a plethora of scholars 
(see for example Campbell and Burgess, 2012; Fernando, 2011; Ingleby, 2014; Jain 
& Jadhav, 2009; Kirmayer & Pedersen, 2014; Kirmayer & Swartz, 2013; Mills, 
 
2014; Read, 2012; Suffling et al., 2014; Summerfield, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2013; 
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White & Sashidharan, 2014a,b). These individuals are suggesting that implicit in the 
arguments being put forward, and in the research and interventions that have 
followed, is the assumption that mental disorders are biologically grounded entities 
with stable features and singular courses and outcomes. They argue that, although 
Global Mental Health recognises that the manifestations and triggers of mental 
disorders may vary across cultures and may be mediated by social determinants, 
ultimately it is assumed that they have a common biological basis. A number of 
problems and negative consequences of this assumption have been highlighted. 
 
 
Many scholars (for example Fernando, 2011; Ingleby, 2014; Summerfield, 2004, 
2008, 2012, 2013; White & Sashidharan, 2014a,b) have questioned the legitimacy of 
this biological assumption, suggesting that evidence for the physical foundations of 
most mental illnesses remains fairly weak. This kind of critique indeed echoes what 
was at the intellectual core of Britain’s ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement. Commonly 
associated with the works of Cooper (1968), Laing (1967) and Szasz (1971), this 
movement interrogated the notion of mental illness being a brain disease and 
emphasised the weak construct validity of diagnostic categories within psychiatry. 
Relatedly, the ‘anti-psychiatry’ movement also criticised psychiatry’s tendency to 
medicalise mental illness and create disease mongering, an argument which is being 
similarly made by many critics of Global Mental Health (for example Mills, 2014; 
Summerfield, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2013). For example, Derek Summerfield, one of 
 
Global Mental Health’s most ardent critics, argues that the “mental health industry” 
is “out of control”, triggering an “epidemic of psychiatric diagnosis” (Summerfield, 
 
2012, p. 528). For him, Global Mental Health tends to reify subjective consciousness 
through a mechanistic focus on ‘symptoms’, which ultimately pathologises normal 
responses to life’s challenges and medicalises everyday life experience. 
 
 
Moreover, other critics of Global Mental Health have proposed (for example Clark, 
2014; Jain & Jadhav, 2009; Kirmayer & Swartz, 2013; Mills, 2014; Read, 2012; 
Swartz, 2012) that in regarding mental distress as a biomedical pathology, the field 
relies upon and promotes interventions centered on the individual, such as 
medication or simple behavioural interventions. For some (for example Campbell 
and Burgess, 2012; Jain & Jadhav, 2009; Kirmayer, 2006; Kirmayer & Swartz, 2013; 
Mills, 2014; Swartz, 2012; White and Sashidharan, 2014a) this tends to divert 
attention away from the social, political and economic drivers of human distress, and 
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the need for more complex interventions which tackle the structural determinants of 
mental illness. For other critical scholars (for example Read, 2012; Suffling et al., 
2014; White and Sashidharan, 2014b), Global Mental Health’s strong focus on 
increasing access to psychotropic medication has meant that the field tends to gloss 
over the limitations of such treatments, and the ambivalent attitudes they provoke in 
those who take them. These critics emphasise that evidence on the efficacy, 
tolerability and cost-effectiveness of psychotropic treatment remain patchy and 
contested, limitations which tend to be muted in the push to scale-up mental health 
care services. Moreover, some of the most vocal critics of Global Mental Health 
(Summerfield, 2014, p. 409; see also Fernando, 2011) have suggested that this 
uncritical promotion of psychotropic medication, or what is referred to as the 
 
“pharmaceuticalisation of everyday distress”, is deeply embroiled with the economic 
agendas of the pharmaceutical industry. Again, this particular theme has strong 
remnants of the British ‘antipsychiatry’ movement of the 1960s and 1970s (for 
example Rogers & Pilgrim, 2003). As Ingleby (2014, p. 210) argues when talking 
about Global Mental Health: 
 
 
The key to understanding the dominance of biological models lies in the 
adage ‘follow the money’. Most recent research in psychiatry has been 
financed by the pharmaceutical industry, which is only concerned with 
treatment. After all, reducing mental disorders by tackling their causes would 
in no way serve the industry’s financial interests. Thus, as well as 
manipulating published results, the pharmaceutical industry has distorted 
psychiatry’s knowledge base by financing a mountain of evidence on 
pharmacological treatments which it is impossible for other approaches to 
rival in quantity. 
 
 
A second and interrelated cluster of critique of Global Mental Health is what 
Kirmayer and Pedersen (2014) refer to as the “cultural critique”. According to 
Kirmayer and Pedersen, this form of critique has raised a number of concerns about 
what is seen the inappropriate exportation of a supposedly Western, biomedical 
model of mental illness, and the consequent neglect and demonization of more local 
and culturally-relevant ways of approaching mental illness. For example, many 
services users and associated representative organizations (for example Gikonyo, 
2014; Lee, 2014; Ibrahim, 2014; Timimi, 2011; PANUSP, 2014) argue that Global 
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Mental Health has insufficiently consulted with local communities and particularly 
individuals and families actually affected by mental illness in low-and-middle-
income countries. They suggest that the methods for establishing priorities, research 
themes and modes of intervention are dominated by a small consortia of psychiatric 
 
‘experts’ drawn mainly from the geopolitical North and as such, tend to reflect the 
interests and values of Western psychiatry. These individuals and groups have thus 
strongly criticised Global Mental Health for disregarding and ultimately silencing 
their voices. These sentiments indeed strongly resonate with the Mental Health 
User/Survivor movement of the 1970s and 1980s within Britain, and this 
movement’s commonplace slogans of “‘Listen to the voice of the user!” and “Let 
survivors and consumers speak out!” (Crossley & Crossley, 2001, p. 1477; see also 
Rogers & Pilgrim, 1991; 2005). For example, the Pan African Network of People 
with Psychosocial Disabilities recently made the following formal statement with 
regards to the field of Global Mental Health: 
 
 
There can be no mental health without our expertise. We are the knowers and 
yet we remain the untapped resource in mental health care. We are the 
experts. We want to be listened to and to fully participate in our life 
decisions…We want to speak for ourselves (PANUSP, 2014, p. 385). 
 
 
This argument, that Global Mental Health is marginalising local voices and 
 
‘exporting’ an essentially top-down Western biomedical model, has also been made 
by a number of academics (See for example Davar, 2014; Fernando, 2012; Ingleby, 
2014; Lang, 2014; Lee, 2014; Mills, 2014; Sax, 2014; Skovdal, 2012; Suffling et al., 
2014; Summerfield, 2012; Tribe, 2014). According to these scholars, this exportation 
is underpinned by an inherent assumption of the universal applicability of biomedical 
understandings and treatments of mental illness. They rigorously contest this 
assumption, emphasising that it fails to acknowledge the significant variation of 
mental illness cross-culturally. For these critics, given the culture-specific nature of 
mental illness, the kinds of diagnostic tools and interventions being promoted by 
Global Mental Health are not relevant to ‘non-Western’ societies, ultimately leading 
to inappropriate diagnoses and the implementation of ineffective solutions. For 
example Ingleby (2014), Summerfield (2012) and White and Sashidharan (2014a) 
suggest that Global Mental Health is providing inflated and misleading estimates of 
the burden of mental disorders in low-and-middle income countries. According to 
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them, the statistics being cited make sense only when Western psychiatric categories 
and measures are mistakenly applied. 
 
 
Other critical voices (for example Davar, 2014; Fernando, 2011; Lang, 2014; Mills, 
2014; Sax, 2014; Tribe, 2014) argue that the ‘exportation’ of Western biomedical 
models works to suppress or even demonise ‘culturally’ established systems of 
mental health and healing. As Tribe (2014, p. 251) states, “The transfer of western 
psychiatric ideas and the uncritical generalisation of them around the world not only 
ignores local realities and cultures, but also works to discredit, replace and make 
 
‘vanish’…the rich traditions and cultural heritage of many low- and middle-income 
countries”. Many critics, for example Fernando (2011), Mills (2014), Summerfield 
(2012) and Timimi (2011) argue that Global Mental Health’s ubiquitous reports of 
the malign treatment of the mentally ill in Africa, including graphic images of people 
in chains at traditional healing camps misrepresents and pathologises local forms of 
healing. Ultimately, they describe this as a kind of medical imperialism or neo-
colonialism. As Summerfield (2013, p. 347) emphasises: 
 
 
The blithe universalism underpinning Global Mental Health is reproducing 
the dynamics of the colonial era when it was pressed upon indigenous people 
that there were different kinds of knowledge and that theirs was second rate. 
Socio-cultural and socio-political phenomena were framed in European terms 
and the responsible pursuit of traditional values regarded as evidence of 
backwardness. Global Mental Health workers are the new missionaries. 
 
 
Global Mental Health and its discontents: A hostile intellectual climate 
 
 
“There is the need for sociology of knowledge which is neither uncritically deferential to the 
sciences nor uncritically cynical about them, and which, rather than competing for control of the 
territory, cooperates with epistemology to understand the scientific enterprise” 
 
(Haack, 2003, p. 201) 
 
 
Many Global Mental Health advocates (such as Cohen et al. 2011; Cohen 2012; 
Patel, Minas et al. 2013; Patel, 2014) have been outraged by the kinds of critiques 
currently being put forward, and have published a number of fervent responses. They 
argue that Global Mental Health is pervaded by postcolonial sensibilities to form 
 
genuine and reciprocal north-south collaborations. They give examples of 
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partnerships with ‘traditional’ healers developed as part of their programs that are 
sensitive to local cultural traditions. They reference the body of literature on socio-
economic and cultural determinants of mental disorders produced by leading Global 
Mental Health researchers, and argue that this has established a socially and 
culturally sensitive empirical basis to inform their interventions. Ultimately, in 
response to many of the criticisms of Global Mental Health, key advocate Professor 
Vikram Patel (2014, p. 10) recently made the following formal statement: 
 
 
The hard grind of trying to make a difference on the ground, warts and all, 
may make the discipline more vulnerable to attack from lofty critiques 
delivered from ivory towers…Thousands of people with mental disorders 
turn up each day in health centres around the world only to receive 
inappropriate treatments, or die prematurely, or face discrimination and 
human rights abuses- we must not allow the false prophets, hiding behind the 
duplicitous cloak of protecting the ‘natives’ from a profiteering and self-
serving ‘Western biomedical imperialism’ to distract Global Mental Health 
practitioners from their duty and responsibility to reduce this suffering. 
 
 
In an attempt to address these growing controversies and tensions, the Division of 
Social and Transcultural Psychiatry at McGill University organised a meeting in July 
2012 which brought together key proponents and critics of Global Mental Health 
(Bemme & D’souza, 2012 provide a summary of the key themes raised at this 
meeting). Although the goal was to identify areas of consensus, clarify concerns and 
map potentially common programs of research, the meeting generated considerable 
anger and resentment on both sides, with many individuals leaving prematurely 
(Personal communication, Doerte Bemme, December 2012). 
 
 
One effect of current conversations between Global Mental Health advocates and 
critics is that all sorts of essentialised categories, damaging polarized forms of 
thinking and somewhat unnuanced views of power are being produced. For example, 
according to Bemme and D’souza (2014), Kirmayer and Pedersen (2014) and 
Kirmayer (2006), arguments on both sides of the divide are tending to reproduce 
somewhat a reified view of ‘culture’, with very little recognition of the fact that this 
notion has undergone a long history of problematization and reconceptualization, 
including calls for its abandonment as an analytic category. Moreover, these scholars 
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suggest that the debates are generating all sorts of essentialised binary oppositions: 
the biological versus the socio-economic; nature versus culture; pharmacological 
treatments versus psychosocial interventions; global versus local; the universal 
versus the relative; passive critique versus active intervention; the conceptual versus 
pragmatic. As will be revealed in this thesis, the problems with these kinds of rigid 
dichotomies, and the assumptions upon which they are based, has been the subject of 
much critical social theory for many decades now (See for example Craffert, 1997; 
Good, 1994; Law, 2008a; Mol, 2008). 
 
 
We are therefore currently facing an intellectual climate within the international 
mental health arena which is characterised by stark polemics, polarized forms of 
thinking and widespread denunciations of one side versus another. It is indeed 
becoming somewhat difficult for people involved not to take sides, and in taking 
sides, it is hard not to get locked into the constrictive terms of the competing 
perspectives as they are emerging. For example, throughout my PhD research, I 
was frequently asked whether I am ‘for-or-against’ Global Mental Health. So often 
I felt forced to choose, and if I did not, a choice would typically be imputed. 
 
 
In many ways, the terms increasingly shaping current conversations between critics 
and advocates of Global Mental Health echo the early ‘rationality debates’ of the 
 
1970s between universal rationalists and cultural relativists (e.g. Feyerabend, 1987; 
Hollis & Lukes, 1982; Wilson, 1970), as well as the so-called ‘science wars’ of the 
 
1990s between scientific realists and postmodernist critics (Labinger and Collins, 
2001). As various philosophers of science have suggested (Green, 2012; Haack, 
2003; Latour, 2004; Stengers, 2003; 2008), these kinds of epistemological wars 
ultimately became trapped in a hermeneutics of polemics and stark choices, making 
it very difficult for scholars to think outside of the frameworks of established 
positions, canons and criticisms. That is, while the polemics may have been 
productive in propelling debate, they tended to obscure emergent spaces, concepts, 
and fields of inquiry between and beyond divides. And this ultimately set up the 
conditions in which the much-needed discussions of care and nurture and well-being 
were ultimately sabotaged. 
 
 
Thus, when talking about the destructive fallout of the science wars, Isabella 
Stengers (2008) recently called upon academics to stop developing ever cleverer 
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denunciations of one side versus the other, and to open-up a dialogue about an 
ecology of knowledge that might offer researchers a way of moving past damaging 
polarised forms of thinking. Similarly, Susan Haack (2003, p. 201) emphasised that 
 
“there is the need for sociology of knowledge which is neither uncritically deferential 
to the sciences nor uncritically cynical about them, and which, rather than competing 
for control of the territory, cooperates with epistemology to understand the scientific 
enterprise”. Ultimately, ‘cooperating with epistemology’, and ‘opening up a 
dialogue’ about knowledge is exactly where I situate this PhD. 
 
 
Positioning this PhD: A focus on knowledge 
 
 
“So, I think my problem and ‘our’ problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical 
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for 
recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings and a no-nonsense commitment to 
faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world, one that can be partially shared and friendly to earth-wide projects 
of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness”. 
 
(Haraway, 1999, p. 175) 
 
 
My research is thus a knowledge project, an intellectual engagement with the themes 
of epistemology and power. As such, it is situated at the ‘meta-level’, concerned with 
the representational politics of contemporary thinking on the ‘gap’ in mental health 
care in Africa. Work from such a meta-perspective focuses on the processes, 
purposes and theoretical lenses that silently mediate the knowledge outcomes. In 
other words, it is research which is tuned into epistemological questions regarding 
the nature of the knowledge produced, disentangling the power dynamics at play. 
 
 
What I am insisting upon through such a meta-level approach is that knowledge is 
not neutral, but is imbued with power and interests, and that knowledge practices are 
deeply political. Moreover, one of the key starting premises of my research is that our 
underpinning knowledge assumptions have profound consequences. Thus, unlike 
common sentiments amongst many Global Mental Health advocates which tend to 
view work at a more conceptual level as diverting attention away from the hard work 
needed ‘on the ground’, my current research is based upon the assumption that what 
and how we know have significant material effects. Put in a slightly different way, 
my intention through this epistemological project is not to deny ‘the real’. Rather, my 
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research begins from a place which recognises, like many Global Mental Health 
advocates, that mental suffering, for example, is a serious phenomenon in Africa, and 
elsewhere, causing immense pain and claiming many lives and livelihoods 
everywhere. Regardless of the labels and the definitions, there is a ‘dis’ in mental 
distress. 
 
 
And yet how this ‘dis’ is understood and described will also have very real 
repercussions, shaping the kinds of questions that can be asked, and giving practical 
expression to the decisions that are made. In other words, as suggested by Weed 
(1995, 1999), without looking critically at the epistemic grounds of the knowledge 
we produce and the strategies we propose, the solutions implemented may end up 
being inappropriate and ineffective . Possibly even more serious, as various scholars 
have demonstrated (Bowker, 2001, 2005; Haack, 2003; Haraway, 1991; Latour, 
1987, 2004; Swartz, 2012), without a critical engagement with the capillaries of 
power and ideologies implicated (often unknowingly) with the knowledge we 
develop, well-meaning strategies face the danger of oppressing particular people and 
voices. 
 
 
The public health example in Kenya (Minakawa et al, 2008), where bed nets were 
provided to combat malaria, only to find that the villagers were rather using these for 
drying and catching fish, is a classic example of how interventions might end up 
having unintended consequences if they are based upon assumptions which are 
incongruent with the needs and priorities of those they are seeking to help. Another 
pertinent example is the case of HIV/AIDS where, as suggested elsewhere (for 
example Campbell, 2004; Crewe & Aggleton, 2003; Sabatier, 1988; Stillwaggon, 
2003), the uncritical use of racial paradigms when collecting and organizing health 
data in Africa has produced devastatingly racist stereotypes of African people and 
their sexualities The point is then, unless we are aware of our tools and concepts and 
the politics to which they are linked, we will invariably reproduce very real forms of 
power and orthodoxies that potentially censor thought and subjugate people, rather 
than supporting them. Thus, as Donna Haraway (1999, p. 175) so eloquently puts it, 
 
“We need the power of modern critical theories of how meanings and bodies get 
made, not in order to deny meanings and bodies, but in order to live in meanings and 
bodies that have a chance for a future”. 
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My epistemological project is also predicated upon a deep sense of dissatisfaction 
with the historical and contemporary global inequalities underpinning the context of 
knowledge production. That is, like many critics of Global Mental Health, and much 
Postcolonial scholarship more generally (for example Connell, 2007; De Sousa 
Santos et al., 2007; Smith, 1999; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1990), I recognise that there is 
still a tenacious endurance of Eurocentric power, whereby experiences within Africa 
continue to be filtered through an imperial epistemological gaze. The problems and 
consequences of the dominance of this knowledge order will be unpacked in detail in 
Chapters Three and Four. Suffice to say here, I join the long list of Postcolonial 
scholars who are seeking to chip away at the grip of this hegemonic epistemic order. 
As such, my research is based on an ethics and politics that seeks to imagine a more 
democratic epistemological world, one which is not organized by axes of 
domination. 
 
 
And yet at the same time, my research also starts off from a position which is deeply 
concerned with some of the central ways in which scholars are attempting to 
dismantle the continuing dominance of Eurocentric structures of knowledge, 
including in the realm of mental health. That is, as various critical social theorists 
have argued (for example Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995; 1998, Bhabha, 1995; 
Green, 2012; Mbembe, 2002; Odora Hoppers, 2002), there is a strong and 
problematic tendency within Postcolonial and anti-imperialist struggles to challenge 
this hegemony by asserting that Africa has its own unique identities, knowledges and 
practices which are radically different from those of the so-called ‘West’. A project 
of decolonization then, from such a perspective, is about rejecting structures of 
thought that originate from the ‘West’, and at the same time unearthing ‘native 
African’ ways of thinking in their original form. This kind of ‘Afro-centric’ 
perspective indeed features prominently within many critiques of Global Mental 
Health, and their ubiquitous talk of the ‘exportation’ of Western psychiatry and its 
supposed irrelevance for Africa. 
 
 
As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three, such a position tends to be based 
upon an unadulterated, static and monolithic view of ‘Africa’, ultimately devoid of 
outside influence or multiplicity. Ultimately, in seeking to separate myself from this 
kind of perspective, my research is predicated on the necessity of developing theory, 
 
practices and politics which are neither Eurocentric nor Afrocentric. In other words, 
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seek to reimagine the possibilities for scholarly ways of knowing which are not 
necessarily dictated to by the epistemological order of European Colonial Modernity, 
whilst simultaneously recognising that Africa is multiple and dynamic and that there 
is a constant entanglement between knowledges and identities- both ‘local’ and 
 
‘global’. I will term this kind of scholarship ‘Africa-focused’, the nature of which I 
will attempt to articulate in Chapter Three. 
 
 
Aims, objectives and scope 
 
“Knowledge which matters has to be knowledge which is open to its own historicity and spatiality, 
 
and open to alternative ontologies” 
 
(Bowker, 2001, p. 10) 
 
 
The aim of my research is thus to problematize the epistemological assumptions 
underpinning contemporary thinking on the ‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa. 
The specific objectives can therefore be summarised as follows: 
 
 
1. To surface and subject to critique the dominant structures of knowledge 
mediating the production of knowledge on the ‘treatment gap’ in Africa; 
 
2. To explore how theory, policy and attendant practice on the ‘gap’ in 
mental health care in Africa might be rearticulated within a decolonized 
economy of knowledge. 
 
 
As a way into investigating thinking in this area, my research analyses knowledge 
 
produced on the ‘gap’ in mental health care at three specific sites: 
 
 
1. Mental health research in Africa published over the last decade; 
 
2. The national mental health policies of 14 African countries; 
 
3. Narratives of 28 psychiatrists who are all working clinically in public mental 
health care settings in one of four African countries (South Africa, Uganda, 
Ethiopia, or Nigeria). 
 
 
These three sources of knowledge constitute portals into dominant kinds of thinking 
in this area, or what Bowker (2010, p. 146) calls the “formal archive” or “official 
groupthink”. They were chosen because they each possess a considerable amount of 
 
power and influence, as will be described in the next chapter. In sum and taken 
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together, these particular sources of knowledge provide a picture of the central kinds 
of thinking in this area. But inevitably a partial picture. 
 
 
Work at a meta-level requires critical conceptual tools and sharp theoretical 
devices. I therefore developed a conceptual toolbox, one which extracts and 
synthesizes various theoretical concepts commonly used within two broad fields of 
study, namely Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Postcolonial Studies. 
Using the apparatuses from this conceptual toolbox, my analysis of the three 
sources of knowledge was guided by the following broad research questions: 
 
 
1. What kinds of episteme, paradigms and classification systems are 
underpinning the knowledge produced on the ‘gap’ in mental health care? 
 
2. What epistemological assumptions and relations of power are embedded 
in these knowledge structures? 
 
3. What are the socio-economic and political origins of these knowledge 
structures? 
 
4. What alternative and potentially meaningful epistemologies and knowledge 
politics might exist? 
 
 
This research thus focuses on unearthing and interrogating the questionable 
certainties and power dynamics of the dominant structures of knowledge mediating 
thinking on the ‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa. It explores how such thinking 
might be reinforcing (albeit unknowingly) some of the ideologies and matrices of 
power that became embedded in the epistemological order of European Colonial 
Modernity. I will show how knowledge on this ‘treatment gap’ is indeed deeply 
inserted within this dominant epistemological order. In particular, I will reveal how 
such knowledge is being strongly mediated by two particular paradigms of thought, 
those of evidence-based science (including biomedicine) and human rights. Rather 
than rejecting these structures of knowledge outright, I will explore how appropriate 
they might be for thinking about the diverse mental health needs and dilemmas of 
people on the African continent. 
 
 
Whilst focusing on destabilising the stranglehold of certain inherited and Eurocentric 
assumptions, my analysis also searches for, and seeks to harness, potential treasures 
which may lie hidden in the cracks of the dominant epistemological order. That is, it 
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attempts to unpack, and where possible foreground, more marginalised 
epistemologies and knowledge politics, which do not necessarily originate from a 
European Colonial and Modernist form of consciousness. I will show how the 
conceptual resources of ethnographic articulations and critical phenomenology, for 
example, which emerged amongst the softer voices in this research, may embody 
examples of such ‘other’ ways of thinking. I will explore how the more dominant 
knowledge claims might be negating authentic dialogue with these ‘other’ kinds of 
knowledge paradigms and forms of ordering. Ultimately, through my analyses I pose 
questions around how these more marginalised ways of knowing might enable more 
decolonised forms of knowledge on the ‘gap’ in mental health care to grow and 
potentially enter into centres of power and influence. I consistently ask how these 
alternative epistemologies might transform current conversations on the ‘gap’ in 
mental health care in Africa. Ultimately my aim is to raise different aspects of these 
complex questions, rather than to bring them to closure with definitive answers. 
 
 
Thesis structure 
 
 
 
This thesis is structured around a series of peer-reviewed publications and 
interlinking unpublished chapters. After this introduction, in Chapter Two, I describe 
the particular empirical methods that I employed to develop the archive of 
knowledge to be to be analysed. As indicated above, as a way into investigating 
thinking on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa, I chose to look at knowledge 
produced on this topic at three specific sites: 1) Mental health research in Africa 
published over the last decade; 2) The national mental health policies of 14 African 
countries 3) Narratives of a sample of 28 psychiatrists from one of four African 
countries who are all working in public mental health care settings in their respective 
countries. In Chapter Two I unpack the search strategies I used to access the research 
and policies documentary material. I also highlight how a narrative-based approach 
to interviewing was used in order to tap into the thinking on the mental health care 
 
‘treatment gap’ amongst the psychiatrists, the third source of knowledge included in 
my knowledge archive. I describe the collection of stories as a particular method of 
research, along with providing details about who the psychiatrists I interviewed were, 
how I gained access to them and the nature of the interviews that took place. 
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Delving into research on the ‘gap’ in mental health care, it became clear that 
research in this area was divided into two different focuses. The first tended to 
concentrate on the provision of care and how services should be scaled-up so as to 
narrow the ‘gap’ in mental health care. The second placed its attention on the uptake 
of services, or what was commonly referred to as ‘help-seeking behaviour’, and how 
this can be enhanced so as to reduce the ‘gap’ in mental health care. As I explain in 
Chapter Two, my analysis of research on the ‘gap’ in mental health care therefore 
followed this division. In the final chapter, I address this apparent division in 
research focus, and how it may speak to some of the larger issues that are at stake 
with knowledge on this topic. 
 
 
In Chapter Three, I develop the conceptual toolbox that will be used for my 
epistemological project. My toolbox draws upon various concepts commonly used 
within two broad and multidisciplinary fields of study, those of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and Postcolonial Studies. Four concepts form the 
foundation of this toolbox, namely, the notions of an ‘episteme’, a ‘paradigm’, a 
 
‘classification system’ and ‘black-boxing’. Taken together, these concepts enable me 
to identify some of the underpinning structures of knowledge, and understand how 
these structures are socially constructed, exceedingly powerful and yet ultimately 
invisible. I then view these concepts through a Postcolonial space of thinking. This 
serves to ground them within a particular time and space, and thus position the focus 
of my epistemological project in a very specific way. When viewed from such a 
perspective, what one sees is that a particular episteme, and associated paradigms 
and classification system emerged during the era of colonialism and what is 
understood as European modernity. I refer to this as the episteme of European 
Colonial Modernity, and unpack one of the most stubborn and powerful forms of 
classification buried in the ‘black box’ of this episteme. This classification system is 
one which tends to demarcate the social world into homogenous entities and rigid 
binary oppositions. In order to destabilise the continued hegemony of this 
epistemological order, it needs to be rigorously decolonised. Drawing on the ideas of 
 
‘African Modes of Self-Writing’ and ‘Southern Theory’ I delineate the specific kind 
of decolonization I seek to undertake through my research. This is one which 
attempts to shift the privilege granted to Eurocentric forms of meaning-making to 
more ‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship. I explore what I mean by the slippery 
notion of ‘Africa-focused’. That is, the production of knowledge which is centred 
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upon the needs and dilemmas in Africa, whilst simultaneously recognises that 
identities and experiences on the continent are inherently complex and varied. 
 
 
In Chapter Four, I surface and put into historical perspective the epistemological 
assumptions underpinning two key paradigms of thought which are both deeply 
inserted within the episteme of European Colonial Modernity, namely those of 
evidence-based science (including biomedicine) and human rights. I concentrate on 
these particular paradigms because, as will be later revealed, they are strongly 
mediating contemporary knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa. 
 
This chapter therefore provides a historical platform from which to understand this 
knowledge on the ‘gap’ in mental health care. Rather than being self-evident or 
inevitable mappings of the world, these paradigms emerged within a very specific 
social and historical milieu. That is, they arose out of, and provided an ideological 
basis for, many of the socio-economic forms of organization and capillaries of power 
characterizing 17
th
 and 18
th
 century Europe. As such, they share many of the same 
kind of epistemological assumptions, in particular, those of universalism, naturalism, 
objectivity and rationalism. At the same time, these paradigms are underpinned by 
many homogenous entities and stark binary oppositions. I explore how, one of the 
major effects of these assumptions and form of classification, is the way in which 
they tend to occlude ‘other’ ways of thinking and being from entering the formal 
canon of knowledge. 
 
 
Chapters Five to Eight are the analytical chapters of my three knowledge sources, 
that is, the research, the policies and the narrative interviews. These chapters are 
structured as a set of individually published, peer-reviewed journal articles. One 
paper, which is Chapter Five, analyses research on the provision of care and a second 
paper, Chapter Six, explores the other aspect of the ‘gap’ in mental health care, that 
of research on the uptake of services (‘help-seeking behaviour’). The policies 
highlighted both of these components of the ‘gap’, and both aspects emerged as 
prominent themes in the narrative interviews with psychiatrists. I therefore published 
one paper which focuses on the policies, to be found in Chapter Seven, and one 
which concentrates on the psychiatrists’ stories, Chapter Eight. 
 
 
The first paper, currently published in Health: An Interdisciplinary Journal for the 
Social Study of Health, Illness and Medicine, looks critically at research on the 
 
34 
provision of care and its thinking around how services should be scaled-up so as to 
narrow the ‘gap’ in mental health care. Using the concept of a paradigm from my 
conceptual toolbox, I explore how the paradigms of evidence-based science and 
human rights are strongly mediating research in this area. I destabilise the 
epistemological assumptions underpinning these paradigms, shedding light on the 
many questionable and contentious certainties upon which they are based. I show 
how these paradigms, and associated assumptions, are also marginalizing other, 
potentially important ways of thinking about the provision of care in Africa which 
might not originate from European Colonial and Modernist forms of consciousness. 
In this paper I touch on a few examples of critical ethnographic research which 
embody ‘other’ ways of thinking about the provision of care, ways which may lie 
outside of the epistemological codes of evidence-based science and individualised 
human rights. 
 
 
The second paper, currently in press in Transcultural Psychiatry, problematizes 
research on help-seeking behaviour and the thinking around how to increase the 
uptake of services so as to reduce the high levels of untreated mental illness. My 
analysis draws particularly on the concept of a ‘classification system’ from my 
toolbox in order to problematize how the classifications within this research 
contribute to producing the knowledge that they are supposedly designed simply to 
store. I highlight how this research is being mediated by a particular kind of 
classification system, one which demarcates the social world into homogenous 
entities and binary oppositions. As touched upon in Chapter Three, and expanded 
upon in this paper, this is a very powerful system of classification buried in the 
 
‘black box’ of the episteme of European Colonial Modernity. I highlight the 
problems with this form of ordering the world, and associated epistemological 
assumptions. By way of contrast, I explore how two critical ethnographic studies 
confront help-seeking for mental distress in Africa through alternative forms of 
classification, which are neither Eurocentric nor Afrocentric. I pose questions around 
how this kind of research, and associated systems of classification, might transform 
the ways in which we understand how people do, and potentially could, seek support 
for mental illness in Africa. 
 
 
The third paper, currently in press in Disability and the Global South, uses the 
concept of a paradigm from my conceptual toolbox to scrutinise knowledge on the 
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‘gap’ in mental health care- both the provision and uptake of care- produced by the 
14 national mental health policies. To contextualize this analysis, I provide a 
historic-political account of the emergence of the notion of Primary Health Care 
(PHC), and its entanglement within the decolonization forces of the 1960s. I unpack 
how and why this concept was subsequently atrophied within the field of public 
(mental) health, being stripped of its more revolutionary sentiments from the 1980s 
onwards. Against this backdrop, I show how, although the 14 national mental health 
policies are saturated with the rhetoric of Primary Health Care and associated 
concepts of community participation and ownership, in practice they tend to 
marginalize local meaning-systems and endorse a top-down framework heavily 
informed by colonial medicine. The policies thinking around the ‘gap’ in mental 
health care thus end up reproducing many of the very Eurocentric assumptions that 
the original Primary Health Care notion sought to transcend. More specifically, like 
research on the provision of care explored in Chapter Five, the paradigms of 
scientific evidence and human rights become the gatekeepers of knowledge, 
legislating what are legitimate forms of knowing, and by extension, valid forms of 
care. I argue that a greater appreciation of the Primary Health Care concept, in its 
earliest formulation, offers a potentially fruitful terrain of engagement for developing 
more contextually-embedded and epistemologically appropriate mental health 
policies in Africa. 
 
 
The fourth paper, currently in press in Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry provides a 
critical analysis of the narrative-based interviews that I conducted with the 28 
psychiatrists. Again, for my analysis I draw particularly upon the notion of a 
paradigm. I show how dominant thinking amongst the psychiatrists about the 
 
‘treatment gap’- both the provision and uptake of care- was heavily informed by a 
biomedical form of thinking. There were, however, cracks in this master narrative, 
which crystalised in the stories that were told by three particular psychiatrists. I 
explore how their narratives operated within an alternative paradigm, one which 
appeared to be informed by the tradition of phenomenology, and in particular the 
ideas associated with French philosopher Merleau-Ponty. I suggest that this more 
marginalised thinking may offer important insights into reducing the mental health 
 
‘treatment gap’ in Africa in ways very different from those created by current seats 
of power. 
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In Chapter Nine, the final chapter of this thesis, I put the different sources of 
knowledge in conversation with each other, tying together some of the key themes 
which emerged in my separate analyses. Here I discuss how, although there were 
differences between them, the knowledge produced at all of the different locations 
tended to be underpinned by a similar set of meaning-codes and epistemological 
politics, ones which are deeply inserted within the episteme of European Colonial 
Modernity. Across the sources of knowledge analysed there were, however, places 
where the shrill and somewhat singular voice of scholarly authority was at times 
softened by a chorus of more marginalised voices. In this chapter I explore the 
enabling potential of these more marginalised voices for bringing about more 
 
‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship on the ‘gap’ in mental health care on the 
continent. As will be revealed throughout, and pulled together in this chapter, 
developing new and potentially transformative knowledges is, however, a precarious 
endeavour. Therefore, my modest goal in this final chapter is to surface particular 
tensions and resonances and hold them up to the light, with the hope of disturbing 
certain intellectual reflexes and helping to open-up a space for potentially alternative 
kinds of theories, practices and politics. 
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2. THE ARCHIVE OF KNOWEDGE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“A formal archive is the current official groupthink of how things should be…it is 
jussive…deliberately sequential…a bowdlerized, legally aware presentation… But what is told is only 
ever a small subset of that which is relevant. There is a principle of socio-cultural exclusion in every 
act of recall”. 
 
(Bowker, 2010, p. 213/214) 
 
 
In this chapter I describe the empirical methods that I employed to develop my 
archive of knowledge to be analysed for this epistemological project. As a way into 
investigating the thinking on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa, I chose to 
explore, and put into conversation, knowledge produced on this topic at three 
specific sites: 
 
1. Mental health research in Africa published over the last decade; 
 
2. National mental health policies in Africa; 
 
3. Narratives of a selected sample of psychiatrists all working clinically in 
public mental health care settings in Africa. 
 
I envisioned that each of these sources of knowledge would constitute important 
portals into the dominant kinds of thinking in this area, or what Geoffrey Bowker 
 
(2010, p. 146) calls the “formal archive” or “official groupthink”. That is, these three 
sources of knowledge were chosen because I considered them be sites of power and 
influence. In the current ‘evidence-based’ knowledge economy, research is playing an 
increasingly important role in informing policy and practice in the health and social-
related sectors (Evans & Benefield, 2001). That is, with the growing need to ensure 
value for money in relation to measurable outcomes, research is more and more being 
used “to help determine and justify what worked and why, and what types of policy 
initiatives are likely to be most effective” (Clegg, 2005 p. 416). 
 
Similarly, national policies are political pronouncements which constitute the official 
discourse or current received wisdom of the state (Law, 2008b). As Leow (2011, p. 
312), puts it, policy documents tend to “personify the intrinsic, dominant ideologies and 
underlying rules and assumptions in a society”. Finally, Yen and Wilbraham (2003) 
suggest that psychiatrists are relatively high-up in the professional hierarchy 
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of public sector mental health care provision, including in Africa, and thus possess 
immense symbolic, social and material power to regulate and govern 
understandings and practices surrounding mental illness. As Morant (2006, p. 819) 
articulates, psychiatrists are: 
 
 
Society’s ‘practical experts’ charged with the task of deciding who is 
mentally unwell and how they should be treated…Their work transforms 
government policy on care of the mentally ill, and expert theories on the 
treatment of mental health problems into tangible practices that shape the 
lives of clients and their families. 
 
 
My selection of these particular sites of knowledge does not, however, represent an 
exhaustive archive of dominant knowledge in this area. Many other sources could 
have been chosen, which might have provided alternative sorts of windows and 
different kinds of pictures. The sources of knowledge included in this project are 
therefore inevitably specific and partial. But my hope is that my analyses of them 
are strong and detailed enough to offer insights that may be of a wider significance 
than the particular. In what follows, I describe the various procedures I undertook to 
develop each of these three specific sources of knowledge. 
 
 
Knowledge source one: Mental health research in Africa over the last decade 
 
 
 
The first source of knowledge I chose to incorporate in my knowledge archive was 
research, which has been published over the last decade, on the mental health 
 
‘treatment gap’ in Africa. Obtaining textual material is not as difficult as negotiating 
access to people. Texts cannot withhold consent or fail to keep appointments. This is 
not to say that compiling an archive of documentary material is uncomplicated. A 
systematic and transparent approach is needed. I began my search by looking broadly 
at the websites of key organisations known to be working in the areas of Global 
Mental Health. These included: 
 
The Movement for Global Mental 
Health
5
; World Federation of Mental 
Health
6
; World Psychiatric Association
7
; 
 
5 http://www.globalmentalhealth.org  
6 http://www.wfmh.org/ 
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World Health Organization’s Evidence Resource Centre
8
; 
 
International Observatory on Mental Health Systems
9
; 
 
Society for the Study of Psychiatry and Culture
10
; 
 
Centre for Public Mental Health
11
; 
 
Centre for Global Mental Health
12 
 
Mental Health Innovation Network
13
. 
 
 
I also scanned journals which I knew had produced special issues on Global Mental 
Health research. These included series in the Lancet (2007)
14
, (2011)
15
; Harvard 
Review of Psychiatry (2012)
16
; PLOS Medicine (2009)
17
; Revista Brasileira de 
Psiquiatria (2010)
18
; and International Health (2013)
19
. Furthermore, I conducted 
on-line searches in Medline and PsychInfo databases using the very broad phrases: 
 
“mental disorders”, “mental health”, “Africa” (including the names of all individual 
countries on the continent), and “treatment gap”. Where applicable, keywords were 
combined with Medical Subject Headings for the Medline databases and Subject 
Headings for the PsycINFO database. 
 
 
From these searches I accumulated a wealth of published research on the mental 
health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa. I spent some time reading through these articles, and 
immersing myself in the kinds of themes that were materialising. What very quickly 
emerged was that research was divided into two main focuses. As I explained in 
Chapter One, the first concentrated on the inadequate availability of mental health 
care services, and the consequent need for the widespread scale-up of services. Thus, 
here the emphasis was on the provision of care, and how such scale-up should be 
operationalised so as to narrow the ‘gap’ in mental health care. The second major 
focus of research on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ centred on the uptake of 
 
7 http://www.wpanet.org  
8 http://www.who.int/mental_health/mhgap/evidence/en/index.html  
9 http://www.cimh.unimelb.edu.au/iomhs  
10 http://psychiatryandculture.org/  
11 http://www.cpmh.org.za/  
12 http://www.centreforglobalmentalhealth.org/  
13 http://mhinnovation.net/  
14 http://www.thelancet.com/series/global-mental-health  
15 http://www.thelancet.com/series/global-mental-health-2011  
16 http://informahealthcare.com/toc/hrp/20/1  
17 http://www.ploscollections.org/article/browse/issue/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fissue.pcol.v07.i06  
18 http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_issuetoc&pid=1516-444620100003&lng=en&nrm=iso  
19 http://inthealth.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/1.toc 
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services, or what was commonly referred to as ‘help-seeking behaviour’, and what 
was seen as the significant underutilization of mental health care services. Thus, here 
the emphasis was on how to increase the uptake of services so as to reduce the high 
levels of untreated mental illness. This split in focus suggested that I needed to 
explore each of these specific focus-areas further. Thus, in order to identify 
additional research related to the provision of care, I performed on-line searches in 
Medline and PsychInfo databases using the key phrases: “mental disorders” OR 
“mental health” OR psychiatr* AND “Africa” (including the names of all individual 
countries on the continent) AND “scaling up” OR “care” OR “service” OR 
“treatment” OR “system”. As before, where applicable, keywords were combined 
with Medical Subject Headings for the Medline databases and Subject Headings for 
the PsycINFO database. 
 
 
In order to identify additional research on the uptake of care, I conducted on-line 
searches in Medline and PsychInfo databases using the key phrases: “mental 
disorders” OR “mental health” OR psychiatr* AND “Africa” (including the names of 
all individual countries on the continent) AND “help seeking behaviour” OR “health 
care seeking behaviour” OR “help seek*” OR “seek* help” OR “seek* treatment” 
OR “health care access” OR “health care utilization” OR “service uptake” OR 
“treatment uptake” OR “treatment barriers”. In both cases, the reference lists of all 
applicable papers were scanned to identify further potentially relevant studies, and I 
contacted the authors of various papers and enquired whether they knew of any other 
studies in the area. In addition, I got in touch with people known to be working in the 
field of Global Mental Health and asked if they could provide me with any relevant 
references. Some of the papers I found by serendipity. 
 
 
My accumulation of relevant research was also facilitated by the fact that between 
September 2011 and February 2015 I was appointed as Website Manager for the 
Centre for Global Mental Health
20
, a collaborative initiative between the London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) and the Institute of Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Neuroscience (IoPPN) at Kings College London (KCL). The 
primary aim of the Centre is to foster research, advocacy and capacity building in the 
policy, prevention and care of mental disorders in low-and-middle-income countries. 
 
 
20
 http://www.centreforglobalmentalhealth.org 
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My role within the Centre was to manage and update its website, which involved 
uploading relevant news and events, as well as keeping the resource databases up to 
date. As the designated point of contact, the Centre’s Management and Steering-
group teams and extended networks were encouraged to email me whenever they 
published new research or gained access to relevant Global Mental Health articles 
and reports. Ultimately, my role within the Centre was invaluable for the 
development and accumulation of my knowledge archive, as I was consistently sent 
relevant articles. 
 
 
The building of my research archive took place over a three year period. Although I 
conducted my formal searches of the online databases between January 2012 and 
June 2012, I continually added to and updated my expanding archive. A list of all the 
research included in my knowledge archive is provided in appendices four and five. 
In accumulating this archive of research, I was as ‘methodical’ and ‘explicit’ as 
possible throughout. And yet, the process of finding relevant research in this area 
was filled with unexpected twists and turns. It was thus characterised by an 
inherently iterative and flexible process, whereby new studies were uncovered which 
frequently pointed to new avenues. Some of these I ventured down, whilst others I 
did not. My search strategies always involved long chains of choices- which search 
terms to use, which databases to investigate, which inclusion/exclusion criteria to use 
and which areas to investigate further. 
 
 
Ultimately, my objective was not to undertake a ‘systematic review’, a particular 
kind of methodology that has gained increased popularity with the public health 
sciences. As suggested by Mullen and Ramírez (2006) and Rosen et al. (2010), such 
an approach erroneously assumes it possible to obtain an objective and exhaustive 
summary of all the ‘evidence’ that is ‘out there’. Taking heed of this critique, my aim 
was thus to collect a wide body of material which could provide a picture of the main 
kinds of research being conducted on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa. 
 
By triangulating my search methods and reaching a level of theoretical saturation 
(Willig, 2001), I am confident that collectively the material accumulated has enabled 
me to develop a good picture. But also a partial one, with inevitable gaps and 
omissions. 
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Knowledge source two: Contemporary national mental health policies 
 
 
 
The second source of knowledge I included was national mental health policies in 
Africa. I had thought that accessing these policies would be a relatively easy task. I 
was proved wrong. After a week of performing Google searches and scanning 
Government websites, it became clear that national mental health policies on the 
African continent are not readily available in the public domain. I therefore emailed 
Dr. Sebastiana Da Gama, the then Director of the World Health Organization’s 
 
(WHO) African Regional Office, to enquire whether the WHO had a database of 
national policies on the continent. After receiving no responses to my three ‘friendly 
reminder’ emails, I phoned her, where she informed me that the WHO does not have 
access to these policies. She indicated that obtaining them would ultimately require 
negotiating directly with the Ministries of Health in each country. She also provided 
me with a link to the WHO Mental Health Atlas (WHO, 2011), a document which 
stipulates which African countries had an officially approved mental health policy in 
2010. I was somewhat surprised that the WHO did not have these policies at their 
disposal, given that this organization has published a number of analyses on the 
nature of mental health policies in Africa, and how they can be improved (See WHO, 
2003; 2009 for examples of such analyses). 
 
 
The WHO (2011) Mental Health Atlas indicated that 19 African countries had a 
mental health policy in 2010. See Table 1 below for a list of these countries. I 
decided to focus on accessing these particular policies. I realised that the contacts I 
had made during my previous job as a researcher on the Mental Health and Poverty 
project (MHaPP)
21
 might prove helpful in this regard. As described in Chapter One, 
I was involved in the qualitative component of this project, which entailed 
conducting and analysing in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in mental health 
care in South Africa, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia. My role on this project thus 
provided me with key professional links, including with individuals working within 
the various Ministries of Health in Africa. 
 
 
I therefore emailed, and followed up with many phone calls, the relevant contacts I 
had, and asked whether they could help me with accessing their own and other 
 
21
 http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Project/50165/ 
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national policies on the African continent. Such communications spanned over a 
year, with my frequently pursuing a long sequence of referrals and extended links. I 
spent many hours phoning Ministries of Health in different African countries, where 
frequently I was transferred back-and-forth to different departments and individuals. 
Often the phone connection was lost, and the process needed to be started all over 
again from scratch. I was consistently struck by how, in many cases, the Government 
health officials I spoke to knew that they had a mental health policy, but were 
unaware of how to retrieve a copy. In certain instances, when the policy was located, 
it did not exist in electronic form, and thus needed to be photocopied and posted to 
me as a hard copy. On some occasions, the policy arrived in the mail, but on other 
occasions it did not. I often wonder, for example, whether Botswana’s policy, which 
was supposedly posted to me twice, is still floating through the postal system on its 
journey to London. Moreover, I still marvel at my hard copy of Zambia’s policy, 
which is apparently one of the few copies that exist and which was kindly couriered 
to me in South Africa. This relative unawareness of, and associated difficulties 
around obtaining, the policies raises all sorts of questions around their real meaning, 
and the degree of ownership local governments really had in their development. I 
touch on these issues in my analysis of these policies in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
My attempts at accessing these policies took place between December 2011 and 
January 2013, during which time I was able to obtain 12 policies out of the total 19 
African countries which had one in 2010 according to the WHO’s 2011 Mental 
Health Atlas. Four of these policies (Nigeria’s, Rwanda’s, South Africa’s and 
Uganda’s) were revised post-2010, and these updated versions were emailed to me 
by the various contacts I had made through my initial investigative attempts. In 
addition, in 2012 both Ethiopia and Sierra Leone approved their first national mental 
health policy. One of my contacts in Ghana, who knew I was collecting these 
policies, emailed both of them to me in January 2013. I am unaware if other 
countries, which did not have a policy in 2010, have had one approved since then. 
Thus, in total, my archive of national mental health policies on the African continent 
comprises those of 14 countries: Ethiopia (2012); Gambia (2007); Ghana (1996) 
Lesotho (2005); Liberia (2009); Namibia (2005); Nigeria (2011); Rwanda (2012) 
Sierra Leone (2012); South Africa (2013); Tanzania (2006); Uganda (2011); Zambia 
(2005); Zimbabwe (2004). 
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Table 1: African countries which had a mental health policy in 2010 according 
 
to the WHO (2011) Mental Health Atlas 
 
 
Country Date approved 
  
Algeria* 2009 
Botswana* 2003 
Democratic Republic of Congo* 1999 
Gambia 2007 
Ghana 1996 
Guinea* 2000 
Lesotho 2005 
Liberia 2009 
Madagascar* 2005 
Mauritania* 2005 
Namibia 2005 
Nigeria 1991 and revised in 2011 
Rwanda 1995 and revised in 2012 
Senegal* 2006 
South Africa 1997 and revised in 2013 
Uganda 2000 and revised in 2011 
United Republic of Tanzania 2006 
Zambia 2006 
Zimbabwe 2004 
 
 
* indicates those policies I was unable to access 
 
 
As reflected in this table, I was unable to access the policies of 7 countries which, 
according to the WHO, had one in 2010. These include those from Algeria, Botswana, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania and Senegal. For 
various primarily linguistical and practical reasons, my numerous attempts to obtain 
these policies, ultimately failed. As part of my role as Website Manager for Centre for 
Global Mental, I was tasked with compiling a database of past and current Global 
Mental Health projects in Africa
22
. From this work, it became clear that the 14 
countries whose policies I was able to access were all involved in at least one major 
Global Mental Health project. In many cases, the development of these policies were in 
fact embedded within these research projects, forming an integral part of the projects’ 
interventions. From what I could see, with the exception of Botswana and Guinea, the 
other five countries whose policies I was unable to access did not have a significant 
Global Mental Health presence and did 
 
22
 A selection of these projects are provided here: 
http://www.centreforglobalmentalhealth.org/projects 
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not have any large-scale mental health project taking place. Might the mental health 
policies from these countries be qualitatively different from those I was able to 
access? Would their inclusion in my archive of knowledge have produced a slightly 
different picture of policy thinking? Sadly, these questions can only be posed, 
ultimately remaining unanswered in this thesis. 
 
 
Knowledge source three: Psychiatrists’ narratives 
 
 
 
The third and final source of knowledge included in my archive was in-depth, 
individual interviews with psychiatrists all working clinically in public mental health 
care settings in Africa. For these interviews, I used a narrative-based approach in 
order hear their stories about the ‘gap’ in mental health care. In Chapter Eight, where 
I analyse these stories, I unpack in detail the theoretical underpinnings, and 
associated assumptions, of a narrative-based form of enquiry. I will not repeat these 
details here. Rather, in this chapter I focus on providing details about who these 
psychiatrists were (whilst preserving anonymity), how I gained access to them and 
the setting and nature of the interviews that took place. 
 
 
Recruitment and sampling 
 
 
 
In total, I interviewed 28 psychiatrists, comprising 19 men and 9 women. Eighteen of 
these I knew personally and contacted initially by email, whilst the remaining ten 
psychiatrists interviewed I recruited through snow-balling techniques (Kvale, 1996). 
As with the policies, gaining access to psychiatrists was facilitated by my previous 
work with the Mental Health and Poverty (MHaPP) project. As mentioned above, 
through this project I developed professional links with various mental health care 
stakeholders, including psychiatrists, working in the public mental health care sector 
in Africa. I made a list of, and then contacted via email, all of the psychiatrists I 
knew of (21 in total), and asked whether they would be willing to be interviewed as 
part of my research. I was struck by the quick responses I received from the majority 
of psychiatrists I emailed, with so many of them telling me how happy they were that 
I got in touch and how delighted they would be to be interviewed. Remarkably, 18 of 
the 21 psychiatrists I initially contacted agreed to be interviewed. I did not hear back 
from 3 of the psychiatrists I emailed, despite two follow-up emails. I do not know 
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why they never replied, and whether they might have told different kinds of stories 
and provided alternative sorts of insights. 
 
 
Many of the psychiatrists I emailed initially also spontaneously provided me with the 
names and details of other individuals who might be willing to be interviewed and 
who they thought I should contact. The friendly and helpful responses I got 
immediately made me feel uneasy, as given the critical lens of my research, I worried 
that they might be somewhat unaware of what, exactly, they were signing-up for. 
Indeed, many of the psychiatrists emphasised in our correspondences how the issue 
of the ‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa is a really important and pressing matter, 
and how “fantastic” it was that I was focusing on this topic. Would they have had 
such positive sentiments if they had known more clearly the nature of my research? 
Was I deceiving them? 
 
 
During my email correspondence with one of the Ethiopian psychiatrists, she 
mentioned that a mental health conference was taking place in Addis Ababa. She 
explained that a number of psychiatrists from the African continent would be 
attending, and wondered whether I wished to join. I realised that this would provide a 
unique opportunity for me to interview some psychiatrists in person, many of whom 
I had already been in contact with via email. I therefore attended the 4-day 
conference, and was able to interview a number of psychiatrists in person in Addis 
Ababa. 
 
 
Certain characteristics of the psychiatrists are shown in Table 2. Given the small 
number of psychiatrists in Africa, as outlined below, I have not provided the names 
of the specific hospitals where they worked in order to ensure anonymity. The 
commonality between the psychiatrists was that they were all working in 
Government-funded, public sector and urban-based mental health facilities. 
Furthermore, all of the psychiatrists were African nationals. Seven of the 
psychiatrists had undertaken their psychiatric training in Europe, 5 in the United 
States with the rest having obtained their training in Africa. The psychiatrists from 
South African were all based in Cape Town, those from Uganda were situated in 
Kampala, the Nigerian psychiatrists were all working in Lagos and those from 
Ethiopia were all located in Addis Ababa. Eighteen of the psychiatrists worked in 
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standalone psychiatric hospitals, while the rest were based in psychiatric units 
located in general hospitals or clinic-based settings. 
 
 
The sample of psychiatrists is specific and small, from particular countries on the 
continent- South Africa, Uganda, Ethiopia and Nigeria. All four of these countries 
had a national mental health policy and a relatively large proportion of research on 
the mental health ‘treatment gap’ came out of these countries (as seen in Appendices 
four and five). As such, I anticipated that speaking to psychiatrists in these particular 
countries would aid my comparison of the different sources of knowledge. I also 
focused on these particular countries as I had considerable contacts and connections 
with people working within mental health care in these settings. Rather than being 
viewed as a limitation, this prior familiarity may have contributed to the 
psychiatrists’ tendency to open up and provide rich and detailed stories. Indeed, 
story-telling as a specific research methodology has been found to be particularly 
productive when a relationship between ‘interviewer’ and ‘interviewee’ exists before 
proceeding with the formal interview process (Kvale, 1996; Willig, 2001). 
 
 
The relatively small size of this sample must, however, be viewed in the light of the 
paucity of psychiatrists available in Africa. Current available estimates indicate that 
there are only 22 practicing psychiatrists in Uganda (Kigosi et.al 2010); 40 in 
Ethiopia (Ethiopian MoH 2012) and fewer than 100 in Nigeria (Issa 2005). The 
availability of public sector psychiatrists in South Africa is relatively higher, with 
estimates that there are approximately 0.28 psychiatrists per 100 000 population 
(Lund et.al 2009). With all of this said, however, I do not wish to suggest that the 
views expressed by the psychiatrists included in my research characterise the 
sentiments of all psychiatrists in these four countries, let alone the continent as a 
whole. The stories that were told were specific and local, about particular sites and 
situations. However this does not mean that their significance is necessarily restricted 
to the local. As Mol (2008) and Turnbull (2000) found when using stories as a form 
of knowledge production, it is somewhat paradoxically because of their specificity 
and attention to detail that stories have the power to travel, to offer wider insights 
that may be transported to other contexts. 
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Table 2: Demographic details of the psychiatrists 
 
Characteristic Number 
  
Country  
South Africa (Cape Town) 8 
Ethiopia (Addis Ababa) 7 
Nigeria (Lagos) 7 
Uganda (Kampala) 6 
  
Sex  
Male 19 
Female 9 
  
Ethnicity  
Black 22 
White 6 
  
Place of work  
Standalone psychiatric hospital 18 
Psychiatric unit in a general hospital/clinic 10 
  
Place obtained psychiatric training  
Africa 16 
USA 5 
Europe 7 
  
 
 
Interview settings 
 
 
 
The interviews with the psychiatrists took place in one of three locations- in their offices at 
the hospitals where they worked, in the lounge of the hotel where I was staying during my 
time in Addis Ababa or on the phone. Initially I had been concerned about the public and 
somewhat casual setting of the hotel lounge. However, very quickly this proved to be 
useful, as I think the relaxed environment of the hotel lounge, usually accompanied by 
strong Ethiopian coffee, helped the psychiatrists to talk more freely. In fact, interviewing 
people in naturally occurring and informal settings has been found to increase their 
tendency to open-up and share rich details about their lives (Kvale, 1996; Willig, 2001). 
Similarly, I had been concerned that conducting interviews on the phone would not 
provide the best medium for story-telling, as it has been suggested that this interview 
modality frequently leads to less honest and in-depth forms of discussion (for example 
Kvale, 1996; Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). I came to appreciate, however, that the phone 
might in actual fact create a kind of barrier, a space of face-less distance, or what Trier- 
 
Bieniek (2012, p. 642) refers to as the “sense of anonymity involved with virtual 
conversation” (See also Block & Erskine, 2012; Mealer & Jones, 2014). Somewhat ironically 
then, talking on the phone may have helped the psychiatrists feel comfortable to 
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talk in what emerged as very personal and candid ways. Moreover, these phone-calls 
usually occurred at the weekend or in the evenings, when the psychiatrists were away from 
their daily pressures and demands. This too may have helped create a space for the 
psychiatrists to feel more relaxed and willing to share information. Having previously met 
most of these psychiatrists in person meant that a degree of familiarity and rapport had 
already been established prior to the interview, and thus the ‘getting to know you’ kinds of 
conversations could be avoided. Ultimately, some of the longest and richest interviews I 
had were with those psychiatrists who I interviewed on the phone. 
 
 
Whilst in Addis Ababa, I was included in all of the conference dinners and group-tours of 
the city, where I took part in many informal conversations with the psychiatrists attending 
the conference. This provided me with invaluable additional insights into some of their 
thinking. But I was also plagued with a constant sense of unease, always feeling as if I 
was an under-cover spy. I sweated profusely through-out my time in Addis Ababa, 
probably a combination of the relentless heat and my persistent anxiety. 
 
 
For the interviews that took place in hospital settings, I ended up spending a considerable 
amount of time waiting for the interview to begin. Most of the psychiatrists were delayed 
for our scheduled interview time, and in Ethiopia, often by over two hours. In fact, I learnt 
that time operates differently in Ethiopia, possibly a result of the fact that the country is 
structured around, simultaneously, two different time/date systems, one international and 
one local. I thus ended up spending much time soaking up the energy of the various 
hospitals, which so often left me feeling uneasy. I was again and again struck by the 
extreme poverty, the dire infrastructure and the severe forms of physical and mental 
disability I saw. The dull stares and whisperings from the various patients I briefly crossed 
paths with always made me very uncomfortable. In one of the hospitals in Addis Ababa, I 
was consistently unnerved by the regular power cuts which were always accompanied by 
fire alarms ringing and piercing yelling, doctors and patients alike. In fact, after my first 
interview at one of the psychiatric hospitals in South Africa, I felt nauseous and struggled 
to concentrate. I wondered how I was going to endure this process, and I deliberated about 
whether an epistemological project such as mine was properly engaging with these 
impenetrable material realities. But after that first day I became somewhat de-sensitised, 
with my experiences and concerns somewhat stabilising in my psyche. I wondered about 
the extent to which the psychiatrists I spoke to had also become inured in some way, 
 
maybe as a way of coping. 
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Accessing the stories 
 
 
In order to tap into these psychiatrists’ thinking on the mental health ‘treatment gap’, 
 
I employed a narrative-based approach to interviewing. As will be explored in detail 
in Chapter Eight, such a method of enquiry is based on the premise that stories are 
socially-embedded, primary meaning-making structures. Proceeding from this view, 
the objective of the interviews was to elicit stories or ‘whatever comes to mind’. I 
began each interview by indicating that I was interested in their understandings of 
why people who need mental health care may or may not be getting the care that they 
need. I provided a two-page hand-out (See appendix one) summarising the nature 
and aims of the study, and a form for them to give their consent to participate in the 
study (See appendix two). Those whom I interviewed in person signed the form, and 
I emailed the forms to those I interviewed on the phone for them to read, and before 
beginning they provided verbal consent. In all cases, I made it clear that they were 
under no obligation to participate and could terminate the interview at any point. I 
also assured them of confidentiality and anonymity, and gained permission to audio-
record the sessions. 
 
 
I asked extremely broad and open-ended questions which were structured as 
 
‘narrativised’ topics or story-telling invitations (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000). These 
questions included, for example, if they could describe how they came to be working 
at the hospital, what a typical day involves, what sorts of challenges they face, what 
kinds of patients they are currently seeing and have seen in the past, incidents with 
patients they found challenging, positive and/or memorable and any other things they 
wanted to talk about (See appendix three for the loose interview guide used). Where 
thoughts were expressed in somewhat general or abstract terms, I tried to anchor 
these to specific incidents which had actually happened, urging the psychiatrists to 
describe examples from their daily experiences. Throughout the interviews, I created 
spaces for extended turns and associative shifts in topic, encouraging one story to 
lead to others even if they appeared to be non-linear, partial and fragmentary. I ended 
up asking very few of the questions that I had devised prior to the exchanges, with 
the majority of psychiatrists telling long stories in response to a few brief questions. I 
was consistently struck by the psychiatrists’ tendency to open up and provide rich 
and detailed stories, with each interview lasting between 1½ hours to 4 hours. Each 
interview thus took on a life of its own, characterized by a continual elaboration of 
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the themes and ideas that they presented in their own accounts. This was important as 
 
I felt that I was gaining access to the participants’ own meaning frames, as we 
followed their own associative trails and unfolding logic (Riessman 2008). 
 
 
In addition to the issues that I have already mentioned, the psychiatrists’ tendency to 
be forthcoming may also have been facilitated by the fact that I was a PhD student, 
which created a unique interview dynamic between us. Many of the psychiatrists 
were supervising their own Masters and PhD students, and I frequently felt as if they 
positioned themselves as ‘the educator’ and me as ‘the student’. This allowed me to 
ask for very detailed descriptions and explanations, as I was ‘authentically the 
learner’. Consider the following exchanges: 
 
Psychiatrists: You see, a lot of people are aware of the problem, but are just not 
doing anything about it….But I think it’s the whole bystander thing. 
 
Sara: bystander thing? 
 
 
Psychiatrist: I’m sure you came across this term in social psychology, maybe in your 
undergraduate years? Anyway, how I like to explain it to my students…is that…You 
really should look into this concept as it could be very useful for your research… 
 
Another interview exchange ended as follows: 
 
 
Psychiatrists: So how many other psychiatrists are you planning on interviewing? 
 
 
Sara: I’m hoping to interview maybe about 30 psychiatrists in total. 
 
 
Psychiatrists: Wow. That is a lot. I don’t know much about the kind of methodology 
you are using, but I imagine you might find it is very scattered, with people going all 
over the place…and very broad kinds of themes coming up…my colleagues and I 
actually recently did some more qualitative-type research and we found it very useful 
to…I’d be happy to show you some of our stuff… 
 
 
Thus, as reflected in these two excerpts, many of the psychiatrists perceived me as a 
kind of colleague, but particularly, a more junior colleague, one whom they could 
 
‘teach’ and ‘show’ things. If I did not comprehend something, frequently they took the 
time to explain it to me slowly and meticulously, using examples from their lives 
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so that I properly understood. Ultimately, this was very helpful for obtaining details 
and example-rich narratives, which proved significant for making sense of their 
thinking. I transcribed all of the interviews myself in full. After each interview, and 
during my time in Addis Ababa, I also performed intensive journaling, jotting down 
some of my post-interview thoughts and observations. I would regularly consult 
these journal entries, noting issues that needed to be followed up in future interviews. 
 
 
A note on ethics 
 
 
 
Formal ethical approval to conduct my research was obtained from both the London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine’s [Ethics reference no. 6310] and the 
University of Cape Town’s [Ethics reference no. 162/2013] ethical review boards, 
and my research adhered to all formal research ethics practices. And yet in unveiling 
the epistemological politics embedded in the knowledge produced, I fear I have not 
done justice to the multifaceted identities the researchers, policy-makers and 
psychiatrists have, and the difficult circumstances in which they work and seek to 
improve. Through the stories I was told by the psychiatrists, I was consistently 
moved by the amount of time and energy these psychiatrists put into trying to help 
their patients. And spending time in the various hospitals, I was made acutely aware 
of how they are attempting to do this within dire contexts characterised by minimal 
resources and limited support structures. Similarly, many of the researchers whose 
works I have included I know personally and have even worked with on previous 
occasions. I am always struck by how many of them have a genuine and relentless 
desire to improve the lives of those with mental health problems in Africa and 
elsewhere. Ultimately, whilst writing, and reading through this thesis, I have been 
plagued by feelings of guilt. In taking a critical approach to this research, I have not 
meant to trivialize or demonize who these individuals are, and the work that so many 
of them tirelessly do. At the same time, however, I have not been able to ignore the 
many meaning-codes that lurked in the shadows of the stories I heard and texts I 
read, ones which were implicated with particular forms of power. Holding these 
shadows up to the light is ultimately a slippery ethical and political endeavour, one 
which carries both perils and possibilities. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Research is a messy business that often involves a great deal of improvisation and 
continual reassessment. Adequately capturing this ‘mess’ is not easy, and largely 
discouraged when writing research methodologies. Indeed, when talking about the 
prevailing preoccupation with “methodological cleanliness”, John Law (2004, p. 3) 
articulates: 
 
 
Sometimes I think of it as a form of hygiene. Do your methods properly. Eat 
your epistemological greens. Wash your hands after mixing with the real 
world. Then you will lead the good research life. Your data will be clean. 
Your findings warrantable. The product you will produce will be pure. 
Guaranteed to have a long shelf-life. 
 
This research project was far from clean: Policies never arrived; search strategies for 
documentary material consistently changed; phones played up; tape-recorder 
batteries went dead; interviews were delayed or rescheduled or even cancelled; and 
many tricky ethical and personal concerns emerged and were never quite resolved. 
 
Writing about ‘what I did’ after these were done has made things appear a lot more 
ordered and planned. They were not. However, a consistent set of research practices 
has endured through this project, practices that involve the methodical and 
transparent collection of information, deep reading and adaptation of theoretical 
concepts and texts, and intense reflection on purposes and interests, both my own and 
others. 
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 3. THE CONCEPTUAL TOOLBOX 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“Only by making the rules of the playground visible and negotiable might myriad ways of seeing, 
 
knowing and being be able to bloom” 
 
(Bowker, 2001, p. 10) 
 
 
As I have been describing, this research is concerned with the production of 
knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa. It is thus an 
epistemological project, focused on problematizing the nature of the knowledge 
produced in this area. A knowledge project such as this is therefore less concerned 
with the actual content of an area of interest, and more on the deep knowledge 
assumptions that mediate the way in which problems get framed and solutions get 
determined. Ultimately, it is research which is tuned into epistemological questions 
regarding the conventions of meaning-making that lie behind the knowledge that is 
produced, disentangling the power dynamics at play. 
 
 
In this chapter I develop a conceptual toolbox for this task, one which extracts and 
synthesizes various theoretical resources being used widely within two broad fields 
of study, namely Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Postcolonial Studies. 
STS is an interdisciplinary field which is informed by a range of theories and 
standpoints, inter alia Wittgensteinian philosophy, post-structuralism, Foucauldian 
critical theory, symbolic interactionism, semiotics, feminist epistemology, actor 
network theory amongst many others (Bauchspies et al. 2006; Labinger & Collins, 
2001; Pinch, 2001; Restivo, 1995). The intellectual landscape of this field is thus 
inherently varied, comprising a number of diverse theoretical and methodological 
positions. However, as suggested by various scholars (Biagioli, 1999; Bauchspies et 
al. 2006; Bowden, 1995; Callon, 1995; Hackett et al., 2008; Law, 2008a; Sismondo, 
2004), a common thread that holds the fabric of STS together is a unified concern 
with the representational politics of scientific knowledge and practice. That is, there 
is a shared focus on the social, historical, political, economic, cultural and/or material 
foundations of science, including medical science. Indeed, a number of scholars have 
looked critically at the medical sciences from a STS perspective (for example Berg & 
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Mol, 1998; Casper & Berg, 1995; Elston, 1997; Levine, 2012; Mol, 2008, 2002; Mol 
et al., 2010; Moser, 2005; Stengers, 2008), and others have focused specifically on 
the mental health sciences (for example Moser, 2008; Pols, 2004; Stengers, 2003). 
 
 
Postcolonial Studies is likewise a multi-disciplinary intellectual enterprise that has a 
similar interest in the basis of knowledge structures and the representational work 
that knowledge does. However, this field tends to anchor such a concern to a 
particular set of historical power struggles and their geopolitical consequences. 
More specifically, Postcolonial Studies seeks to problematize the unequal relations 
between the geopolitical North and South that were historically construed by 
European colonialism and modernity (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995, 1998; De 
Sousa Santos et al., 2007; Moore-Gilbert, 1997; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1990). The field 
thus directs its critique towards the relationship between colonisers and colonised, 
and the epistemological and cultural effects this relationship have had on the 
production of knowledge (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995, 1998). Like STS, 
various scholars have engaged with the medical sciences through a Postcolonial lens 
(for example Butchart, 1998; Comaroff, 1993; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1992; King, 
2002), including the mental health sciences in particular (for example Barrett, 1996; 
Fanon, 1963; Holdstock, 2000; McCulloch, 1995; Swartz, 1986; 1998; Vaughan, 
1991). 
 
 
Despite the overlapping interests of these two fields, according to various scholars 
(Anderson, 2002; Anderson & Adams, 2008; Harding, 1998; McNeil, 2005), they 
have thus far sustained somewhat of a limited formal engagement with each other. 
There have been a few recent attempts to put these two intellectual traditions in 
dialogue with each other. For example, two special issues (Anderson, 2002; McNeil, 
2005) have been published recently in an effort to outline what they refer to as 
 
“postcolonial technoscience”. This has been defined as research which is tuned into 
 
“both the impact and legacies of formally deposed imperial regimes and to new 
forms of exploitative global relations…and the importance of acknowledging such 
relations in the context of STS” (McNeil, 2005, p. 107). Thus, proceeding from this 
view, I attempt to undertake a careful and in-depth conversation between these two 
fields of study. Ultimately, it is hoped that this will provide a potentially productive 
intellectual space for engaging with the nature of knowledge on the mental health 
 
‘treatment gap’ from the perspective of Africa. 56 
Four concepts form the core of my conceptual toolbox, namely, those of an 
 
‘episteme’, ‘paradigm’, ‘classification system’ and ‘black box’. These concepts have 
been defined in varying ways and used within a number of different contexts within 
both STS and Postcolonial studies. I thus describe how I will use these concepts, 
particularly in relation to each other, and articulate how they might usefully buttress 
one another. I explore how taken together, they enable one to identify some of the 
underpinning structures of knowledge, and understand how these structures are 
socially constructed, exceedingly powerful and yet ultimately invisible. 
 
 
I then view these concepts through a Postcolonial space of thinking, which serves to 
ground them within a particular time and space, and thus position the focus of my 
epistemological project in a very specific way. That is, one which seeks to contribute 
towards decolonising the episteme of European Colonial Modernity. I draw upon the 
ideas of ‘African Modes of Self-Writing’ and ‘Southern Theory’ in order to articulate 
the specific kind of decolonization I seek to undertake through my research. This is 
one which aims to shift the privilege granted to Eurocentric forms of meaning-
making to more ‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship. I define what I mean by the 
slippery notion of ‘Africa-focused’. That is, scholarship which is centred upon the 
needs and dilemmas in Africa, whilst simultaneously recognises that identities and 
experiences and knowledges on the continent, as with elsewhere, are complex and 
heterogeneous. 
 
 
The underpinning structures of knowledge: Episteme, paradigms, classification 
 
systems and black boxes 
 
 
“…And what of the left handers in the world of right-handed magic, chronic disease sufferers in the 
 
acute world of allopathic medicine, the vegetarian in MacDonalds?” 
 
(Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 9) 
 
 
 
Four concepts, an ‘episteme’, a ‘paradigm’, a ‘classification system’ and a ‘black 
box’ form the foundation of my theoretical toolbox, notions which I shall now 
explore. The concept of an episteme is commonly associated with the French 
philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault. Foucault was particularly interested 
in the historical configurations of knowledge/power structures, and the forms of 
 
regulation such structures exercise. In his The Order of Things, he moves 
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language, literature, paintings, economics and more, from the 16th to the 19th 
centuries, in an attempt to explore the ways in which ‘things’ were ordered- the “pure 
experience of order and of its modes of being” (Foucault, 1970, p. xxiii). Here he 
highlights how a major change took place in Western systems of thought between the 
Classical age of the seventeenth century and the modern era beginning during the 
eighteenth century. Introducing the notion of an episteme, Foucault explains that 
each period was characterized by a distinct “epistemological field” or “discursive 
formation” that shaped the “conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether 
expressed in a theory or silently invested in a practice” (ibid, p. 267). Each of these 
eras thus comprised of a whole ensemble of unspoken rules that governed what were 
thinkable and acceptable. In other words, each of these periods comprised a distinct 
episteme. In his subsequent book, The Archaeology of Knowledge Foucault (1972, 
p.212) provides a more explicit definition of an episteme. He writes: 
 
 
An episteme may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice 
of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one 
the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure 
of thought that men [sic] of a particular period cannot escape- a great body of 
legislation written once and for all by some anonymous hand…the episteme 
makes it possible to grasp the set of constraints and limitations which, at a 
given moment, are imposed on discourse. 
 
 
Therefore, as depicted here, an episteme is a historical a priori that grounds the 
modes of knowing of an era. It is a set of assumptions that structures the ways in 
which people think, understand, and act in the world at any given time (Dreyfus, & 
Rabinow, 1983). Each episteme prescribes rules for ordering our knowledge and 
practices, and thus configures the conditions of possibility within a particular epoch. 
An episteme therefore serves as a kind of all-pervasive space in which the thoughts 
and practices of an age inhabit, be they philosophical, scientific, social, political or 
artistic and so forth (Turnbull, 2000). As Foucault (1972, p. 212) goes on to assert: 
 
 
By episteme, we mean, in fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given 
period, the discursive practices…the way in which each of these discursive 
formations…are situated and operate…the lateral relations that may exist 
 
58 
between epistemological figures in so far as they belong to neighbouring, but 
distinct sets of practices. 
 
 
Thus, an episteme creates structural relations between different schools of thinking 
and acting in a given time. What this definition implies is that an episteme is made-
up of many distinct “discursive formations”, which are united through an equivalent 
set of underpinning assumptions. These more specific ‘discursive formations’, or 
what can be understood as paradigms, are thus connected through their collective 
insertion within the same episteme. I thus buttress the notion of an episteme with the 
concept of a paradigm, in order to further develop my conceptual toolbox. 
 
 
In his ground-breaking book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn 
(1962) focused on understanding how changes in scientific knowledge come about. 
His key argument is that, contrary to popular belief, transformations in scientific 
theory do not follow a logically determinate procedure, and cannot be accounted for 
solely by cognitive changes. Rather, such transformations are complex social 
processes that emerge out of changing intellectual circumstances and possibilities 
(Zammito, 2004). In making this argument, Kuhn invokes the notion of a paradigm, a 
concept which he illustrates by the following story: 
 
 
An investigator who hoped to learn something about what scientists took the 
atomic theory to be, asked a distinguished physicist and an eminent chemist 
whether a single atom of helium was or was not a molecule. Both answered 
without hesitation, but their answers were not the same. For the chemist the 
atom of helium was a molecule because it behaved like one with respect to 
kinetic theory of gases. For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom 
was not molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. Presumably 
both men were talking of the same particle, but were viewing it through their 
own research training and practice (Kuhn, ibid, p. 51). 
 
 
For Kuhn, these scientists see things differently because they live and work in 
different worlds, or within different paradigms. They understand a helium atom 
differently because they are inserted within particular disciplines that each have their 
own agreed upon ways of understanding and handling scientific objects. As Kuhn 
 
(ibid, p. 46) argues: 
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Scientists…never learn concepts, laws and theories in the abstract and by 
themselves. Instead, these intellectual tools are from the start encountered in a 
historically and pedagogically prior unit that displays them with and through 
their appliances. 
 
 
Thus a paradigm, according to Kuhn, constitutes a world view or what he also calls a 
 
“disciplinary matrix”, a kind of constellation of communal commitments and 
presuppositions. Conjointly, these elements set the terms, or provide “abstracted 
rules” (ibid, p. 47) around what counts as significant questions, what modes of 
analysis are appropriate and what kinds of solutions are acceptable. As Kuhn (ibid, p. 
108) explains: 
 
 
As a vehicle for scientific theory, the paradigm functions by telling the 
scientist about the entities that nature does and does not contain and the ways 
in which those entities behave. That information provides scientists not only 
with a map, but also with some of the directions essential for map making. In 
learning a paradigm, the scientist acquires theory, methods and standards 
together usually in an inextricable mixture. 
 
 
A paradigm therefore serves as a conceptual prism through which people make sense 
of the world (Zammito, 2004). Or put slightly differently, only that which ‘fits’ with 
the ideas of the accepted paradigm make sense and thus acquire significance. That 
which does not ‘fit’, the anomalies, might go unnoticed or be displaced, until one day 
they might potentially fit into a new paradigm (Turnbull, 2000). Thus, for Kuhn, 
 
‘normal science’ takes place when scientific puzzle-solving occurs within the terms 
of a shared paradigm, in other words, it is “research firmly based upon one or more 
past scientific achievement, achievements that some particular scientific community 
acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice” (ibid, p. 
10). ‘Revolutionary science’ occurs when anomalies accumulate and are increasingly 
deemed to be significant: “the tradition-shattering complements to the tradition-
bound activity of normal science” (ibid, p. 12). This might provide the impetus for a 
major crisis and with it a paradigm shift, bringing about a new paradigm whose 
consolidation signals the return to normal science and its associated puzzle solving. 
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My conceptual toolbox can therefore be thickened by placing Kuhn’s paradigm and 
Foucault’s episteme in conversation with each other. A paradigm can be thought of 
as the distinct set of assumptions that structure the production of knowledge within a 
particular discipline or school of thought. Different paradigms might have different 
sets of rules governing what is thinkable and sayable. And yet these varying 
paradigms, with their own specific communal commitments, will all still share a 
similar epistemological and metaphysical space. In other words, they will be 
connected through their collective insertion within the same episteme. In the same 
way as an episteme is made up of a number of interrelated paradigms, a paradigm 
can also be thought of as having various connected components or knowledge 
structures. A classification system can be understood as one such ‘smaller unit’, 
amongst many others. I thus come to the third key concept of my theoretical toolbox, 
the notion of a classification system. 
 
 
The idea of classification systems, and how such systems shape our knowledge of the 
world, has received much attention from scholars Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh 
Star. In their Sorting Things Out, they explore the role of categories in shaping the 
modern world (Bowker & Star, 1999). For these scholars, systems of classification 
are essential, without which any attempt at understanding the world would be 
inconceivable. Such systems are therefore necessary and unavoidable. But this does 
not mean that they are given or innocent, as is commonly assumed. As Bowker and 
Star assert (ibid, p. 10), a classification system is “a spatial, temporal, or spatio-
temporal segmentation of the world…a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) into 
which things can be put to then do some kind of work”. What these scholars are 
therefore insisting is that classifications create boxes, and it is the design of these 
boxes- their size, shape, quantity, site and substance- which mediates what can be put 
into them. They go on to emphasize that, “Many scholars see categories and 
classification as coming from an absent sense of ‘mind’, little anchored in the 
exigencies of work or politics” (ibid, p. 286). For these scholars then, although 
classification systems are frequently assumed to be inevitable, in fact much effort 
goes into their construction and maintenance. This work that is involved with their 
development is always imbued with particular ideological positions, interests and 
values. 
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The example of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related 
Health Problems (ICD), as described by Bowker and Star (ibid, pp. 107-134), is very 
illuminating in this regard. They demonstrate how, as social and political mores shift 
and change, so too do categories of disease entities. New ‘diseases’ are frequently 
being ‘discovered’ and classified within the ICD, with others being determined as no 
longer illnesses after all and consequently eliminated as valid disease categories. The 
ICD thus constantly negotiates and redefines the boundaries of illness categories. 
Indeed, as outlined in detail elsewhere (Smith, Bartlett, King, 2004), the specific case 
of homosexuality, which until the mid-1980s was categorized as a medical condition, 
most aptly captures the political nature of illness classifications. It is not difficult to 
see how this official medical diagnosis occurred within the context of powerful 
socio-political forces that were against variations from the traditional heterosexual 
dyad that prevailed for much of the 20th century (Smith, Bartlett & King, 2004). 
 
 
Taking the notions of an episteme, a paradigm and a classification system together 
provides a useful framework for thinking about the underpinning structures of 
knowledge. What all of these concepts imply is that the production of knowledge is 
not merely a descriptive practice, one which generates supposedly inevitable 
mappings of the world. Rather, at the heart of all three concepts is the idea that 
knowledge is fundamentally social and political and historical, deeply contingent 
upon the context in which it is produced. How we understand phenomena, solve 
problems and categorise entities are intrinsically moulded by a deep and shared 
ensemble of unspoken assumptions that are accepted within a given moment of time. 
What these concepts therefore suggest is that understanding the nature of knowledge 
necessitates that we surface the episteme, and associated paradigms and classification 
systems, and unpack their underpinning politics and assumptions. 
 
 
What makes knowledge structures such elusive entities for analysis, however, is that 
they are as invisible as they are powerful (Bowker & Star, 1999). The episteme in 
which we operate, and associated paradigms of knowledge and classification systems 
become so taken for granted and natural, so intrinsically accepted as ‘given’, that 
almost by definition their underlying scaffolding disappears (Foucault, 1970, 1972). 
In other words, all of the rules and assumptions and values and politics that shape 
how we see and think in the world, become deeply buried, or sealed up in what 
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Bruno Latour (1987, 1999) has called the ‘black box’, the fourth fundamental 
concept of my conceptual toolbox. 
 
 
In his Science in Action, Latour (1987) explores the activities of scientific ‘fact-
making’, unpacking how scientific ‘facts’ become accepted as incontrovertible 
 
‘givens’. Here he constructs the notion of the ‘black box’, referring to entities whose 
constitution are so completely taken for granted, so assumed to be real, that their 
inner workings need not be examined nor questioned. These inners workings are all 
the interests and politics and values and rules inscribed in the construction of 
knowledge, which I have been describing above. Once something becomes a ‘black 
box’, or ‘black boxed’, we stop scrutinizing how it came to be, or who and what 
participated in its construction. It becomes a “closed” and “tightly sealed” file 
imbued with a spurious quality of self-evidence (ibid, p. 23). In his Pandora’s Hope, 
Latour (1999, p. 304) enlarges on the process of ‘black-boxing’ as: 
 
 
The way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. 
When a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need 
focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, 
paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque 
and obscure they become. 
 
 
What this opaqueness enables, according to Latour (1999, p. 304), is a focus on 
 
“inputs and outputs” and not on the complex processes that produce these effects. In 
other words, all of the meta-narratives and politics through which the ‘fact’ was 
produced and is maintained are concealed. The logic and consequences of the 
knowledge produced thus become deeply hidden. And lest this sounds too 
conspiratorial, we have to understand that this process is normalised and archived in 
such a way as to be inherited and accepted as common-sense reality. It is here that 
 
‘black boxes’ become so very powerful, as by making their inner workings invisible, 
they create the illusion, or “god-trick” that they represent self-evident truths, a kind 
of “nature has spoken” (Haraway, 1999, p. 177). This will invariably censor certain 
kinds of thought and oppress particular people, albeit unknowingly. Thus, according 
to Latour (1999, p. 29) we need to “reopen the black box, break it apart and 
reallocate its components”. We need to delve into the archives of epistemic, 
paradigmatic and classification design, making them visible, unpacking their 
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assumptions and power relations and thinking about their implications. It is 
ultimately about making some of the most routine and accepted knowledge claims 
 
“strange” (Collins, 2001, p. 159), destabilising their apparent stability and piercing 
their self-evident logic. 
 
 
Thus, in terms of my specific topic of the mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa, 
what my analysis so far suggests is that knowledge in this area, and the solutions 
being proposed, are neither neutral nor given. Rather, such thinking is being shaped 
by a whole ensemble of unspoken knowledge assumptions and politics within the 
mental health sciences specifically, and society more generally. Such thinking is 
deeply embedded within a variety of accepted norms around what count as 
significant kinds of questions, what modes of analysis are appropriate for answering 
these questions and what sorts of solutions are acceptable. Unpacking these taken-
for-granteds thus requires making visible the dominant paradigms and classification 
systems structuring knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’. It necessitates 
unearthing the hidden assumptions and capillaries of power that are embedded in 
such organizing frameworks. It involves problematizing which views about Africa, 
mental distress, care, dignity, human behaviour and progress (to name just a few) are 
inserted into these larger explanatory metanarratives. Ultimately, it requires asking 
what other, potentially productive ways of thinking and choices are being obscured 
by these understandings. 
 
 
By prizing open the black boxes of knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ 
in this way, making the silent codes and conventions that guide the knowledge 
outcomes visible, this research becomes a form of epistemological politics; in other 
words, a struggle over meaning. Yet the very real practical and material significance 
of an epistemological project such as this cannot be overstated. As suggested by 
Krieger (2000), work at an epistemological level is indeed somewhat uncommon 
within the public health sciences, frequently dismissed as abstract and inappropriate 
given the urgency of pressing health issues. However, examining the assumptions 
embedded in our work is profoundly practical. This is because knowledge is not only 
constructed, but also constitutive. Through our knowledge producing practices, we 
bring very ‘real’ things into being. This is indeed the perspective of various STS 
scholars working within a post-structuralist albeit materially-oriented mode of 
 
thinking (see for example Haraway 1991, 2008; Latour, 2004; Law, 2008a; Law 
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Urry, 2004; Mol 1999, 2002; Moser, 2008). According to such thinking, the 
episteme, paradigms and classification systems in which we work have very real 
force in the world. As Lien and Law (2011, p. 68) assert, “Social structures are being 
generated at the same time and in the same moment as scientific (or other) forms of 
classification or knowledge: the social and the natural classifications are being 
enacted together in material practices”. 
 
 
Thus, from this perspective, the ‘real’ and the representational, the material and the 
semiotic are dialectically intertwined (Jensen & Bowker, 2005). Knowledge 
structures simultaneously represent and enact realities. Indeed, this is what Kuhn was 
getting at when he ascertained that after a paradigm shift occurs, scientists work in a 
different world. The world after Copernicus or Einstein changed, or as Kuhn (1962, 
p. 111) puts it, “What were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are 
rabbits afterwards”. Bowker and Star also provide a useful example in the case of 
mental illness to illustrate the real, material force of our classificatory practices: 
 
 
Consider the case where all diseases are classified purely physiologically. 
Systems of medical observation and treatment are set up such that physical 
manifestations are the only manifestations recorded. Physical treatments are 
the only treatments available. Under these conditions, then, logically 
schizophrenia may only result purely and simply from a chemical imbalance 
of the brain. It will be impossible to think or act otherwise (1999, p. 49). 
 
 
Our knowledge structures are therefore powerful entities that influence both 
representations and realities. They valorise some points of view and obscure others, 
privilege certain kinds of truths and silence others. At the same time, they also bring 
certain worlds into being and make it difficult for others to come into existence. 
Ultimately, those anomalies, which cannot be encapsulated within the structures of 
our paradigms and classification systems, are excluded from our knowledge archive 
and in turn our potential ways of being in the world. As such, the underpinning 
knowledge assumptions structuring thinking on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ 
will invariably have very real and material consequences. They will provide a lens 
through which the issues are being framed, and thus mediate the kinds of solutions 
that will be determined. They will help shape the nature of the services that are 
 
developed, the kinds of health campaigns that are implemented and the 
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behaviours that are advocated. Ultimately, unless we look critically at what lies 
behind the thinking of these initiatives, they might prove to be ineffective (however 
this is defined) and have unintended negative consequences. 
 
 
The dominant episteme: European Colonial Modernity 
 
 
 
“‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means exactly what I choose 
it to mean- neither more nor less’. 
 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words means so many different things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master- that’s all’” 
 
(Carroll, 1872, p.72) 
 
 
Thus far, I have developed my conceptual toolbox by incorporating and relating the 
notions of an episteme, paradigm, classification system and black boxing. I have 
explored how, in conversation with each other, these concepts help one to understand 
how the underpinning structures of knowledge are socially constructed, powerfully 
constitutive and yet ultimately invisible. Now, if we look at these concepts through a 
Postcolonial space of thinking, what we see is that a particular episteme, and 
associated paradigms and overarching classification system, emerged during the era 
of colonialism and what is understood as European modernity. I will refer to this 
throughout as the episteme of European Colonial Modernity. This episteme 
increasingly came to govern the structures of thought amongst both the colonists and 
colonised (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995, 1998; Moore-Gilbert, 1997). In other 
words, beyond its economic and political dimensions, colonialism also had a strong 
epistemological dimension. It was thus characterised by both physical forms of 
exclusion, oppression and discrimination, as well as more subtle forms of cultural 
and epistemological domination. 
 
 
In the next chapter, I explore in detail the nature and historical constitution of two 
particular paradigms of thought which are deeply inserted in the episteme of 
European Colonial Modernity. These are the paradigms of evidence-based science 
(including biomedicine) and human rights. In this current chapter, I would like to 
touch on one of the most stubborn and powerful forms of classification buried in the 
 
‘black box’ of this episteme. This is a broad system of classification which tends to 
demarcate the world into homogenous entities and stark binary oppositions: ‘Africa’ 
versus ‘Europe’, ‘traditional’ versus ‘modern’, ‘primitive’ versus ‘civilized’, ‘belief’ 
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versus ‘knowledge’, ‘subjective’ versus ‘objective’. As most pertinently 
demonstrated by Edward Said (1978) in his Orientalism, through the metalanguage 
of colonialism and modernity, imaginary lines were drawn and monolithic categories 
were constructed. Through this logic, entities in one column were designated as 
inherently superior or essentially progressive, whilst those in the other column were 
relegated as innately inferior or naturally subsidiary. The value judgements and 
assumptions underpinning these designations were, however, ultimately ‘black-
boxed’ in the normalised categories of science, objectivity, progress, knowledge and 
so forth. 
 
 
As suggested by various Postcolonial scholars (Chakrabarty, 2000; Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 2012; Quijano, 2000; Said, 1978), this kind of classification system, and 
associated hidden assumptions, was intimately embroiled with modernist Europe’s 
attempts to delineate its own contemporary identity, and to produce, define, and 
contain non-European difference. From the eighteenth century onwards, there was a 
mounting belief in the exceptionalism and uniqueness of contemporary Europe, 
inherently different from its own previous eras. Not only essentially dissimilar to 
however, but also inherently better than, its past. As Enlightenment scholar, 
Immanuel Kant famously asserted, the Enlightenment was “man’s final coming of 
age…the emancipation of the human consciousness from an immature state of 
ignorance and error” (cited in Wilson, 2004, p. 649). In other words, as highlighted 
by Festa & Carey (2009), modernist Europe’s contemporary institutions, practices, 
and conceptual schemes- an industrial capitalist economy, a liberal nation-state, 
positivistic scientific methods, human rights principles or various ensembles of these 
things - were increasingly understood as essentially modern, inevitably progressive 
and inherently superior. 
 
 
It was through this same logic that Enlightenment Europe also depicted and created the 
colonial ‘Other’ (Festa & Carey, 2009; Iggers 1982). Eighteenth century Europe began 
to understand itself as holding a superior position, not only in relation to its own past, 
but also in relation to other contemporary societies. These other, non-European 
societies were increasingly characterised as embodying more rudimentary 
organizational stages of development, and thus occupying a retarded temporal space 
within the evolutionary chain (Smith, 1999). They were assumed to be the primitive 
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version of Europe, similar to what Europe was before it evolved into the era of 
modernity (Oguejiofor, 2007). As Quijano (2000, p. 221) succinctly states: 
 
 
All non-Europeans could be placed vis-à-vis Europeans in a continuous 
historical chain from ‘primitive’ to ‘civilized’, from ‘irrational’ to ‘rational’, 
from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’, from ‘magic-mythic’ to ‘scientific’; in sum 
from non-Europeans to something that could be, in time, at best Europeanized 
or ‘modernized’. 
 
 
Therefore, in legitimizing tropes of otherness and polarizations of difference, this 
form of classifying the social world served to unambiguously distinguish Europe 
from its ‘other’, and validate its supposed “positional superiority” (Said, 1978, p.7). 
Moreover, as suggested by various scholars (Chakrabarty, 2000; Comaroff and 
Comaroff, 2012; Quijano, 2000), this system of classification contained a strong 
normative stance, implying that European modernist ways of knowing and being 
were those to which all of humanity should aspire. Ultimately, to become modern, 
was to become European, or rather as Aníbal Quijano (2000, p. 221) puts it, 
 
“Europeanised”. This normative position was indeed deeply entangled with 
European imperialist ends, providing the ideological justification for Europe’s 
appropriation of other territories and peoples (Dussel, 2000; Oguejiofor, 2007; 
Quijano, 2000, 2007; Said, 1978; Smith, 1999). As Enrique Dussel (2000, p. 472) in 
his Europe, Modernity and Eurocentrism suggests: 
 
 
The modern, European civilization casts itself as a superior, developed 
civilzation. The aforementioned superiority makes the improvement of the 
most primitive, coarse people a moral obligation…insofar as barbaric people 
oppose the civilizing mission, modern praxis must exercise 
violence…understood as an inevitable action in order to destroy the obstacles 
impeding modernization. 
 
 
Thus, under the guise of the ‘civilizing mission’, this way of ordering the social 
world was used to validate colonialism as a supposedly moral endeavour aimed at 
modernizing non-European populations and helping to liberate them from their 
supposed backwardness. Ultimately, such enterprises were cast as merely helping 
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non-European societies develop apparently more modern and progressive ways of 
knowing and being. 
 
 
Despite the end of formal colonial rule however, many have argued (Connell, 2007; 
Smith, 1999; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1990) that conventional knowledge of the world 
today continues to be filtered through this epistemological order and associated way 
of ordering the social world. That is, although political power was ostensibly 
transferred to the formerly colonised, it “did not transform the structures of 
domination - that is, the institutional and cultural contexts of Western hegemony in 
the global international order, and African [and Third World] marginalisation within 
it” (Grovogui, 1996, p. 2). 
 
 
For example, in her Southern Theory (2007), Raewyn Connell highlights how there 
are still deep global inequalities within the context of knowledge production. She 
demonstrates how scholars in the geo-political South continue to operate within an 
academic terrain dominated by the form of ordering the social world originating from 
the geopolitical north during European modernity and colonialism. As such, Connell 
argues, there is still a stubborn endurance of Eurocentric power, whereby experiences 
within Africa continue to be filtered through the structures of knowledge formed by 
the episteme of European Colonial Modernity. Along similar lines, in her 
 
Decolonizing Methodologies, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) argues that the episteme 
of European Colonial Modernity established a positional authority of Western ways 
of ordering the world. She suggests that this epistemological order continues to have 
a tenacious hold today, still powerfully conditioning the possibilities for 
contemporary subaltern scholarship. In other words, the experiences of the 
previously colonialized continue to be the subject of an orientalising gaze, and 
understood through classifications developed to understand and define the realities of 
modernist and colonial Europe. As Smith (ibid, p. 199) ascertains: 
 
 
It is still difficult for the heirs of the colonizers and the colonized alike to 
think outside of the categories and bodies of knowledge formed by the 
epistemological order of colonialism… or even to make out whether one 
speaks from within, outside of, or at all without colonial discourse. 
 
 
 
69 
These kinds of arguments about the continued dominance of the episteme of 
European Colonial Modernity, and associated classification system, have been made 
in relation to the mental health sciences more specifically. Many scholars have 
argued that since their emergence, and continuing into the present, the mental health 
sciences have been constituted predominantly out of knowledge and theories which 
originate from the geopolitical north. For example, during the colonial and early 
postcolonial period, critical psychiatrists such as Collomb (1975), Fanon (1963) and 
Lambo (1981) argued strongly against the intrinsically Eurocentric nature of 
psychiatry, and its reproduction of a hegemonic imperial cultural order. For example, 
 
Collomb (1975, p. 106) through his vision of a ‘une psychiatrie africaine 
authentique’ challenged young African psychiatrists of his day to free themselves 
from the constraints of Western psychiatric models by developing local solutions 
which fitted with Africa’s own social and cultural resources. Similarly, Franz 
Fanon through his ‘psychiatry of liberation’ consistently spoke about the 
universalizing trends of psychiatry, and argued for its ‘decolonisation’, along with 
the African psyche (Vergès 1996). 
 
More recently, a number of African scholars have spoken about the “cultural 
colonialism” (Mkhize, 2004, p. 26) of the contemporary mental health sciences and 
their continued “cultural one-sidedness” (Louw, 2002, p. 1) and “Westocentric” 
nature (Holdstock, 2000, p. 10). It is emphasized (for example Barrett, 1996; 
Danziger, 1997; Hook, 2004; Inglby, 1981; Staeuble, 2006; Swartz,1998; Yen & 
Wilbraham, 2003) that so many of the theories and concepts of the mental health 
sciences still reflect a particularly Eurocentric epistemological structure of human 
existence and understanding. Ultimately, as Stam (2004, p. 24) succinctly puts it, the 
mental health sciences continue to embody “scientized and institutionalized variants 
of the eighteenth century colonial moral language”. 
 
 
Many problematic effects of the continued hegemony of this epistemological order, 
including within the field of mental health, have been highlighted. It is suggested that 
this dominance perpetuates the legacies of colonialism and of racism, and buttresses 
certain kinds of privilege. Indeed, for many critical Postcolonial scholars (for 
example Mignolo, 2007; Nandy, 1989; Quijano, 2000, 2007; Sardar, 1998; Smith, 
1999), uncritically accepting the authority of this epistemological order is to inhabit a 
particular political philosophy, one which they identify as an extension of 
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colonialism. At the same time, the continued supremacy afforded to this episteme 
means that ‘other’ kinds of knowledges, which do not necessarily share the same 
epistemological space, are so often marginalised or excluded (Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin, 1995; Moore-Gilbert, 1997; De Sousa Santos et al., 2007, Spivak, 1990, 
1995). This exclusionary logic will be unpacked in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
Ultimately, this epistemological order, which will continue to exert its powers in 
more or less productive ways, needs to be subjected to rigorous critique. In other 
words, in order to destabilise its continued dominance, and enable ‘alternatives’ to 
potentially grow, the intellectual heritage of modernity and colonialism needs to be 
decolonized (Appiah, 1995; Mignolo, 2007; Nandy, 1989; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1990, 
1995; Turnbull, 2000). Or as Water Mignolo (2007, p. 469) puts it, we need to 
 
“unveil the totalitarian complicity and seeming historical inevitability of the rhetoric 
of modernity and the logic of coloniality in order to open up space for the possibility 
of ‘another world’ in which many worlds can co-exist…”. 
 
 
Decolonising the episteme: The rise of an ‘indigenous knowledge’ movement 
 
 
“There should be no room for cultural arrogance. Africans are neither Americans nor 
 
Europeans…African people should be treated within the framework of their own culture and 
belief systems”. 
 
(Mosotho et.al, 2011, p.447). 
 
 
Such a project of epistemic decolonization has been interpreted and approached in a 
range of diverse and at times opposing ways. One particularly influential strand, 
from which I wish to separate my research, has been referred to as ‘indigenisation’ or 
the ‘indigenous knowledge movement’. According to various critical Postcolonial 
theorists (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995, 1998; Green, 2012; Odora Hoppers, 
2002), this movement has sought to challenge the continuing dominance of Northern 
structures of knowledge by asserting that Africa has its own ‘indigenous’ knowledge 
systems - or perhaps, multiple ones - which are independent from ‘Western’ 
knowledge structures. As suggested by these scholars, a project of decolonization 
from this kind of indigenous perspective, requires discarding structures of thought 
that originate from the West, and at the same time unearthing ‘native’ ways of 
thinking in their original form. 
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 These sentiments are clearly discernible within many of the critiques of 
contemporary Global Mental Health, as alluded to in the previous chapter. Here there 
is a common tendency to speak about the “dubious enterprise” of Global Mental 
Health which is “imposing” Western psychiatry whilst “suppressing indigenous heal-
ing systems and knowledge” and “disrespecting the wisdom of traditional cultures” 
 
(Fernando, 2011, p. 22; see also Davar, 2014; Fernando, 2012; Ibrahim, 2014; 
Ingleby, 2014; Lang, 2014; Lee, 2014; Mills, 2014; Sax, 2014; Summerfield, 2012 
who all make this kind of argument). Thus, ‘Western’ psychiatric models tend to be 
construed within these critiques as essentially malign, and with relatively little to 
offer for people in Africa. Strong calls are therefore being made for the rejection of 
such supposedly ‘alien’ models and the development of mental health theories and 
practices which are based upon apparently ‘traditional’ African values and systems 
of healing. 
 
 
As emphasised by Connell (2007), this kind of ‘indigenous knowledge’ movement is 
an understandable retort to the consistent hegemony of structures of thought which 
depend on the epistemological order of the geopolitical north. However, the 
problems and potential dangers of this kind of ‘Afrocentric’ perspective are 
manifold. Such an approach tends to produce a view of Africa as essentially static 
and monolithic, ultimately outside of influence and multiplicity. It is premised on an 
idea of Africa’s distinctiveness from Europe, and that there are essentially ‘pure’ and 
‘authentic’ African identities and system(s) of knowledge, which may be unearthed 
and revived. Yet as various critical Postcolonial scholars have argued (Ashcroft, 
Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995, 1998; Bhabha, 1994, 1995; Connell, 2007; Mbembe, 
2002; Smith, 1999), this current of thought tends to obscure the inherent fluidity, 
diversity and interdependence of identities and knowledges. 
 
 
For example, Homi Bhabha ascertains that different cultures and knowledges, 
including those in Africa, are complex and diverse, having assimilated and mutated 
over centuries. He thus argues against the notion of a “primordial unity or fixity” of 
identities and knowledge systems, the “inherent originality or purity” that can be 
unearthed and reclaimed (Bhabha, 1995, p. 208). Along similar lines, Achille 
Mbembe (2002, p. 254) suggests that calls for indigenization or what he terms 
 
“nativist currents of thought” claim “that Africans have an authentic culture that 
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confers on them a peculiar self irreducible to that of any other group”. This results in 
an emphasis on establishing a unique “African science,” an “African democracy,” an 
“African language” which, according to Mbembe (ibid, p. 255), is premised upon a 
mythologised view of a “unique African identity” and an “authentic African 
interpretation”. For him, ‘authentic’ or ‘pure’ kinds of identities and knowledges do 
not exist. Rather, there is an inherent contingency, entanglement and malleability 
between knowledges, a constant melange of cross influences and currents- global and 
local. As he articulates: 
 
 
To be sure, there is no African identity that could be designated by a single 
term or that could be named by a single word or subsumed under a single 
category. African identity does not exist as a substance. It is constituted, in 
varying forms, through a series of…mobile, reversible, and unstable practices 
(ibid, p. 272). 
 
 
Therefore, according to scholars such as Bhabha and Mbembe and others, this 
indigenization approach becomes a new kind of essentialism, whereby although 
seemingly at loggerheads with Eurocentricity, is in fact structurally very similar. 
That is, both Euro- and Afro-centric modalities of thought have a single, monolithic 
benchmark by which to judge and value the world and they share a view of history 
that denies change and multiplicity, as well as the movement of people and things in 
more than one direction. Although calls for indigenization may have changed the 
content, the Eurocentric system of classification system, with its stark demarcations 
and homogenous entities, remains firmly intact. As Mbembe (2002, p. 256) asserts, 
 
“nativist currents of thought draw their fundamental categories from the myths they 
claim to oppose and reproduce their dichotomies”. Thus, according to both Bhabha 
(1994, 1995) and Mbembe (2002) and others, this ultimately limits the possibility of 
an effective subversion of the inherited Eurocentric knowledge archive. 
 
 
Such an approach is not only misguided, but might also have potentially dire 
consequences, as the case of HIV/AIDS in South Africa most pertinently shows. As 
Green (2012) and Colvin (2012) both suggest, here supposed ‘African medicine’ was 
constructed as the antithesis of ‘Western science’, undergirding the state’s policy to 
deny HIV-positive people antiretrovirals, which cost millions of South Africans their 
 
lives. These kinds of sentiments are clearly discernible within certain critiques of 
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Global Mental Health, and particularly the suggestion that psychotropic medications 
are essentially ‘Western’ and thus inappropriate for the people in Africa. Ultimately 
this argument could have similarly detrimental repercussions as the case of 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
 
Contributing to decolonization: Transcending both Afro- and Euro-centricity 
 
 
 
“Can we have social theory that does not claim universality for a metropolitan point of view, does not 
read from only one direction, does not exclude the experience and social thought of most of humanity, 
and is not constructed terra nullius?” 
 
(Connell, 2007, p. 47). 
 
 
So, the question is, how might we think about challenging the unequal nature of the 
global knowledge economy, whilst simultaneously appreciating the inherent 
complexity and synchronicity of people and things in numerous directions? That is, 
how to contribute towards decolonising the episteme of European Colonial 
Modernity, without recourse to a stance of indigeneity and Afro-centrism? Achille 
 
Mbembe (2002) has coined the now catch term, “African Modes of Self-Writing” 
which might be helpful in this regard. This phrase acknowledges the need for people 
in Africa to find their own styles and theories which are not necessarily defined by 
the modernist vision and the legacy of colonialism. For Mbembe (ibid, p.242), such 
modes of creating knowledge need to fit with ‘African’ realities, and be shaped by 
these. However, such meaning-making needs to simultaneously appreciate that there 
is an inherent heterogeneity of “African imaginations” which come forward as 
“multiple, disparate but often intersecting knowledges and practices”. In other words, 
it is about “opening up the way for selfstyling” on the continent, in a manner which 
recognises African knowleges and traditions as diverse, complex, global and cross 
cutting (ibid, p. 242). 
 
 
Along similar lines, Raewyn Connell’s (2007) notion of ‘Southern Theory’ might 
also be useful for thinking about how we might destabilise the unequal nature of the 
global knowledge economy in ways which refuse both Afro- and Eurocentricity. 
Connell (ibid, p. 47) asks: “Can we have social theory that does not claim 
universality for a metropolitan point of view, does not read from only one direction, 
does not exclude the experience and social thought of most of humanity, and is not 
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constructed terra nullius?”. What Connell is suggesting by terra nullius, that is, ‘the 
silence of the land’, is the problem with the disregard for context within dominant 
social theory. Thus, according to her, approaches to knowledge production need to 
take place and context seriously, appropriately entangling theory with the realities, 
lexicons and matrices of particular, situated contexts. Importantly, however, a focus 
on ‘the particular’ needs to avoid geographical essentialism based on local/global 
conceptual binaries. For her, such provincializing ignores the zones of engagement 
and connectedness between supposedly ‘local’ and ‘global’ knowledges and actors. 
Instead, Connell argues for what she calls ‘Southern theory’, which is predicated on 
 
“relations- authority, exclusion, inclusion, hegemony, partnership, sponsorship, 
appropriation- between intellectuals and institutions in the metropole and those in the 
world periphery” (ibid, p. viii–ix). 
 
 
What scholars such as Mbembe and Connell are therefore suggesting is that there is 
an urgent need for boundary pushing within the modes of creating knowledge, modes 
which shift the privilege granted to Eurocentric forms of meaning-making to more 
 
‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship. This shift is not, however, about 
overthrowing one monolithic benchmark or conceptual orthodoxy and uprooting 
another. Rather, it is about an opening up and a loosening. That is, it necessitates 
loosening the inevitability of the inherited European archive of knowledge by 
unravelling its contours and revealing its weaknesses. Importantly, this does not 
mean necessarily rejecting such structures of thought. Indeed, for scholars such as 
Mbembe and Connell, knowledge, wherever and by whomsoever it is produced, is 
potentially available for transgressive, emancipatory and counter-hegemonic use. But 
such structures of knowledge cannot remain black-boxed entities. They need to be 
opened-up, their meanings unpacked, and their politics re-thought. Ultimately, it 
requires asking in which context and for whom such structures of thought might or 
might not be appropriate and worthwhile ways of thinking and living. As Mignolo 
(2007, p. 499) argues, “Emancipating projects, as devised in Europe in the eighteenth 
century, can be kept alive, but they must be ‘extracted’ from their appropriation by 
the rhetoric of modernity to justify the logic of coloniality”. 
 
 
At the same time, developing more ‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship also 
necessitates exploring what ‘other’ kinds of epistemologies and knowledge politics, 
which do not necessarily originate from European colonial and modernist forms of 
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consciousness, might be possible and potentially transformative. Importantly, this is 
not about unearthing or retrieving a lost purity, but requires thinking about how 
theories and practices might be centred upon and appropriate to the needs and 
dilemmas in Africa, whilst recognising that these are complex and varied in different 
parts of the continent and Diaspora. 
 
 
My research will thus scrutinise how knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ 
in Africa might still remain bound to Eurocentric content and orientation. That is, I 
will interrogate how such knowledge might be reinforcing (albeit unknowingly) 
some of the ideologies and matrices of power that became embedded in the 
epistemological order of European Colonial Modernity. I will show how such 
thinking on the ‘gap’ in mental health care is indeed deeply inserted within this 
knowledge order, and associated classification system and paradigms of evidence-
based science and human rights. Rather than rejecting these structures of knowledge 
outright, I will explore how appropriate they might be for thinking about the diverse 
mental health needs and dilemmas of people on the African continent. 
 
 
At the same time, throughout this research, I will also unpack and where possible 
foreground ‘other’, potentially transformative forms of meaning-making. I will show 
how the conceptual resources of ethnographic articulations and critical 
phenomenology, which emerged amongst the softer voices in this research, may 
embody examples of such ‘other’ ways of thinking. I will explore how the more 
dominant knowledge claims might be negating authentic dialogue with these ‘other’ 
kinds of knowledge paradigms and forms of ordering the world. I will pose questions 
around how these marginalised ways of knowing might enable more ‘Africa-
focused’ forms of scholarship on the ‘gap’ in mental health care to grow and 
potentially enter into centres of power and influence. Ultimately, I ask how these 
alternative epistemologies might transform current conversations on the ‘gap’ in 
mental health care in Africa. 
 
 
Importantly, I will constantly raise different aspects of these complex questions, 
rather than bring them to closure with definitive answers. Sadly, there are no ready 
answers, and any attempt to provide them would be to proclaim some newly captured 
moral high ground. This risks setting up a new kind of knowledge orthodoxy which I 
have been arguing against. My challenge is therefore more modest, one which is 
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conditioned by a constitutive limit. That is, I attempt to surface particular tensions 
and resonances and hold them up to the light, with the hope of disturbing certain 
intellectual reflexes and opening-up a space for potentially new imaginings. This is 
what Donna Haraway (1992, 1999) suggests is at stake for ethical, responsible and 
self-reflexive research. That is, research whose “images are not the products of 
escape and transcendence of limits…but the joining of partial views and halting 
voices into a collective subject position that promises a vision of the means of 
ongoing finite embodiment, of living within limits and contradictions” (Haraway, 
1999, p.182). For Haraway then, this disposition of limitedness is, somewhat 
paradoxically then, the basis of our accountability, the way in which “we might 
become answerable for what we learn how to see” (ibid, p. 177). Ultimately, a 
limited and ambivalent perspective, rather than the all-seeing eye of finality, can be 
held responsible for both its possibilities and perils. 
 
 
This posing of questions and searching for alternatives is, fortunately, enabled by the 
fact that knowledge structures are invariably unstable. Despite their power, they are 
also vulnerable. Although the core argument holds- that black boxes seal-up the 
constructedness of coded assumptions and their consequences- the black box is 
indeed somewhat of a blunt analytical instrument. This is because neither the 
ordering nor the order is ever closed. Paradigms can change, entities can be 
classified differently and knowledge structures can at times contest the dominant 
order. Knowledge inevitably comprises sites of potential discrepancy, lack of ‘fit’ 
and seepage into and out of the black box. As Bowker and Star (1999, p. 161), assert: 
 
 
Black boxes may be opened and closed as circumstances and 
structural conditions change…the box, if you will, is neither clearly 
closed nor completely black. 
 
 
Black and white are therefore notorious in their concealment of grey, and thus partial 
visibility is a more likely condition. This is ultimately why a project of delving into 
the nature of our accepted codes and assumptions is so challenging, and yet also 
potentially so transformative. 
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4. THE PARADIGMS OF EVIDENCE-BASED SCIENCE AND 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“Ideas neither descend from a timeless heaven nor are they grounded in the necessities of ‘nature’, 
 
but develop out of the imaginations and intellects of historical human beings” 
 
(Foucault, 1984, p. 42) 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that during the era of European colonialism and 
modernity, a particular epistemological order emerged and increasingly came to 
govern the ways of thinking amongst both the colonists and colonised. I termed this 
epistemological order the episteme of European Colonial Modernity, and touched 
upon one of the most stubborn and powerful forms of classification buried in the 
 
‘black box’ of this episteme. In this current chapter, I develop this analysis further, 
by looking at the historical constitution of two particular paradigms which are deeply 
inserted in this episteme. These are the paradigms of evidence-based science 
(including biomedicine) and human rights. In particular, I surface, and put into 
historical perspective, the epistemological assumptions underpinning these 
paradigms of thought. 
 
 
I concentrate on these two particular paradigms as, deeply intertwined, together they 
capture many of the fundamental contours of the episteme of European Colonial 
Modernity. Moreover, as will become clear, these paradigms are playing a 
fundamental role in shaping contemporary knowledge of the mental health ‘treatment 
gap’ in Africa. This chapter therefore provides a historical platform from which my 
subsequent analyses of this knowledge can be understood. It is important to highlight 
from the start why I speak about ‘the paradigms of evidence-based science (including 
biomedicine)’ rather than referring to biomedicine as its own, distinct paradigm. As I 
will show, biomedicine lives within, and ultimately arises out of, the broader 
paradigm of evidence-based science. What is now commonly referred to as 
 
‘biomedicine’ or the ‘the biomedical model’ can thus be conceived of as the 
scientific paradigm of modern medicine. 
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Rather than being self-evident or inevitable mappings of the world, these paradigms 
arose out of, and in turn provided an ideological basis for, many of the socio-
economic forms of organization and capillaries of power characterizing 17
th
 and 18
th
 
century Europe. These paradigms are thus intimately entangled with each other, and 
with the context in which they emerged. For the purpose of analysis, I discuss each 
of these paradigms separately. Drawing on the works of key historians of science and 
Postcolonial scholars, I explore their origins and some of their main knowledge 
assumptions. Moreover, I unpack how both their roots and underpinning 
epistemologies were dialectically intertwined with the socio-economic and political 
forces of 17
th
 and 18
th
 century Europe. A lot has been written about the dominance 
of these paradigms during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, and why they gained such a 
formidable force during this time (see for example Armstrong, 1983; Comaroff, 
1993; De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; McCulloch, 1995; Turner, 1995). Although I 
touch on this later period, my focus in this chapter is on the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. 
That is, I explore how the tenaciousness of these paradigms have much earlier roots, 
a power and influence which was strengthened further and ultimately consolidated in 
subsequent centuries. 
 
 
Although there are obvious differences between them, I demonstrate how both 
paradigms share a number of underpinning epistemological assumptions, in 
particular, those of naturalism, universalism, objectivity and rationalism. Moreover, 
both paradigms are strongly mediated by stark binary oppositions, indeed the 
powerful form of classification I explored in the previous chapter. Drawing on the 
concept of “epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1990, 1995), I argue that a major 
epistemological effect of these paradigms, and associated assumptions and form of 
ordering, is the way in which they tend to occlude other ways of thinking and being 
from entering the formal canon of knowledge. I argue that this exclusionary logic 
was deeply embroiled with Enlightenment battles over the authorisation of 
knowledge and attempts to develop boundaries of socio-economic and political 
legitimacy. Although emanating over four hundred years ago, the forms of exclusion 
produced by these paradigms still retain their power today. This will become a 
common thread that will run through my subsequent analyses of knowledge on the 
mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa. 
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The paradigm of evidence-based science 
 
 
“‘You are to be in all things regulated and governed’, said the gentleman, ‘by fact. We hope to have, 
before long, a board of fact, composed of commissioners of fact, who will force the people to be a 
people of fact, and of nothing but fact. You must discard the word Fancy altogether. You must use 
mathematical figures which are susceptible of proof and demonstration. You can only form the mind 
of reasoning animals upon facts. This is the new discovery. This is fact. This is taste’” 
 
(Dickens, 1854, p. 18) 
 
 
Central epistemological assumptions 
 
 
From the middle of the 16
th
 century to the early decades of the 17
th
, Western Europe 
witnessed an explosion of scientific discoveries and innovations. This era, now 
termed the Scientific Revolution, saw an infinite number of breakthroughs in the 
natural sciences (Henry, 2004; Israel, 2001; Knellwolf, 2004). During this time, the 
finite spherical and earth-centred universe was replaced by Copernicus’s notion of a 
sun-centred solar system in an infinite expanse of space. Galileo’s pioneering laws of 
planetary motion were advanced, and Newton developed his innovative theory of 
gravitation. These evolutions in the fields of cosmology and physics were 
accompanied by numerous innovations in human anatomy and physiology including, 
for example, Harvey’s epochal theory of the circulation of blood and the pumping 
action of the heart. 
 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, what was significant about this period was that it 
saw the emergence of particular ways of thinking about the world, and how it can be 
known. More specifically, it was during this period that the principles and methods 
of science were born and consolidated. According to various historians of the science 
(Henry, 2004; Israel, 2001; Knellwolf, 2004; Stewart, 2004), both the origins and 
fundamentals of this new philosophy of science can be thought to lie in the works of 
Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes and Isaac Newton. I thus briefly touch on the central 
ideas of these three scientists, as this will shed light on some of the key underpinning 
assumptions of the scientific paradigm of thought. 
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Francis Bacon (1561–1626), commonly referred to as the ‘father of the experimental 
method’ was the first to articulate the empiricist philosophy of science (Stewart, 
2004). For Bacon, ideas should not be upheld because of religious doctrines, but 
should be determined through rigorous, empirical methods. That is, all knowledge 
claims should be based upon generalizations of observable facts and technical rules. 
More specifically, he proposed that through direct manipulation and observation, in 
the form of an experiment, one can gain an understanding of the workings of nature 
in a supposedly objective fashion (Knellwolf, 2004). Thus, for Bacon, in order to 
obtain valid knowledge about the world, “all that was required of the scientist was to 
follow procedure correctly” (Dickson, 1979, p. 12). 
 
 
Drawing on these ideas, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), French scientist and founder of 
the so called ‘mechanical philosophy’, proposed a second method for achieving what 
he perceived as legitimate knowledge. Descartes, like Bacon, wished to free himself 
from the current religious criteria of validity, and thus embarked on a general 
reformation of how truth can be obtained (Henry, 2004; Stewart, 2004). Whereas 
Bacon focused on the generalizations of observations and facts, Descartes proposed 
the value of reason as the locus of legitimate knowledge (Schouls, 2004). In 
developing his Cartesian epistemology, Descartes argued that the world could be 
divided into two realms (Henry, 2004). The first realm comprises of the hard and 
machine-like regularities that operate in terms of mathematical laws of cause and 
effect, while the second encompasses human sensibilities and subjective judgements. 
He thus formulated a new kind of radical dualism between the objective and the 
subjective, between logical reason and irrational feelings, between mind and body. 
According to Descartes, it is the first realm which holds the key to the acquisition of 
valid knowledge (Knellwolf, 2004). In other words, according to Descartes, 
legitimate knowledge is that which is built upon the supposedly objective and 
rational deductions of the mind, deductions which should be detached from the 
corporeal and the emotional. 
 
 
These ideas of Bacon and Descartes culminated in Isaac Newton’s (1643- 1727) 
theory of mechanics and gravitation, a theory which was increasingly seen to provide 
a comprehensive scientific explanation of the physical universe (Henry, 2004). 
 
Newton shared Descartes’ view of the mechanistic nature of the universe, but 
tempered this with a Baconian concern for matters of fact and avoidance of 
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speculation. He thus combined the rational, mechanical approach of Descartes with 
the strict empirical procedures of Bacon (Murdoch, 2004). According to Newton, the 
physical universe consists of discrete, solid objects of moving matter that influence 
each other through material forces. The motions of these objects, and their effects, 
are in turn governed entirely by stable laws of nature. The universe as a whole, 
Newton thus asserted, behaves deterministically and that the motions of all physical 
objects can, in principle, be calculated objectively by a finite number of 
mathematical formulae (Henry, 2004). 
 
 
Despite their differences, these three scientists were united on a number of fronts, 
commonalities which embody some of the core contours of the scientific paradigm. 
All three sought to challenge theological understandings of reality by proposing a 
world-view which deferred to science as the ultimate basis for truth (Stewart, 2004). 
All three scientists assumed that physical nature was a rational sphere, operating 
according to orderly and universal principles of cause and effect (Murdoch, 2004). 
For all three of these scientists, these natural laws and principles are in turn knowable 
though the principles and methods of science. In other words, by following a 
standard logic- observation, experimentation, measurement and/or deduction- we can 
come up with explanatory models that objectively capture what is ‘out there’. 
Although they disagreed over whether ‘truth’ was to be derived deductively from 
self-evident first principles or by observation and experiment, there was ultimately a 
shared assumption that ‘truth’ and ‘certainty’ could be acquired through human 
reason (Henry, 2004). In other words, scientific rationality, rather than the religious, 
the spiritual, the emotional, held the key to greater understanding. As such, together 
these scientists formulated a particular style of thinking about the way in which of 
phenomena operate, and how these workings can be legitimately known. 
 
 
As the 17
th
 century unfolded, this particular style of thought had a profound effect 
on thinking not only within the physical sciences, but also within the intellectual and 
social world more generally (Israel, 2001, 2006). It was increasingly believed that if 
phenomena in the physical realm were governed by natural and universal principles, 
then surely the social world would be regulated by a similar set of rules and 
conventions (Fitzpatrick, 2004). There was indeed growing optimism in science as 
the guarantor of knowledge, with the expectation that by imitating the methods and 
principles of the natural sciences, the social world could be grasped and positively 
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directed (Knellwolf, 2004; Wilson, 2004). It was increasingly believed that it was 
just a matter of bringing such methods and thinking to bear on other aspects of 
human affairs. As Enlightenment philosopher Marquis de Condorcet (1795, cited in 
Henry, 2004, p. 24) enquired rhetorically, 
 
The sole foundation for the belief in the natural sciences is the idea that the 
general laws directing the phenomena of the universe, known or unknown, 
are necessary and constant. Why should this principle be any less true for the 
development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man than for the other 
operations of nature? 
 
 
In a similar regard, Rene Descartes also confidently asserted (cited in Henry, 2004, p. 
28): 
 
Those long chains of deductive reasoning… of which geometricians make 
use in order to arrive at the most difficult demonstrations, had caused me to 
imagine that all those things which fall under the cognizance of men might 
very likely be mutually related in the same fashion, and that, provided that 
we… always retain the order which is necessary in order to deduce the one 
conclusion from the other, there can be nothing so remote that we cannot 
reach to it, nor too recondite that we cannot discover it. 
 
 
Proceeding from these kinds of sentiments, from the late 17
th
 century society 
increasingly came under the sway of scientific rationality. And what was most 
significant about this time, was the way in which the principles and methods of 
science came to take on a normative stance, the benchmark for all forms of 
knowledge and ways of thinking. As Henry (2004, p. 10) argues, from the mid-17
th
 
century, “scientific knowledge acquired the cultural kudos in the West…science 
began to be recognized as the supreme cognitive authority, the intellectual system to 
which all others should defer”. Thus, during this time, previous beliefs were steadily 
questioned in light of the new principles of science. There was a growing 
renunciation of mythological and religious cosmologies, which were replaced with 
the new trinity values of observation, experimentation and calculation (Wilson, 
2004). That is, conceptions of truth, and the criteria for judging what is true, were 
more and more governed by the principles of science. For knowledge to acquire 
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value as ‘truth’ it was increasingly believed that it had to constantly strive to become 
 
‘scientific’, to construct and organize concepts according to certain rigorous criteria 
of scientificity. Radical and unequivocal separations were made between the 
 
‘scientific’ and the ‘non-scientific’, the ‘rational’ and the ‘irrational’. And all that 
was seen to be outside of science was increasingly deemed “inadequate, illegitimate 
or nonsensical or superstitious” (Henry, 2004, p. 10). Ultimately, as articulated by 
 
Israel (2001, p.3), “After 1650, everything, no matter how fundamental or deeply 
rooted, was questioned in the light of scientific reason”. 
 
 
The emergence of biomedicine 
 
 
 
Medical practitioners were particularly inspired by the achievements of those 
working in the natural sciences, and increasingly sought to understand the body 
through similar methods and principles (Harrison, 2004). As such, from the late 
17
th
 century a new scientific approach to medicine began to emerge, one which 
crystalized towards the end of 18
th
 century. This scientific paradigm of modern 
medicine is now commonly referred as ‘biomedicine’ or the ‘the biomedical model’ 
 
(Armstrong, 1983), the central tenets of which I will briefly unpack. Drawing heavily 
on the ideas of Bacon and Descartes and later Newton, medical practitioners of the 
late 17
th
 century began to think of the body as if it were a machine, capable of 
mechanistic explanation and manipulation (Good, 1994; Nettleton, 2006; Russell, 
2013). And like the supposedly orderly and predictable ‘nature’ of other entities, it 
was increasingly assumed that so too was disease a natural reality; an invariant 
biological object with a stable, discrete and universal identity (Armstrong, 1983; 
Gordon, 1988; Kirmayer, 1988). Such mechanical imagery is clearly depicted in the 
following 17
th
 century text written by one of the early anatomists who tried to 
understand the workings of the human body: 
 
 
Whoever examines the bodily organism with attention will certainly not fail 
to discern pincers in the jaws and teeth: a container in the stomach: water-
mains in the veins, the arteries and other ducts; a piston in the heart; sieves or 
filters in the bowels; in the lungs, bellows; in the muscles, the force of the 
lever; in the corner of the eye, a pulley, and so on (cited in Russell, 2013, p. 
9) 
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Like those working in the physical sciences who were seeking to separate themselves 
from spiritual understandings of reality, from the late 17
th
 century medical 
practitioners also sought to distinguish disease from theological metaphysics (Good, 
1994; Gordon, 1988). That is, rather than seeing disease as sin, the outcome of 
misfortune or ‘divine punishment’, it was increasingly understood as mechanism: 
“not prayer, but ‘looking and seeing’ what is wrong in the body machine and 
repairing” was regarded as key (Gordon, 1988, p. 24). Similarly, drawing on 
Descartes’ mind-body dualism, clinicians began to distinguish between a person’s 
mind and the material and mechanical operations of the body. That is, ideas, 
emotions, beliefs and values- matters of the mind- were more and more seen as of 
secondary importance when it came to understanding and fixing body-machines 
(Good, 1994; Kirmayer, 1998; Nettleton, 2006). Furthermore, during this time, there 
was a growing expectation that the mechanical functioning of the body and by 
extension, the natural laws of its dysfunctions, would eventually be identifiable, 
explainable and repairable through scientific endeavour (Russell, 2013). Thus, from 
the late 17
th
 century, clinicians increasingly sought to understand the workings of the 
body according to scientific principles and methods, and to discover the laws that 
governed the operations of disease (Harrison, 2004). 
 
 
Towards the end of the 18
th
 century, with the newly discovered pathological 
anatomy, medicine was thought to have found these natural laws. Or as Harrison 
(2004, p. 57) puts it, from this time, medicine was seen to have acquired a supposed 
 
“objective real, and at last an unquestionable foundation for the description of 
disease”. Commonly associated with the work of French physician Xavier Bichat 
(1771-1802) and his ‘tissue pathology’, the discovery of the autopsy and pathological 
anatomy gave rise to the claim that disease existed in the form of localised legions 
inside of the body (Armstrong, 1983, 1984; Sullivan, 1986). In other words, 
particular tissues within the interior of the body were identified as the original sites 
of disease. As Mark Sullivan (1986, p. 335) articulates: 
 
 
Before the autopsy revealed the lesion as the disease, diseases were identical 
to their symptoms. After the autopsy became the definitive way to confront 
disease, it was no longer necessary to define disease in terms of its most 
common symptoms…The symptoms now point to the lesion alone. The 
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lesion becomes the necessary and sufficient condition for the presence of 
disease. 
 
Thus, according to Sullivan (1986) and Armstrong (1983, 1984), with the autopsy, it 
became possible to make inferences from inner lesions back to outer symptoms and 
vice versa. Following Michel Foucault’s analysis of the rise of the ‘medical gaze’, 
Sullivan suggests that this fundamentally transformed the way in which disease was 
understood, and the nature of clinical inquiry. That is, with the discovery of lesion at 
autopsy, disease could now be identified as a supposedly purely natural phenomenon 
within the biological body, totally independent of the patient’s awareness of it. 
Disease was thus increasingly seen as separate from patients’ experienced sense of it. 
 
As Sullivan (ibid, p. 335) highlights: 
 
 
 
By revealing the lesion at autopsy, it becomes possible for the physician to 
identify disease in a way totally independent of the patient's experience of it. 
Disease thus begins to be autonomous from patients’ experienced sense of 
disability. 
 
 
In other words, disease was understood as real, biological disorder, prior to and 
independent from the subjective experience of it. Illness, on the other hand, was seen 
to represent the patient’s personal experience of distress. And these two aspects of 
distress were increasingly afforded a different status. That is, the patient’s subjective 
account of illness was deemed unreliable and essentially irrelevant to the physician’s 
biomedical diagnosis of supposed ‘real disease’. In other words, the patient’s 
personal awareness of distress was subordinated to supposedly objective evidence of 
disease acquired through visual inspection and pathological inquiry modelled after 
the autopsy. According to Sullivan (ibid, p. 337): 
 
 
As the ultimate source of medical knowing shifted from clinical language to 
visibility at the autopsy, the epistemological status of patients’ reports of 
symptoms changed…Symptoms were now data to be used in the search for 
the identity of the disease rather than constituting that identity themselves. 
 
 
A similar argument is made by David Armstrong (1983, 1984), who also draws on 
Foucault’s notion of the rise of the ‘medical gaze’ in the late 18
th
 century. According 
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to Armstrong, at this point, the focus of the clinical exchange was increasingly 
placed on the physical anatomy of the patient in order to localise and identify the 
pathological lesion within the inner spaces of the body. As a result, signs were 
distinguished from symptoms, with the former conceptualised as the prime source of 
knowledge within the clinical inquiry; the final arbiter of clinical truth: 
 
Sign and symptom were separated: the symptom might well remain silent, the 
truth of the disease was contained only in what the doctor found, in the form 
of the sign. Symptoms, what the patient said, could provide a guide or a hint 
or a suspicion of which organ or system might be involved but were only 
preliminaries; the core task of medicine became not the elucidation of what 
the patient said but what the doctor saw in the depths of the body (Armstrong, 
1984, p. 738). 
 
 
Thus, according to Armstrong, as clinical inquiry sought to anticipate anatomical 
inquiry, for example through greater reliance upon techniques of physical diagnosis 
and laboratory investigation, the patient’s capacity for self-knowledge and 
interpretation was isolated away from the body. Or as Sullivan (1986, p. 344) puts it, 
 
“The activity of self-interpretation or self-knowledge is eliminated from the 
body…The body known and healed by modern medicine is not self-aware”. 
 
 
This biomedical understanding of disease, and the nature of clinical inquiry, thus 
produced, and increasingly came to rely upon an additional kind of binary 
opposition, over and above the mind-body split. Sullivan (1986) refers to this as the 
 
‘epistemological dualism’ which lies at the heart of biomedicine. That is, medical 
science increasingly made distinctions between disease and illness, and relatedly, 
between that of physician as active knower and patient as passive known. Within this 
way of thinking, subjective awareness of illness was seen as meaningful only so far 
as it helped point to the underlying disease entity; if no such empirical referent could 
be found, such personal opinions were conceived as essentially irrelevant. ‘Real 
pathology’, on the other hand, reflected natural, disordered physiology (Armstrong, 
1983, 1984; Good, 1994; Gordon, 1988; Sullivan, 1986). 
 
 
Moreover, from this perspective, medical scientific techniques, such as direct 
observation and laboratory results, were seen as able to provide objective and 
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accurate knowledge of the reality of pathology (Armstrong, 1983, 1984; Good, 1994; 
Sullivan, 1986). In other words, medical knowledge and practice was conceived of 
as reflecting the facts of nature; the straight-forward and transparent depiction of the 
universal workings of disease. Put slightly differently, the validity and rationality of 
medical science was seen as dependent upon the causal-functional integration of 
biological systems (Good, 1994). Ultimately, ‘rational’ ways of thinking and 
behaving were understood to be those which are oriented to identifying and treating 
the underlying mechanisms of real pathology. Such an approach to knowing and 
being was seen as providing the means for a definitive, rational and natural science 
of disease, and of medicine. As Bichat in his Anatomic Generale put it (cited in 
Sullivan, ibid, p. 341): 
 
 
Medicine has for a long time been excluded from the exact sciences; it will 
have a right to be associated with them at least as regards the diagnosis of 
disease when one shall have combined everywhere with vigorous clinical 
observation the examination of the alterations suffered by our organs.., of 
what value is clinical observation if one is ignorant of the seat of evil? 
 
 
Understanding the growing sway of scientific rationality 
 
 
 
The question is how this scientific paradigm gained such a powerful influence on 
society so quickly after its emergence, and importantly, how it acquired such a 
normative position with regards to knowledge production, including within 
medicine? The efficiency of scientific rationality, which had led to all kinds of 
ground-breaking understandings and discoveries, including in relation to disease, is 
undeniably a contributing factor. Yet the authoritative stance that science 
increasingly came to occupy cannot be understood solely as the consequence of its 
proficiency. Various historians of science (Israel, 2001, 2006; Knellwolf, 2004; 
Murdoch, 2004) have demonstrated how its growing hegemony in the late 17
th
 and 
18
th
 centuries was also intimately linked to a number of complex social, religious 
and economic forces and interests. These provided a fertile ground for the 
widespread acceptance of, and increasingly normative status afforded to, scientific 
modes of thinking. 
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At the time when the scientific paradigm emerged, Western Europe was experiencing 
a number of significant religious, economic and political changes. As clearly 
articulated by Jonathan Israel in his Radical Enlightenment (2001) and 
 
Enlightenment Contested (2006), 16
th
 and 17
th
 century Europe was ravaged by 
strife and chaos in the name of religion, notably the Thirty Years War (1618-48) on 
the continent and the English Civil Wars of the 1640s. People were deeply affected 
by the horrors of these wars, which had produced immense human suffering- food 
and resource scarcities, disease, violence, material destruction and loss of life. These 
conflicts also gave rise to a growing crisis and confusion in religious thought, and an 
increased schism within western Christendom between Catholicism and 
Protestantism. This period was thus characterized by a growing questioning of, and 
rebellion against, the authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and the simultaneous 
widespread suppression of such dissidence. 
 
 
Within this context, there was a desire for the end of tyrannical ecclesiastical 
hierarchies, and for a philosophy that would bring some form of direction and clarity 
to the growing sense of uncertainty (Israel, 2001, 2006; Knellwolf, 2004). It was 
increasingly believed that there must be a better way to live than under the dominion 
of oppressive religious authorities. The emerging philosophy of science, which was 
explicitly seeking to free itself from theological doctrines, was alluring. Relatedly, 
scientific modes of thinking were thought to have found order within the changing 
world of nature and time, which would have also been appealing. Bacon had indeed 
compared science to a harp, the sounds of which would “quieten beasts” and thereby 
maintain “society and peace…but if these instruments be silent, or that sedition and 
tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion” (cited 
in Israel, 2006, p. 198). Science was seen as possessing the ability to harmonize 
society and sedate social conflict. Thus, as Israel (2006, p. 201) argues “Amid so 
great a crisis gripping religion and religious authority in western Europe, it was only 
to be expected, given the recent stunning advances in astronomy, physics, and 
mathematics, that theologians and philosophers should turn to a new source- science-
for help, confirmation, and support”. 
 
 
The growing acceptance and popularity of scientific thinking was also deeply 
entwined with the economic changes that were occurring in Europe during the 17
th
 
and 18
th
 centuries, or as Habermas puts it, “from the very beginning an intimate 
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relationship existed between scientific philosophy and the bourgeois revolution” 
 
(cited in Arslan, 1999, p. 201). During the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, the continent was 
engaging in widespread colonial expansion, conquering first the Americas and then 
other regions of the world. This was in turn giving rise to a climate of economic 
competition and commercial exchange, with Europe accumulating all kinds of new 
commodities, mineral riches and land (Israel, 2001, 2006; Murdoch, 2004). Relatedly, 
during this time, the beginnings of industrialization started to take shape, first in 
England and later spreading to the rest of Europe. It was a time in which transport links 
were improving, new forms of mechanisation were developing, and towns were 
growing and becoming cities. Europe during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries was thus 
witnessing a major growth in empire and commerce, ultimately giving rise to a 
growing industrial, capitalist economy (Israel, 2001, 2006; Murdoch, 2004). 
 
 
This new wave of commercial and economic development within Europe was 
producing profound shifts in social hierarchies and forms of organization, and in 
particular, the ascendance of a new and powerful entrepreneurial class (Israel, 2001, 
2006). This wealthy class was increasingly placing value on the secular ideals of 
material wealth, commercial growth and individual freedom, ideals which were 
coming into conflict with the ideologies of the church and feudal hierarchies 
(Murdoch, 2004). This rapidly growing bourgeoisie resented the power and wealth 
of the church and feudal lords, which were seen as hindering their more secular 
interests of material progress, and increasingly sought ways of acquiring greater 
power and autonomy within the socio-economic and political realms (Festa & Carey, 
2009). Science, including biomedicine, was seeking to undermine the credibility of 
the church, and was thus seen by the bourgeoisie as a crucial means through which 
they could liberate themselves from social and economic forms of submission. 
Ultimately, science, with its ideals of discovery, progress and reason, was believed to 
hold key intellectual insights for economic advancement and greater socio-political 
freedom (Murdoch, 2004). 
 
 
Therefore, by the time the scientific paradigm emerged in the mid-17
th
 century, there 
was growing dissatisfaction with theological dogmatism and tyrannical hierarchies in 
Europe. Moreover, profound socio-economic shifts were taking place during this 
time, with the continent changing into a society increasingly dominated by 
commercial power structures and interests. Late 17
th
 and 18
th
 century Europe was 
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therefore characterised by the growing desire for new kinds of thinking and 
authorities. The principles and methods of science held the key to legitimizing and 
consolidating these transformations and sentiments. However, as suggested by 
Arslan (1999), Festa & Carey (2009) and Wilson (2004), for this to be possible, 
science needed to be become the authoritative, even sole criterion of truth claims. Put 
somewhat crudely, the methods and principles of science needed to become a new 
kind of orthodoxy, the benchmark to which all other ways of knowing and being 
should defer. Rigid distinctions needed to be made between the ‘scientific’ and the 
‘non-scientific’, and thus the ‘rational’ and the ‘non-rational’; the ‘legitimate’ and 
the ‘illegitimate’. Ultimately, these kinds of stark delineations, and the values 
imbedded within them, were intimately entangled with efforts to undermine the 
legitimacy of ecclesiastical doctrines and weaken the monolithic hold of the 
Christian Church and feudal hierarchies. 
 
 
As the 19
th
 century unfolded, these socio-economic and political changes taking 
place in Europe were consolidated, and the paradigm of science played a 
fundamental role their solidification. As will be expanded upon below, 19
th
 
century Europe saw the decline of feudalism and royal absolutism and the birth of 
the modern, nation and industrial state. From this point, the church was separated 
from the state, and activities previously undertaken within the sacred sphere were 
increasingly subsumed under bureaucratic institutions and practices related to the 
nation-state (Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1993; Scott, 1998; Turner, 1995). During 
this time, the social prestige afforded to science expanded considerably. 
 
 
In summary, with the formation of the new state, together with the associated 
maturing industrial and capitalist economy, there was growing state concern around 
how to introduce greater control and management of individuals (Armstrong, 1983; 
Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1993; Turner, 1995). That is, the regulation of 
populations, or in Foucault’s words, ‘the governmentality’ of people- their wealth, 
their health, their means of subsistence, their customs and habits and so forth-
increasingly emerged as political objectives of the state (Foucault, 1984). As Scott 
(1998, p. 77) emphasizes, “Early modern European statecraft required knowledge of, 
and access to, a previously opaque society… not only the new forms of thought, but 
also novel procedures of documentation, computation and evaluation”. Here the 
emerging scientific bodies of knowledge (medicine, criminology, penology, 
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sociology, psychology, education, etc.), and associated institutions (the asylum, the 
clinic, the prison etc.), held a special place. Conceived of as knowing the 
mechanisms by which individuals and populations functioned, such apparatuses were 
seen to provide the means for their governmentality, a role which they increasingly 
came to occupy (Armstrong, 1984; Rose, 1993; Turner, 1995). 
 
 
The increased authority afforded to science, and particularly biomedicine during the 
19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, was also intimately entangled with the growth of Empire. 
During this time, the colonial endeavours of the preceding centuries expanded 
considerably, with Europe violently invading, occupying and annexing countries in 
Africa. Biomedicine occupied a special place within these endeavours, or as 
Comaroff (1993, p. 306) puts it, the “development of colonialism in Africa as a 
cultural enterprise was inseparable from the rise of biomedicine as a science”. If lay 
people in Europe were increasingly seen to hold frequently erroneous subjective 
understandings about illness, the beliefs of people in Africa were understood to 
personify the height of irrationality and degeneration (McCulloch, 1995; Vaughan, 
1991). As such, medicine within the colonies in Africa was characterized, at least in 
part, by a struggle between rational Western biomedicine and primitive traditional 
therapeutics (Comaroff, 1993; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1992; King, 2002; Vaughan, 
 
1991). In its imaginary, ‘Western’ biomedicine embodied the highest form of 
rationality, in contrast to the supposed backward and superstitious nature of 
indigenous medical beliefs and practices. Thus, during the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, 
there was a strong focus on supposedly medically ‘modernizing’ populations within 
 
Africa. Such ‘modernization’ entailed denigrating and attempting to drive out 
primitive traditional therapeutics, via export of biomedical theories and practices. 
This process was ultimately constructed as a humanitarian endeavour, essentially 
freeing backward societies from the grip of irrational forms of thinking and being. 
 
 
There was thus a dialectical interplay between 19
th
 century biomedicine and the 
colonizing project in Africa, or in Comaroff’s (1993, p. 306) words, “they were cut 
from the same cultural cloth”. That is, when the colonists tried to ‘domesticate’ the 
realities of supposedly primitive Africa, they drew heavily upon biomedical icons 
and practices to impose their domination. Biomedicine was therefore intrinsic to the 
operation of colonial power, providing the legitimacy of science to colonial 
ideologies (Comaroff, 1993; McCulloch, 1995; Vaughan, 1991). At the same time, 
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colonial endeavours in Africa also provided biomedicine with an essential empirical 
 
‘laboratory’ and a supposedly natural rationale for its emerging vision of the body 
and its ailments. Indeed, the ‘African’ mind and body captured the imagination of 
colonial medicine, increasingly becoming prime ‘objects’ of study for British 
medical practitioners (Butchart, 1998; Holdstock, 2000; McCulloch, 1995; Swartz, 
1986). Thus, as Vaughan (1991, p. 201) puts it, “Colonialism provided much ‘raw 
material’ on which the new scientific biomedicine drew for the elaboration of its 
theories, and also provided a ‘surgery’ for the evolving practice of medicine”. 
 
Colonial activities therefore provided further power and authority to the emerging 
biomedical sciences in Europe. In summary, 19
th
 century biomedicine and the 
ideology of imperial control buttressed each other, ultimately verifying and 
strengthening the other through the categories and metaphors of a mutually 
sustaining vision. As Comaroff (1993, p. 324) succinctly articulates: 
 
 
Medicine both informed and was informed by imperialism, in Africa and 
elsewhere. It gave the validity of science to the humanitarian claims of 
colonialism, while finding confirmation for its own authority in the living 
laboratories enclosed by expanding imperial frontiers. 
 
 
The paradigm of human rights 
 
 
“Rights are too often treated as a kind of god-term. Rights clearly have historical roots…and need to 
be understood in light of their place in the order of existence” 
 
(Frohnen & Grasso, 2009, p. 1) 
 
 
As I have been suggesting, during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century, Europe was being 
strongly influenced by scientific rationality, with this mode of thinking laying the 
seeds for a number of other forms of knowledge about the social world. One such 
structure of thought, which drew heavily on the new principles of science, was the 
paradigm of human rights. According to various historians on this subject (Frohnen 
& Grasso, 2009; Hunt, 2007; Stearns, 2012), both the origins and fundamentals of 
the notion of human rights can be seen to lie with the works of three particular 
Enlightenment intellectuals: John Locke (1632-1704), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-
78) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). I thus briefly touch on the central ideas of 
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these three intellectuals, as this will shed light on some of the key underpinning 
assumptions of the human rights paradigm of thought. 
 
 
Central epistemological assumptions 
 
 
 
Central to the political philosophies of both English philosopher John Locke and 
French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the notion of a ‘state of nature’, and 
associated ideas of ‘natural law’ and ‘natural rights’. For these intellectuals, the state 
of nature is one in which people enjoy “perfect freedom” and in which “all men by 
nature are equal” (cited in Gorman, 2003, p. 56/57). According to them, there are no 
divine rights that only the privileged few possess; rather, everyone is equal and no 
one is above the law of nature. As Locke states: “It is evident that all human beings-
as creature belonging to the same species and rank and born indiscriminately with all 
the same natural advantages and faculties- are equal amongst themselves” (cited in 
 
Stearns, 2012, p. 58). In a similar manner, Rousseau proclaimed: 
 
 
 
Man is born free; their liberty belongs to them, and no one but they has the 
right to dispose of it…To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to 
surrender the rights of humanity and even its duties...Such a renunciation is 
incompatible with man's nature; to remove all liberty from his acts is to 
remove all morality from his acts (cited in Fudjack, 2001, p. 7). 
 
 
Thus, for these philosophers, the natural order of things is one in which people are 
inherently free and equal, possessing certain natural rights which cannot be denied, 
abrogated or transferred from one individual to another. In further elaborating the 
 
‘nature’ of these innate rights, the notion of human autonomy emerged as central 
(Hinkelammert, 2004; Mahoney, 2007; Tierney, 2005). That is, for Locke and 
Rousseau, people were seen to be naturally endowed with the inalienable rights of 
self-ownership, self-determination and self-mastery. For example, according to 
Locke, in the state of nature, everyone “is bound to preserve himself” possessing the 
“liberty of acting according to his own Will”. For him, this is the “foundation” of all 
that belongs to oneself, “the fence” to one’s self-preservation and the “law of 
nature…which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind” (cited in Gorman, 
2003, p. 56/57). Furthermore, for these intellectuals, people’s corporal integrity and 
autonomy are intimately entangled with the property rights of individuals. As Locke 
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famously declared “every man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has 
any Right to but himself” and thus “every man, hath by Nature a Power…to preserve 
his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate, against the injuries and Attempts of 
other Men” (cited in Frohnen & Grasso, 2009, p. 43). Indeed, Locke took this idea 
further by asserting that in the state of nature, the world belongs to humankind 
equally, and thus every individual has the right to unlimited accumulation of 
resources: 
 
God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them 
reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience. The 
earth, and all that is therein, is given to men for the support and comfort of 
their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, 
belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand 
of nature…yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity be a 
means to appropriate them some way or other before than can be of any use, 
or at all beneficial to any particular man (cited in Hinkelammert, 2004, p. 15). 
 
 
Further still, for Locke, this unrestricted entitlement to accrue resources also endows 
people with the “private right” to procure human labour in exchange for money: 
 
 
It is plain, that men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal possession 
of the earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, 
how a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product 
of, by receiving in exchange for the overplus, gold and silver, which may be 
hoarded up without injury to anyone, these metals not spoiling or decaying in 
the hands of the possessor (cited in Hinkelammert, 2004, p. 17). 
 
 
According to Locke and Rousseau, people possess these inherent rights and 
freedoms, including property rights, because of the intrinsic rationality of humanity. 
 
In the words of Rousseau, “The freedom then of man, and liberty of acting according 
to his own will, is grounded on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in 
that law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far he is left to the 
freedom of his own will” (cited in Gorman, 2003, p. 57). People were therefore 
understood to be endowed with natural entitlements for no other reason than their 
inherent capacity to reason. And for these philosophers, it is this ability to reason that 
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should guide people in their establishment of fundamental moral principles and 
ethical laws. Put slightly differently, for Locke and Rousseau, morality could be 
objectively determined through none other than human reason. 
 
 
This primacy afforded to reason, in understandings of both human ‘nature’ and 
ethical laws, was further consolidated by the thinking of German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant. Drawing on the works of Locke and Rousseau, Kant believed that 
individuals possess what he called the “innate rights” of equality, freedom and 
dignity (cited in Mahoney, 2007, p. 34). Moreover, like Locke and Rousseau, Kant 
asserted that people possess these ‘innate rights’ because they hold a natural ability 
to reason. As Kant writes: “Man regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a 
morally practical reason… possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he 
exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings of the world” (cited in 
 
Mahoney, 2007, p. 34). Kant asserts further: 
 
 
 
Now, I say, man, and in general, every rational being exists as an end in 
himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that 
will…Beings whose existence does not depend on our will but on nature, if 
they are not rational beings, have only a relative worth as means and are 
therefore called “things”; on the other hand, rational beings are designated 
“persons” because their nature indicates that they are ends in 
themselves….Such an end is one for which no other end can be substituted, to 
which these beings should merely serve as means. For without them, nothing 
of absolute worth could be found (cited in Cheah, 1997, p. 243). 
 
 
In other words, according to Kant, what gives human beings their unique dignity and 
worth is their innate capacity to exercise reason. Moreover, like Locke and Rousseau, 
Kant believed that universal and objective ethical laws could be developed by 
applying this human reason. In seeking to develop a solid foundation on which to 
build a supposedly universal theory of ethics, or what he called “the supreme 
principle of morality”, Kant argued that “the ground of obligation must be looked 
for…solely a priori in concepts of pure reason” (cited in Mahoney, 2007, p. 33, his 
emphasis). 
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For all three philosophers, however, people may not always think and act according 
to reason, and as such, may not inevitably realise their natural rights and freedoms. 
 
As Rousseau explains, what reason requires is “intelligible and plain” but he holds 
that “self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends; and, on the 
other side, ill-nature, passion and revenge will carry them far too in publishing 
others” (cited in Gorman, 2003, p. 58). Similarly, Locke asserted, “Were it not for 
the corruption, and vitiousness of degenerate Men” there would be no need for 
people to leave the state of nature and by mutual agreement develop a means in 
which they can “unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and 
 
Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property” (cited in Mahoney, 2007, p. 19). 
 
For these intellectuals then, there is a need for a legitimate political authority which 
can act as the protector and enforcer of people’s natural rights and universal 
entitlements. As Locke emphasized, “The law of Nature would, as all other laws that 
concern men in the world, be in vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature 
had a power to execute that law” (cited in Gorman, 2003, p. 57). Thus, according to 
Locke, Rousseau and Kant, there is a need for a ‘social contract’ in which each 
individual resigns his power to a socio-political organisation which has a common 
established law and judicature. As Rousseau explains: 
 
 
Just as nature gives each man absolute power over all his limbs, the social 
pact gives the body politic absolute power over its members… What man 
loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to 
everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil 
liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses…We might, over and above 
all this, add, to what man acquires in the civil state, moral liberty, which 
alone makes him truly master of himself; for the mere impulse of appetite is 
slavery, while obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves is liberty 
(cited Mahoney, 2007, p. 16). 
 
 
As such, according to these three philosophers, by developing a legitimate body 
politic, we are compelled to abide by the moral laws that we prescribe to ourselves, 
and in turn, we become masters of our property and of ourselves. For them, through 
this arrangement, genuine human freedom becomes possible. According to all three 
of these philosophers, the kind of political organization that can ensure this is one 
founded on the principle of consensus decision-making, in other words participatory 
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democracy (Franke, 2008, 2011, 2013; Gorman, 2003; Mahoney, 2007). In other 
words, establishing the conditions under which human freedom is possible, wherein 
it becomes possible to determine the rights that humans may appropriately claim of 
one another in a truly universal and objective form, means forming a political regime 
ordered around sovereign, nation-states. This form of political organization, which 
 
Kant defines as a “moral requirement” can thus provide “the sum of laws which need 
to be promulgated generally in order to bring about a rightful condition” (cited in 
 
Franke, 2013, p. 371). 
 
 
 
Pulling these various ideas together, it is clear that these three philosophers’ thinking 
on human rights shared a number of underpinning assumptions (See Pannikar, 1984 
and Sardar, 1998 for comprehensive summaries of these shared epistemologies). 
Their thinking is all premised on the notion of a universal human nature that is 
inevitably shared by all people. This ‘nature’ is one in which human beings are 
essentially independent entities, endowed with an inherent rationality and self-
interested drive. The human being is thus fundamentally the individual, and human 
rights are there primarily to protect the autonomy of individuals, including their 
individual property rights. At the same time, this human ‘nature’ is conceived of as 
essentially different from, and superior to, other living beings. Unlike other beings, 
we have certain intrinsic rights and entitlements because we are born with dignity 
but, more importantly, because we possess the innate rational capacity needed to 
reaffirm such dignity. Moreover, for all three philosophers, universal and objective 
ethical laws can be determined by this innate ability to reason, in other words, moral 
principles and actions should be derived solely through human reason. At the same 
time, their thinking presupposes a socio-political order based on liberal democracy, 
which is lauded for its supposed intrinsic ability to objectively protect and enforce 
the independent rights of individuals. That is, the sovereign nation-state is recognised 
as the inevitable means for achieving otherwise unreachable rights and freedoms. 
 
 
What is particularly significant about this interrelated set of assumptions is the 
quality of normativity and inevitability it tends to embody. People are assumed to be 
naturally autonomous and innately rational, and the sovereign nation-state is seen to 
be a universal inevitability. Indeed, for these philosophers, people who defy their 
supposedly ‘inherent’ way of being and who ‘refuse’ to live by this apparently 
preordained political order, have defied the laws of human nature and have in turn 
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rebelled against humankind. For Rousseau, such individuals can be justifiably forced 
to do so: “If anyone refuses to obey the general will he will be compelled to do so by 
the whole body; which means nothing else than he will be forced to be free” (cited in 
 
Mahoney, 2007, p. 16). For Kant, such individuals “have only a relative worth…and 
are therefore called ‘things’” (cited in Cheah, 1997, p. 243). Similarly for Locke, 
such individuals are no more than objects, or what he terms “noxious creatures” that 
should be annihilated: 
 
 
In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by 
another rule, than that of reason and common equity…and so he becomes 
dangerous to mankind… being a trespass against the whole species, and the 
peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature…Besides the crime 
which consists in violating the law and varying from the right rule of reason, 
whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to quit the 
principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature (Locke, 1690, cited 
in Hinkelammert, 2004, p. 6). 
 
 
More still: 
 
 
[Upon renouncing] reason, the common rule and measure…hath by the unjust 
violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all 
mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger, one of those 
savage wild beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security (Locke, 
1690, cited in Hinkelammert, 2004, p. 6) 
 
 
Epistemological assumptions in socio-economic and political context 
 
 
 
It is thus clear that the paradigm of human rights drew heavily on the kind of 
scientific rationality that was gaining currency at the time. Like the supposed ordered 
and universal ‘nature’ of the physical world, human nature was assumed to 
essentially rational and inevitably common to all people, everywhere. And like the 
laws of the physical realm, it was assumed that universal moral principles too could 
be objectively and unequivocally determined through none other than reason. 
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This new paradigm of human rights was also deeply influenced by, and in turn 
provided legitimacy to, the new socio-political and economic structures that were 
coming into being. As I have been describing, 17
th
 and 18
th
 century Europe was 
witnessing growing hostility towards religious and aristocratic dogmas, and the 
steady weakening of the monolithic hold of the Christian Church. During this time, 
extensive debates were occurring around what might constitute legitimate forms of 
governance. It was a time when all sorts of new ideas were emerging about popular 
sovereignty and the absolute will of the people, as opposed to royal absolutism and 
religious authority. The notion of human rights clearly drew heavily upon, and 
provided further currency for, these sentiments (Franke, 2008, 2011). Rather than 
deriving from divine rights and the will of God, human rights discourse emphasised 
that moral and ethical principles arose naturally from human reason. Furthermore, 
human rights discourse asserted explicitly that the fulfilment of these natural rights 
and freedoms necessitates a particular form of political authority, one based on 
 
‘collective will’, rather than on divine rights and traditions. In emphasising the 
equality of individuals, their natural rights and their power to establish and change 
political authority, the notion of human rights helped validate the breaking with 
aristocratic and religious government and the tradition of divine right (Frohnen and 
Grasso, 2009; Hinkelammert, 2004; Mahoney, 2007). 
 
 
Moreover, the assumptions embedded within the paradigm of human rights reflected, 
and in turn helped further consolidate, the growing capitalist economy and 
increasingly powerful bourgeoisie (Bates, 2012; Haskell, 1985; Manoka, 2009). At 
the heart of Locke, Rousseau and Kant’s theorising of human rights was a particular 
concern with the economic freedom of individuals, and their rights to accrue private 
property, resources and employment. Such thinking clearly reflected the functioning 
of the growing commercial market and the ideals of the entrepreneurial class of 17
th
 
and 18
th
 century Europe. Not only did the paradigm of human rights reflect such 
interests, it also codified some of the most fundamental elements of modern 
capitalism. Indeed, the feudal relations of production had a very particular ideology 
which helped to sustain them. This involved interpreting social relations as having a 
divine origin, with each individual performing a specific function ascribed by God. 
As Larrain (cited in Manoka, 2009, p. 447) puts it, in feudalism: 
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Ideology assumes a religious form; the justification of personal dependence is 
found in a sacred order which is revealed by God and which consequently 
cannot be altered by man. Personal dependence upon, and loyalty to, the 
landlord is spontaneously expressed in the ideological submission to God, 
from which all subordination is modeled. 
 
The paradigm of human rights provided a new form of ideology which helped to 
justify the changes in relations of production from a feudal-based system to a 
capitalist one. In emphasising the inherent freedom and equality of all individuals 
and of the market, human rights discourse ‘naturalised’ the existence of private 
property and wage labour. Ultimately, as Manoka (2009, p. 448) argues, “The 
ideology of freedom and equality embodied in the notion of rights has developed 
historically in an organic relationship with capitalism”. 
 
 
The paradigm of human rights was also intimately entangled with 17
th
 and 18
th
 
century European colonial endeavours in the Americas and the Far East, especially 
India, and later in Africa. As Hinkelammert (2004, p. 4) outlines, prior to the 17
th
 
century, European expansion was justified by the divine rights of the monarchy, 
however, “since the bourgeois revolution had eliminated the divine right of kings… 
the urgency for a new political theory was evident”. The paradigm of human rights 
ultimately provided this new ideology, which was increasingly used to justify 
European expropriation of the other territories and populations as a humanitarian 
endeavour. As highlighted above, through its assumptions of naturalism and 
universalism, human rights discourse implies that people who defy their supposedly 
 
‘inherent’ way of being have rebelled against the natural order of nature. According 
to Locke, for example, these individuals and populations are “degenerate” and “wild 
beasts” who have assaulted “the entire species” and have thus become a “danger to 
mankind” (cited in Hinkelammert, ibid, p. 4). As such, they can be compelled, 
justifiably, to be transformed, or even annihilated. In other words, for Locke, who 
had indeed invested much of his fortune in the English slave trade: “in waging an 
unjust war against humankind” such offenders can be “destroyed as a lion or a tiger” 
and “their goods or services can be appropriated as reparations for the losses suffered 
by the conqueror” (cited in Hinkelammert, ibid, p. 5). Thus, ultimately, drawing 
heavily on this way of thinking, the European invasion and conquering of foreign 
territories could now be vindicated as an apparently legitimate political action in the 
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name of peace; the loyal application and restoration of the supposed ‘natural’ order 
of things. As Hinkelammert (2004, p. 2) describes: 
 
 
The Spanish based the conquest of America on the denunciation of the human 
sacrifices committed by aboriginal American civilizations. Later, the 
conquest of North America was argued for based on the violations of human 
rights on the part of Native Americans. The conquest of Africa was justified 
by the denunciation of cannibalism, the conquest of India by the denunciation 
of widow immolation, the destruction of China by the opium wars was 
equally based on the denunciation of the violation of human rights in China. 
The West conquered the world, destroyed cultures and civilizations… all of 
this was done in in the name of preserving human rights and restoring the 
natural laws of reason. 
 
 
It is thus clear that the paradigm of human rights was thus deeply embroiled with the 
socio-economic and political changes that were taking place within 17
th
 and 18
th
 
century Europe, possessing a dialectical relationship with the decline of religious and 
aristocratic authorities, the rise of the liberal nation-state, the growth of modern 
capitalism and the expansion of empire. The interconnected relationship between 
these different factors culminated in the major changes that occurred at the end of the 
18
th
 century, when the momentous American and French Revolutions took place. 
These revolutions simultaneously gave birth to the modern nation-state and the 
ultimate decline of feudalism, royal absolutism and religious authority. They also 
gave rise to the official legal endorsement of human rights principles (Hunt, 2007). 
Drawing heavily on the works of Locke, Rousseau and Kant, The American 
Declaration of Independence (1776) stated: 
 
 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that 
they are endowed…with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness…that to secure these rights, 
governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed (cited in Stearns, 2012, p. 75). 
 
 
Similarly, France’s Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789) asserted that 
 
“Men are born and remain free and equal in rights”, and assigned sovereignty to the 
 
102 
nation whose sole purpose was to protect the “rights to liberty, property, security 
and resistance to oppression” (cited in Hunt, 2007, p. 21). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
In this chapter I have surfaced, and put into historical perspective, the 
epistemological assumptions underpinning two particular paradigms of thought-
those of evidence-based science (including biomedicine) and human rights. I have 
attempted to destabilise the self-evidence of these ways of thinking by showing how, 
rather than being inevitable mappings of the world, they arose out of a very specific 
social and historical milieu. The growing strength afforded to these paradigms was 
intimately entangled with the way in which they provided an ideological basis for the 
many socio-economic and political changes taking place in 17
th
 and 18
th
 century 
Europe. As these changes were consolidated in the subsequent centuries, so too was 
the tenacity of these ways of thinking. In the chapters which follow, I show how 
these paradigms are playing a fundamental role in shaping knowledge on the ‘gap’ in 
mental health care in Africa. This current chapter has concentrated primarily on the 
historical constitution of these paradigms and associated assumptions. In the 
subsequent analyses, I destabilise the underpinning assumptions I have surfaced in 
this chapter further, by shedding light on the many questionable certainties upon 
which they are based. 
 
 
Although there are obvious differences between these two paradigms, what I have 
tried to reveal in this chapter is that they are both underpinned by a shared set of 
epistemological assumptions. These assumptions merge around a now familiar group 
of abstractions, in particular, those of naturalism, universalism, objectivity and 
rationalism. That is, these paradigms are united in their understanding of the world as 
a rational and invariant sphere, one which operates according to orderly and discrete 
principles of cause and effect. That is, both are premised on the notion of an 
inherently universal ‘nature’ (social, physical, biological etc.) that is ‘out there’ and 
available for mechanistic explanation and manipulation. Furthermore, both assume 
that the ‘nature’ of this world and its inhabitants are objectively knowable though 
scientific rationality. In other words, both paradigms are based upon the assumption 
that ‘truth’ and ‘certainty’ can be acquired through none other than the principles and 
methods of science. So, for example, the body and its dysfunctions are assumed to be 
103 
accurately knowable and treatable through medical science. Moreover, supposedly 
universal ethical laws are understood to be objectively and definitively determinable 
through logic and reason. Ultimately, according to both of these paradigms of 
thought, logical and rational forms of thinking and being, rather than the religious, 
the spiritual, the emotional and so forth, hold the key to greater understanding and 
better ways of living. 
 
 
These kinds of assumptions underpinning both paradigms also coalesce around a 
particular way of ordering the social world, one which is based upon homogenous 
entities and stark binary oppositions. That is, they produce and rely on rigid 
demarcations between the rational and the irrational; the moral and the immoral; the 
objective and the subjective; knowledge and belief; body and mind; disease and 
illness; material and spiritual. Moreover, through this logic, entities in one column 
are designated as inherently superior or essentially progressive, whilst those in the 
other column are relegated as innately inferior or naturally subsidiary. Ultimately, 
the value judgements underpinning these designations become ‘black-boxed’ in the 
supposedly progressive language of science and human rights. 
 
 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, this overarching system of classification is 
indeed one of the most stubborn and powerful forms of classification buried in the 
episteme of European Colonial Modernity. As highlighted in the preceding chapter, 
and contextualised further in this current chapter, this way of ordering the social 
world was intimately entangled with modernist Europe’s attempts to delineate its 
own contemporary identity, and to distinguish itself, unequivocally, from both 
previous eras and other societies. Such efforts ultimately depended upon stark 
demarcations between the legitimate and illegitimate; the rational and the irrational; 
the natural and the unnatural; the moral and the immoral; the modern and the 
primitive. In other words, by legitimizing tropes of otherness and polarizations of 
difference, this form of ordering helped to unambiguously distinguish certain ways 
of thinking and being as inevitably superior in comparison to others. Not surprising, 
those institutions, practices, and conceptual schemes that were constructed as 
supposedly the most advanced were exactly those that were coming into being within 
18
th
 century Europe- an industrial capitalist economy, a liberal nation-state, 
positivistic scientific methods, biomedical techniques, human rights principles or 
various ensembles of these things. 
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 In short, this way of classifying the social world into rigid demarcations, and the 
values embedded in these binaries, was deeply embroiled with 17
th
 and 18
th
 century 
struggles in Europe over the authorisation of knowledge, and attempts to develop 
boundaries of socio-economic and political legitimacy. Ultimately, this form of 
ordering was part and parcel of battles to loosen the power of religious and 
aristocratic authorities, to separate church and state, to consolidate an industrial 
capitalist economy and to expand European empires. The question is whether we 
really need to continue to fight those battles that took place in Europe so long ago, in 
this way. 
 
 
In addition to the material and physical forms of exclusion, oppression and 
discrimination this form of ordering and associated assumptions has generated in the 
past and continues to produce today, it also has significant epistemological 
consequences. One of the major epistemological effects is the way in which it tends 
to negate its ‘others’. That is, through this system of classification and associated 
assumptions, the paradigms of evidence-based science and human rights imply that 
the only worthy ways of thinking and being in the world are those which originate 
from their own epistemological codes (Connell, 2007; De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; 
Mignolo, 2007; Nandy, 1989; Quijano, 2000, 2007; Smith, 1999). Only 
understandings of disease as natural, disordered physiology are seen as legitimate. 
Only the techniques and principles of medical science are understood as being 
appropriate ways of depicting and treating the workings of disease. Only the idea of 
human beings as rational and self-determined individuals is understood as valid. 
Only systems of justice and morality which are derived through reason and enforced 
through a democratic nation-state are conceived of as acceptable. Ultimately, ‘other’ 
ways of thinking and being, which are based upon alternative epistemological 
assumptions and politics, are deemed inevitably irrelevant, inferior, irrational and/or 
illegitimate. 
 
 
This kind of epistemological exclusion or silencing that is produced by the 
paradigms of evidence-based science and human rights is what is meant by Gayatri 
 
Chakravorty Spivak’s (1990, 1995), often used phrase “epistemic violence”, or what 
others have termed “epistemicide” (Harding, 1998). Spivak poses the now much 
publicized question “Can the Subaltern Speak?” which for her is really a question 
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about who is heard, and what enables us to be heard and to hear. As she (1990, p. 
59/60) puts it: 
 
For me, the question ‘Who should speak?’ is less crucial than ‘Who 
will listen?’ ‘I will speak for myself as a Third World person’ is an 
important position for political mobilization today. But the real 
demand is that, when I speak from that position, I should be listened 
to seriously, not with that kind of benevolent imperialism… 
 
Spivak is arguing that the subaltern seldom speaks and is rarely properly heard. If 
they talk at all, they are heard only if they speak through the voice of the inherited 
modernist and colonial archive. In other words, unless one speaks through the 
dominant and entrenched language of European modernity and colonialism, one 
will not be heard. Thus, one of the real epistemological dangers with the kinds of 
paradigms I have explored in this current chapter is the way in which they occlude 
other, potentially important and meaningful ways of thinking and being, from 
entering the citadel of knowledge. 
 
In the chapters that follow, it will become clear that this exclusionary logic is playing 
out profoundly in the production of contemporary knowledge on the mental health 
 
‘treatment gap’ in Africa. That is, a key thread running through my analyses is the 
way in which the two paradigms explored in this chapter are foreclosing other, 
potentially meaningful, ways of thinking about mental health care in Africa. The 
argument I will make throughout these analyses is that these kinds of paradigms of 
thought may be important and meaningful in Africa, and thus should not inevitably 
be rejected. Yet what I will again and again problematise is their hegemony, the way 
in which they become the gatekeepers of knowledge, ultimately policing the 
boundaries of legitimate forms of knowing, and by extension, valid forms of care 
and well-being. 
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Abstract 
 
 
Global Mental Health research is increasingly highlighting the high levels of 
untreated mental illness in Africa and calling for the scaling-up of services in order 
to redress this situation. A particular model of care is being strongly advocated for 
such scale-up, and a recent explosion of research is providing guidelines for its 
implementation. This article seeks to open up the ‘black box’ of international 
research on scaling up the provision of mental health care in Africa, unearthing the 
hidden assumptions and power dynamics underpinning the knowledge produced. It 
insists that gaining a better understanding of care provision demands that we not only 
fill the gaps in knowledge but also problematize the assumptions upon which 
existing knowledge is based. This article demonstrates how two interrelated 
paradigms are strongly mediating research in this area – those of ‘scientific evidence’ 
and ‘human rights’. Drawing on theory and research from Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) and Postcolonial Studies, it demonstrates how these paradigms are 
both underpinned by several contentious epistemological assumptions, assumptions 
which are deeply inserted within the epistemological order of Western modernity and 
colonialism. The main argument is that through their shared ideological undertones 
of ‘objectivity’, ‘universalism’ and ‘rationalism’, these paradigms are potentially 
marginalizing other possibly important ways of thinking about care in Africa, ways 
which might not originate from colonial and modernist forms of consciousness. This 
article makes a plea for a more inclusive and plural archive of knowledge on scaling 
up mental health care in Africa, one which is more hospitable to diverse 
epistemological politics and moral landscapes. 
 
 
Keywords: Africa, care provision, epistemological assumptions, mental health 
research, Postcolonialism 
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Introduction 
 
 
We have presented the knowledge base and the strategies to improve mental health. Now we need 
political will and solidarity, from the global health community, to put this knowledge to use. The time 
to act is now. (Global Mental Health Group, 2007: 1250). 
 
 
… we mistook the map for the territory, and re-imprisoned ourselves in our unbearable wrongness of 
being … (Wynter, 2006: 107). 
 
 
Over the last decade, the mental health situation in Africa has gained renewed 
attention as an important public health concern within the global arena (Global 
Mental Health Group, 2007). One issue of particular concern is what is understood as 
a considerable number of people with mental health problems on the continent not 
receiving care, now referred to as the mental health ‘treatment gap’ (Petersen et al., 
 
2011; World Health Organization, 2001). This issue has in turn given rise to a ‘broad 
new social movement’, led by the international psychiatric community but 
incorporating a broad coalition of actors and agencies, which is focused on 
narrowing this ‘gap’ (Horton, 2007: 806). Within this movement, there is a 
significant degree of consensus that increasing the levels of mental health care in 
Africa requires the scaling-up of services by implementing a particular model of 
care. Such a model, it is emphasized, involves the deinstitutionalization of mental 
health care by integrating it into primary health settings and developing community-
based forms of care (Patel et al., 2011; WHO, 2008). In light of this consensus, a 
strong recent focus of global mental research has been on investigating, and 
providing guidelines around, exactly what kinds of mental health care interventions 
should be implemented within primary health care and community settings (Patel and 
Thornicroft, 2009; WHO, 2010). 
 
 
Now, the content of this particular model of care, and the guidelines around its 
implementation, has generated a fair degree of debate, with various scholars raising 
concerns about its appropriateness for African countries. For example, it has been 
suggested inter alia that such an approach may be associated with an increased 
burden on households (Breen et al., 2007), may create new resource challenges 
(Kigozi, 2007), may exacerbate already over-burdened health systems and associated 
stressors for health workers (Breier et al., 2009; Petersen, 2000) and may marginalize 
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patients with chronic mental illnesses (Swartz and MacGregor, 2002). 
Notwithstanding the importance of these issues, what has received far less attention, 
if any at all, is the epistemological assumptions underpinning this model of care and 
associated implementation guidelines. 
 
 
In light of this silence, this article seeks to problematize discursive constructions of 
scaling up the provision of mental health care in Africa. It attempts to open up the 
 
‘black box’ of research in this area, unearthing the hidden assumptions and 
capillaries of power embedded in the knowledge produced (Latour, 1999). This 
article is insisting that gaining a better understanding of service provision in Africa 
demands that we not only fill the gaps in knowledge, but that we also look critically 
at the assumptions upon which existing knowledge is based. Such assumptions, 
which are frequently deeply hidden and taken-for-granted, have profound practical 
and political consequences, helping to shape the kinds of questions that can be asked 
and thus the solutions that can be generated (Bowker and Star, 1999). As such, unless 
we examine the structures of knowledge mediating contemporary knowledge on 
mental health service provision, current strategies being proposed and implemented 
to address the ‘gap’ in care might prove to be ineffective and inappropriate (Mol et 
al., 2010). Possibly even more serious, without a critical engagement with the 
ideologies implicated with the knowledge produced, well-meaning strategies face the 
danger of oppressing particular people and subjugating certain voices, rather than 
supporting them (De Sousa Santos et al., 2007). When talking about the current 
movement for Global Mental Health, Vikram Patel stresses that although the 
movement ‘advocates a certain function (i.e. healthcare has to follow a set of values 
and aspirations), the form can take many different shapes’ (his emphasis, cited in 
 
Bemme and D’souza, 2012: 6). This article is insisting, however, that it is the actual 
function, the values and aspirations which need to be opened up for greater scrutiny 
and debate. 
 
 
In the first part of this article, I demonstrate how two interrelated paradigms are 
explicitly shaping thinking around mental health care provision in Africa – those of 
scientific evidence and human rights. Drawing on recent international research on the 
scaling-up of mental health care in Africa, I highlight how rationales for the 
particular model of care being advocated are being informed strongly by these two 
structures of thought. Similarly, I show how these two specific paradigms are also 
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mediating research on how this particular model of care should be implemented. In 
the second part of this article, I draw on theory and research coming out of Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) and Postcolonial Studies, in order to turn my gaze 
onto each of these paradigms separately. I demonstrate how despite their appearance 
and widespread acceptance, these structures of knowledge are neither neutral nor 
given, but underpinned by several contentious epistemological assumptions. In 
particular, I highlight how, although there are obvious differences between them, 
both possess deep ideological undertones of universalism, objectivity and 
rationalism. As such, I reveal how they share a very similar epistemological space, 
both forming an integral part of the intellectual heritage of Western modernist and 
colonial thought. The key argument of this article is that the dominance of these 
paradigms, and the associated epistemological space they occupy, may be preventing 
other, potentially important ways of thinking about mental care health in Africa from 
contributing to the formal canon of knowledge. When talking about the ‘fascinating 
pair’ of evidence-based medicine and medical ethics, Annemarie Mol et al. (2010: 
12) enquire whether it might be possible to ‘venture into the enormous space left 
open between these alternatives’. This article seeks to contribute to such debates by 
exploring how research on the provision of mental health care in Africa might better 
 
‘venture’ into this ‘space’. 
 
 
 
It is important to emphasize from the start of this article that I am not suggesting that 
the dominant model of care being proposed is flawed and inevitably should be 
discarded. Nor am I implying that the notions of scientific evidence and human rights 
are necessarily ‘wrong’ and meaningless. What I am arguing against, however, is the 
hegemonic way in which the paradigms of scientific evidence and human rights, and 
associated epistemological assumptions, are mediating research on the scaling-up of 
the provision of mental health care in Africa. This article attempts to shed light on 
the dangers of single voices and hegemonic perspectives when thinking about mental 
health care provision. More specifically, it seeks to show how such hegemonic 
thinking may be foreclosing other, potentially important, ways of constituting 
knowledge about mental health care in Africa, which may not originate from a 
Western modernist and colonial form of consciousness. I provide certain examples of 
potential ‘alternative’ kinds of knowledges and ways of knowing. The focus of this 
article is, however, not on these possible alternatives per se, but rather on how 
greater research into these kinds of alternatives, is ultimately being curtailed. It is 
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thus a plea for a more inclusive and plural archive of knowledge in this area, one that 
is more hospitable to diverse epistemological politics and moral landscapes. Most 
certainly, current demands of the global knowledge economy pose several challenges 
to developing such an archive of knowledge, something which is indeed appreciated 
by various Global Mental Health care researchers and which I briefly consider in the 
conclusion of this article. 
 
 
Scaling up mental health care in Africa: Scientific evidence and human rights 
 
 
While there must always be space for discourse and conflicting ideas, these must be based firmly on 
an equal commitment to science and to the right of people who are demonstrably unwell to receive 
care. 
 
(Patel, in press) 
 
 
In 2001, the WHO dedicated its World Health Report to mental health, a report 
which has been described as a ‘landmark document’ in the field of international 
mental health (Eaton, 2009: 14). Highlighting the high levels of untreated mental 
illness in low-and-middle income countries, the report proposed a particular model of 
care as the means for narrowing this ‘gap’. As stated in the report, 
 
 
The key message to governments is that mental asylums, where they still 
exist, must be…replaced with well-organized community-based care and 
psychiatric beds in general hospitals (WHO, 2001: 4). 
 
 
In justifying this particular recommendation, the report highlights that this proposal is 
‘based on a respect for human rights’ (WHO, 2001: 65) and the fact that ‘there is now 
a strong evidence base, derived from a number of controlled studies, demonstrating the 
effectiveness of de-institutionalization, the development of community-based services, 
and integration into the overall health system’ (WHO, 
 
2001: 105). This report marked the beginning of a strong international research 
movement focused on transforming mental health care provision in low-and-middle 
income countries, including in Africa. Drawing upon, and elaborating, the key 
message of the WHO report, a plethora of articles and special issues dedicated to 
mental health have subsequently been published in a range of high-profile scientific 
journals, including two series in both The Lancet (Global Mental Health Group, 
2007; Patel et al., 2011) and PLoS Medicine (Patel and Thornicroft, 2009; PLOS 
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Medicine Editors, 2013), series in Revista Brasileira de Psiquiatria (Mari and 
Thornicroft, 2010) and Harvard Review of Psychiatry (Becker and Kleinman, 2012), 
as well as papers in Nature (Collins et al., 2011), JAMA (Patel and Prince, 2010) and 
 
New England Journal of Medicine (Patel and Saxena, 2014) among others (see 
Petersen et al., 2011, for reviews of some of this work). In line with the WHO report, 
across this body of work there is a considerable degree of consensus that African 
countries need to transform their mental health care systems by deinstitutionalizing 
them and integrating them within both community and primary health care settings. 
 
 
As with the WHO report, rationales for this recommendation are situated within two 
particular paradigms: those of scientific evidence and human rights. In terms of the 
former, there is a tendency across this body of work to cite a host of clinical trials 
which, it is argued, have shown the efficiency, clinical effectiveness and cost-saving 
nature of this model of care. Outlining the results of such studies in a fair degree of 
detail, it is ascertained that there is now a ‘strong scientific evidence base’ (Eaton et 
al., 2011: 1592) and a ‘robust body of scientific evidence’ (Patel and Saxena, 2014: 
499) which testifies to the ‘clinical and cost-effectiveness’ of this model of care 
(Lund and Flisher, 2009: 1040; Patel, 2012: 7). It is asserted that ‘high-quality 
scientific studies’ (Thornicroft and Tansella, 2013: 12) have shown that such a model 
of care ‘improves the processes and outcomes of health care’ (Dua et al., 2011: 2), 
‘improves clinical outcomes with decreased costs’ (Wiley-Exley, 2007: 1232) and 
 
‘produces large treatment effect sizes’ (Patel and Prince, 2010: 1976). Ultimately, it 
is argued that a ‘growing evidence base’ (Lund et al., 2012: 1; Patel and Prince, 
2010: 344) is demonstrating that such a model of care ‘yields better access to care, 
better physical as well as mental health outcomes, and improved overall cost-
effectiveness than institutional care’ (Patel et al., 2013: 2) and that ‘large custodial 
psychiatric hospitals squander resources on ineffective and inappropriate 
interventions’ (Patel et al., 2007: 1000). 
 
 
In addition to appeals to science, arguments for the deinstitutionalization and 
integration of mental health are also strongly drawing upon the rhetoric of human 
rights. There is widespread agreement across this body of research that such a model 
of care provides an ethical basis of care that resonates with United Nations (UN) 
human rights conventions, in particular the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (UNCRPD) (see particularly Drew et al., 2011; Lund et al., 2012; 
 
115 
Petersen et al., 2011). For example, drawing on this convention, it is argued that this 
model of care ‘supports the notion that people should have equal access to services in 
their own locality and in the least restrictive environment’ (Mari and Thornicroft, 
2010: 210), fosters the ‘importance of self-determination and the rights of people 
with mental illness as persons and citizens’ (Thornicroft et al., 2010: 68) and 
‘promotes independent living in society in accordance with articles 19 and 25 of the 
CRPD’ (Drew et al., 2011: 1670). 
 
 
It is thus clear that two particular conceptual frameworks – scientific evidence and 
human rights – are strongly shaping rationales for why the particular model of 
deinstitutionalization and integration of mental health care should be adopted by low-
and-middle income countries, including those in Africa. The importance of these 
specific paradigms was crystallized in the now widely cited 2007 Lancet series on 
Global Mental Health (Global Mental Health Group, 2007). Consisting six articles, 
the series sought to document the burden of mental disorders and review the 
 
‘evidence’ of effective treatments and barriers hindering their implementation. In 
summarizing the series as a whole, the final article made a ‘call to action’ to scale up 
services for people with mental disorders by developing packages of mental health 
care interventions to be implemented within community and primary health care 
settings. It emphasized that such scaling-up should be based upon the principles of 
scientific evidence and human rights, which according to Patel and Prince (2010: 2) 
have now become the ‘twin principles … widely adopted as a focus of action in 
Global Mental Health’. This final article also made a plea for more research to 
support such scaling-up efforts, research which it emphasized should focus on 
exploring the specific content of these ‘packages’ of mental health interventions. 
 
 
In response to this plea, we have indeed witnessed a recent explosion of research 
investigating ‘what’ specific mental health care interventions should be 
deinstitutionalized and integrated within primary health care and community settings. 
And the paradigms of scientific evidence and human rights are strongly mediating 
such research. For example, between 2008 and 2011, the World Psychiatric 
Association (WPA) appointed a Task Force to oversee a series of studies to explore 
what kinds of community-oriented forms of mental health care should be developed 
in Africa (Mari and Thornicroft, 2010; Thornicroft et al., 2010). In describing the 
overarching conceptual framework for these studies, Thornicroft et al. (2010: 69) 
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emphasize how the guidelines produced were ‘written to explicitly align with the 
requirements of the UNCRPD and associated treaties and conventions’. It is stressed 
further that the main principles to guide community-based services should be ‘the 
protection of human rights as ratified by the relevant UN conventions’ and ‘on the 
grounds of cost-effective and evidence-based mental health systems’ (Mari and 
Thornicroft, 2010: 211). 
 
 
Similarly, between 2009 and 2010, a set of studies, published as a series in PLoS 
Medicine, sought to explore which specific ‘evidence-based interventions’ should be 
delivered within primary health care settings (Patel and Thornicroft, 2009). Six 
mental disorders were chosen: alcohol use disorders, attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, dementia, depression, epilepsy, and schizophrenia. Each study examined 
evaluations of pharmacological and psychosocial treatments for one of these six 
disorders. The ‘evidence’ reviewed across the studies included generic measurable 
outcomes that indicated that an intervention enhanced detection, prevented/delayed 
relapse, reduced costs, increased availability and improved health and social 
outcomes. As such, the ‘evidence’ reviewed only included quantitative data, derived 
from systematic reviews, statistical meta-analyses and randomized controlled trials. 
Other kinds of evaluations, say of a more qualitative nature, were therefore elided 
from the data collection phases. 
 
 
Drawing upon and expanding these studies, in 2010 the WHO launched its Mental 
Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP), their flagship project in mental health care 
(WHO, 2008). As part of the programme, the mhGAP Intervention Guide was 
developed, a kind of ‘what to do’ manual for the management of mental disorders by 
health workers in primary health care settings (WHO, 2010). In developing this 
guide, the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation 
(GRADE) approach was employed, a methodology for synthesizing scientific 
evidence on the effectiveness of clinical interventions, in order to produce clinical 
practice guidelines (Dua et al., 2011; Guyatt et al., 2008). Employing this 
methodology, groups of ‘priority’ mental conditions were identified, on the basis of 
their association with elevated mortality/morbidity rates, high economic costs and 
considerable human rights violations in accordance with the UNCRPD. Common 
measurable outcomes were decided upon, including social and health-related 
outcomes, negative effects of the intervention, economic impacts and barriers 
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impeding implementation. A hierarchy of study designs was developed, which only 
included quantitative research, and considered non-randomized controlled type 
studies (e.g. observational, cohort, case–control studies) only if they met certain 
scientific criteria (Guyatt et al., 2008). The evidence from this research was then 
synthesized and produced into a step-by-step decision-making protocol, which 
outlines the specific scenarios health workers in primary care settings may face and 
associated actions to be taken. Ultimately, it is emphasized that these guidelines are 
 
‘grounded on the best available scientific and epidemiological evidence’ (WHO, 
 
2008: 4) and thus provide ‘the ingredients for scaling up mental health services in 
 
LMICs’ (Petersen et al., 2011: 319). When talking about the mhGAP Intervention 
Guide, Patel and Eaton (2010) assert that: 
 
 
There are two major principles which should underpin policies: improving 
access to evidence-based care and respecting the human rights of affected 
persons. Whereas the principles concerning human rights are 
comprehensively addressed in international instruments such as the United 
 
Nation’s Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD), until 
now we have not had internationally accepted guidelines on the former … 
 
This has now changed. (p. 343). 
 
 
What has now changed, according to scholars such as Patel and Eaton, is that ‘The 
mhGAP provides a robust foundation for scaling up by answering the key question of 
what should be scaled up’ (Patel, 2012: 8). Ultimately, it is argued that ‘The mhGAP 
guidelines should become the standard approach for all countries and health sectors; 
irrational and inappropriate interventions should be discouraged and weeded out’ 
 
(Patel et al., 2011: 1442). This appeal that the mhGAP become the ‘standard 
approach’ is being responded to widely. A burgeoning body of large-scale studies are 
currently being proposed and executed to scale up the mhGAP Intervention Guide in 
African countries, studies which are being backed by significant amounts of funding 
from a variety of international governments and funding agencies (including the 
National Institute of Mental Health, Grand Challenges Canada, Wellcome Trust, 
Department of International Development, UK).
23
 Ultimately, as Patel (2012: 8) 
emphasizes, ‘The roadblocks now lie on the path between knowing what works (as 
 
 
23
 See http://www.centreforglobalmentalhealth.org/projects and Patel (2012) for summaries of 
such projects. 
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synthesized in the mhGAP-IG) and how it will be delivered “to scale” – that is, to 
entire populations’. 
 
 
To sum up, I have demonstrated how scientific evidence and human rights are central 
players in defining the scope and nature of contemporary research on mental health 
care provision in Africa. These paradigms are explicitly informing rationales for the 
model of deinstitutionalization and integration of mental health care. They are also 
mediating research, and associated guidelines, on what specific kinds of 
interventions should be integrated within primary health care and community 
settings. In the sections to follow, I delve into each of these paradigms in more detail, 
exploring some of their underpinning and deeply hidden epistemological 
assumptions. Although I consider each paradigm separately, my analysis hopes to 
reveal how they are in fact structurally very similar, both strongly reflecting the 
epistemological order of Western modernity and colonialism. 
 
Scientific evidence 
 
 
They said … that he was so devoted to Pure Science … that he would rather have people die by the 
 
right therapy than be cured by the wrong. 
 
(Lewis, 1926: 137) 
 
The idea that clinical practice and medical interventions should be based on 
 
‘scientific evidence’ emerged in the 1980s with the rise of what is now referred to as 
 
‘evidence-based medicine’ (Timmermans and Berg, 2003). Criticizing what was seen 
as the common usage of subjective judgements and anecdotal impressions, the 
proponents of ‘evidence-based medicine’ asserted that medical practice must be 
based rather on scientific evidence (Sackett et al., 1996). The notion of ‘scientific 
evidence’, and by extension, ‘evidence-based’ medicine, is underpinned by a set of 
now well-known positivist assumptions, with an emphasis on empiricism, 
rationalism and objective enquiry. At the heart of these notions is the assumption that 
there is a predictable and transparent ‘reality’ that is ‘out there’, one which operates 
on the basis of rational and universal principles of cause and effect (Timmermans 
and Berg, 2003). It is assumed further that this ‘reality’ can be known, objectively, 
through the principles and methods of science and, in particular, a well-designed 
randomized clinical trial (RCT). In other words, by following a specific logic – 
observation, experimentation, measurement and deduction – it is assumed that the 
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methods of science are able to generate the most impartial and incontrovertible form 
of evidence (Montgomery, 2006; Moser, 2008). Put in a different way, it is assumed 
that knowledge which is valid and meaningful includes those aspects of ‘reality’ 
which are directly observable and measurable as tangible indicators and outcomes 
(Mol, 2006). 
 
 
The notion of scientific evidence, and relatedly ‘evidence-based medicine’, is 
therefore underpinned by very explicit assumptions about the nature of ‘reality’ and 
how it can be legitimately known. These conjectures are indeed deeply rooted within 
the epistemological order of Western modernity and colonialism, an order in which 
scientific modes of thinking became crystallized as the supposed paragon of 
investigative virtue and the guarantor of universal truths (De Sousa Santos et al., 
2007; Stengers, 2003, 2008; Turnbull, 2000). As John Henry’s (2004: 10) analysis of 
some of the key tenets of Western, modernist thought demonstrates, from the mid- 
 
17th century, ‘scientific knowledge acquired the cultural kudos in the West … 
science began to be recognized as the supreme cognitive authority, the intellectual 
system to which all others should defer’. Thus, Western Enlightenment thought was 
characterized by a strong epistemological commitment to science, with conceptions 
of ‘truth’, and the criterion for judging what is ‘true’ increasingly governed by the 
principles of science. 
 
 
An extensive body of critical social science scholarship has, however, for some time 
now highlighted the epistemological limitations of scientific rationality (e.g. Bowker 
and Star, 1999; De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; Latour, 1999; Turnbull, 2000), thinking 
which appears to remain completely absent from research on mental health care 
provision in Africa. This body of work has indeed argued that ‘reality’ is a lot more 
complex, unpredictable and context-dependent than assumed by the logic of science, 
a reality which cannot so easily be captured by predictive rules and universal laws. 
Such work has also destabilized the myth that scientific methods are able to generate 
objective and incontrovertible knowledge. It has demonstrated how scientific 
knowledge is neither neutral nor given, but imbued with power and interests, and 
scientific knowledge practices, including RCTs, are deeply political. Such work has 
shown how scientific observations and measurements are not made in isolation, but 
are developed within particular theoretical frameworks and are thus invariably 
filtered through specific ideological agendas. 
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All of this is not to suggest that technically sophisticated scientific research is not 
important. Indeed, the tremendous advantages coming out of industry, medicine and 
technology could not have occurred without scientific principles and procedures. The 
problem is however, through its underpinning assumptions of objectivity and 
definitiveness, scientific evidence becomes a kind of orthodoxy, establishing itself as 
the authoritative, even sole criterion of truth claims (Bowker and Star, 1999; De 
Sousa Santos et al., 2007). As a consequence, other potentially meaningful ways of 
knowing tend to be silenced or disavowed within the formally accredited canon of 
knowledge, something which is increasingly being demonstrated by scholars 
working within the tradition of Science and Technology Studies (Mol, 2006, 2008; 
Mol et al., 2010; Montgomery, 2006; Moser, 2008; Pols, 2004; Scott, 1998; Stengers, 
2003, 2008; Turnbull, 2000). 
 
 
Such scholars are showing how in privileging only formal, deductive, epistemic 
knowledge, certain important parts of nurturing, vitality and life-giving are in turn 
being lost or judged unfit for knowledge within the current ‘evidence-based’ 
knowledge economy. These ‘parts’, such scholars are demonstrating, are frequently 
more spiritual and emotional, more messy and unsettled, and not easily measurable 
within the familiar kinds of enumerations and abstractions of science. And these 
more messy parts of care and well-being, it is argued, might only be accessible 
through other forms of knowledge – tactile knowledge, spiritual knowledge, 
embodied knowledge, practice-based knowledge and movement-based knowledge, 
among others. And yet under the current epistemic edifice of science, these 
alternative forms of knowledge and ways of knowing are ultimately being 
delegitimized, ‘regarded as anecdotal, backward, static traditions, as old wives’ tales 
and superstitions’ (Scott, 1998: 331). 
 
 
Indeed, a small body of recent empirical research, based on in-depth ethnographic 
methodologies in countries such as India (Brijnath, 2011, 2012; Jain and Jadhav, 
2008, 2009), Peru (Orr, 2013) and Ghana (Read, 2012), is revealing that there are 
potentially important ways of constituting knowledge about mental well-being and 
care which may lie outside of scientific, epistemological codes. This research 
demonstrates how there may be certain significant components of care practices 
which cannot easily be measured or modelled, as they are essentially tacit and 
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embodied in particular moments and contexts. For example, based on her 12-month 
ethnographic study in Delhi, Brijnath (2011, 2012) explored the importance of the 
concept of seva (literally meaning ‘service’), which is perceived as a highly valued 
form of care for people who are unwell that takes place between family members. 
Likened to a form of divine worship, Brijnath demonstrates how this modality of 
nurturing is based on practices and ways of knowing which are outside of cognitive 
operations. Incorporating aspects of duty and love, pleasure and intimacy, touch and 
movement, the practice of seva is informed primarily by knowledge gained in 
people’s bodies, their senses, their moods, their unconscious, their wisdom and 
experience. According to Brijnath, for many people in Delhi, these more tacit and 
embodied components of caring encapsulated in the notion of seva constitute some 
of the crucial parts of what it means to care for those who are unwell and thus need 
to be embedded within mental health services if they are to be meaningful and 
appropriate for many patients and their families. 
 
 
In a similar light, in his 12-month ethnographic study among peasant communities in 
the rural Peruvian highlands, Orr (2013) explored how food sharing and consumption 
form core dimensions of Quechua sociality, personhood and caring. He highlights 
how these local ontologies of commensality generate very specific forms of ethical 
political actions, which may play out not only in the work of Yachaqs (‘traditional’ 
healers) but also in broader networks of care, in community solidarity and conflict 
resolution, parenting and jurisprudence. According to Orr (2013): 
 
 
These local conceptualizations of sociality, not envisaged in the standard 
mhGAP guidelines and similar proposals, should inform a more client-
centered approach to mental health care in non-Western settings … Without a 
sense of how relatedness, intersubjectivity, and sanity manifest for patients 
and carers, it is hard to engage with their narratives or to grasp the logic 
behind the therapeutic itineraries that they follow (p. 707). 
 
 
Similarly, this small body of ethnographic research also reveals how understandings 
of ‘recovery’ and ‘wellness’ are often characterized by multiple, complex and 
potentially conflicting rationalities. As such, a focus on symptoms or disability 
defined in generic terms may not capture crucial aspects that are important to patients 
and their families. According to such research, these ‘things’ are often more subtle 
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and idiosyncratic, related to specific individuals, in specific social milieu. They are 
often messy and fluid and thus cannot be fixed, or predicted, or apprehended through 
standardized measures and predictive indicators. These ‘things’ may include, for 
example, the importance of meaning and interpretation and having a space for 
suffering (Jain and Jadhav, 2009); the significance of having positions in which 
esteemed forms of subjectivities and attachments can be exerted and acted (Orr, 
2013; Read, 2012) and the value of spiritual strength and coherence (Brijnath, 2011). 
This body of research reveals how these more qualitative and less tangible ‘things’ 
are not ‘decorative’ additionals that might make care practices more pleasant or 
humane. Rather, they constituted some of the fundamental and irreducible parts of 
wellness and healing for many people. 
 
 
The point is that what is being articulated by this kind of research – conceptions of 
certain embodied and tacit aspects of care practices and the complexities and 
subtleties inherent in notions of well-being – is not easily rendered in the language of 
standardization and may lie outside of scientific metaphysical realities. The 
knowledge produced by this kind of research is difficult to explicate and will have 
trouble getting represented within evaluation studies. This knowledge therefore 
ultimately has no way of entering the formally accredited canon of knowledge on its 
own terms. Only the enumerable and generalizable are being judged as important 
within research on scaling-up care in Africa. Only that which can be captured 
through readily deducible indicators and quantifiable outcomes are being recognized 
as worthy of consideration – morbidity and mortality statistics, detection and relapse 
rates, efficiency parameters and economic variables. 
 
 
Indeed, as shown above, the mhGAP Intervention Guide, understood as providing 
 
‘the key ingredients for scaling up mental health services in LMICs’, was based on 
the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaulation 
(GRADE) methodology, a methodology which includes only quantitative evidence 
with the exclusion of any kind qualitative research. This kind of omission of more 
qualitative data has time and time again been shown to lead to misleading accounts 
that overlook certain crucial dimensions (Flyvberg, 2001; Law, 2007; Scott, 1998). 
The crux of the matter is that there may be potentially important aspects of the social 
world that cannot so easily be captured by the scientific processes of abstraction, 
reduction and standardization and prediction. And yet these more qualitative ‘things’ 
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end up being excluded or silenced within the current evidence-based edifice. 
Ultimately, the hegemonic scientific paradigm in which research on mental health 
care provision in Africa is firmly inserted is thus setting the boundaries of legitimate 
knowledge and, by extension, legitimate forms of care. It is implying that very little 
of value can be known outside of the metacodes of science, indeed one of the great 
enchantments of the modernist and colonial epistemological order (Stengers, 2003, 
2008; Turnbull, 2000). 
 
 
What I am trying to convey here is not that science and the enumerable should be 
discarded, but rather that there is a need for greater epistemological inclusivity within 
research on mental health care provision in Africa. Surely it might be possible for 
research in this area to include other kinds of measurables and alternative sorts of 
evidentiaries? To legitimize ways of knowing which include the associative, the 
visceral and tacit? To appreciate forms of practice which speak of wisdom and 
experience, and not just data? To consider configurations of care which attend to the 
more subtle ‘things’ which people might find nurturing, but which cannot be made 
into standardized indicators and quantifiable outcomes? 
 
 
Human rights 
 
 
The language of human rights expresses such a strong moral agenda … that any attempt to question 
or critique the premise of these rights is seen to stand on the side of injustice. 
 
(Hadjor, 1998: 359) 
 
 
I now turn to the second dominant paradigm informing research on mental health 
provision in Africa, that of human rights. The strong language of human rights is not 
unique to mental health discourse, but since the end of the Cold War, has become a 
ubiquitous framework for thinking more generally about social change (Alves, 2000; 
Arslan, 1999). The current era in which we live has in fact been referred to as the 
 
‘age of rights’, whereby the human rights discourse has become ‘the new criterion of 
political legitimacy’ (Arslan, 1999: 196). Through its emancipatory rhetoric, 
promoting the ideals of liberation, equality and justice, human rights discourse is 
generally accepted as a ‘good’ thing. Problematizing the paradigm of human rights is 
therefore not an uncomplicated endeavour. 
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If we move beneath face-value understandings however, it is clear that the paradigm 
of human rights, in its theoretical origins and contemporary embodiment within 
international conventions, is underpinned by several highly polemical 
epistemological assumptions. Like ‘scientific evidence’, these assumptions are 
deeply rooted within the philosophies emanating from Western modernist and 
colonial thought (De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; Pannikar, 1984). The notion of 
human rights emerged during the era of European Enlightenment and was intimately 
intertwined with the rise of the modern-nation state and associated liberal 
philosophies (Brooks, 2010). In accordance with these philosophies, a human rights 
paradigm is underpinned by an inherent assumption of the universality of human 
nature. In other words, it is assumed that there is a common human nature, one which 
is endowed with a universally derived dignity. Relatedly, it is assumed that this 
dignity is objectively knowable by an equally universal organ of knowledge, that of 
rationality. Furthermore, there is the assumption that individuals are inherently 
separate from one another and from society and even the greater cosmos. In this 
view, a human being is fundamentally the individual, one which is essentially an 
autonomous being. Human rights are thus ultimately about defending the autonomy 
of the human individual. This set of assumptions is succinctly captured by 
postcolonial scholars De Sousa Santos et al. (2007): 
 
 
The concept of human rights is based on a well-known set of presuppositions, 
all of which are distinctly Western and liberal in origin, namely: there is a 
universal human nature that can be known by rational means; human nature is 
essentially different from and higher than the rest of reality; the individual 
has an absolute and irreducible dignity … the autonomy of the individual 
requires that society be organized in a non-hierarchical way, as a sum of free 
individuals. (p. 13) 
 
 
This set of assumptions is indeed clearly evident in the UNCRPD, which, as 
demonstrated above, is being explicitly drawn upon as the gold standard within 
mental health care research on scaling up the provision of care in Africa. For 
example, the Preamble of the UNCRPD begins with a statement which ‘recognizes 
the inherent dignity and worth and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’ (UN, 
 
2006: 1). Moreover, it stated that the Convention recognizes ‘the universality … 
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all human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (UN, 2006: 1). Furthermore, Article 3 
describes that one of the main guiding principles of the Convention is the ‘Respect 
for inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one’s own 
choices, and independence of persons’ (UN, 2006: 5). 
 
 
The notion of human rights is thus underpinned by very particular assumptions about 
personhood and dignity, and how they can be known. Ultimately, these concepts take 
on a spurious aura of normativity, assumed to be knowable through a supposed 
objective and universal ‘rationality’. And yet a large body of critical social analyses 
has demonstrated that what constitutes human dignity and morality, and by extension 
a ‘human’, are far from self-evident, outside of discourse, ideology, history or 
context. Such work has shed light on the diversity and complexity of moral 
sentiments in different polities (e.g. Engelke, 1999; Englund, 2000; Mamdani, 2000; 
Sardar, 1998; Wilson, 1997). For example, research in various settings in Africa has 
revealed that for many people, selfhood and dignity are understood as conditions 
which are acquired, rather than ‘given’. As such, many people in these contexts place 
great value on the gradual social maturation of the person as constantly evolving. 
Relatedly, in such circumstances, personhood is frequently recognized as deeply 
intertwined with the spiritual, the corporeal and the social community, rather than 
about an autonomous individual (Engelke, 1999; Englund, 2000). As such, this 
research revealed that attempts to bring about social justice through the utilization of 
human rights rhetoric have frequently been unsuccessful as they have failed to 
respond appropriately to locally relevant meanings and value systems. 
 
 
A similar kind of analysis has been made in the realm of mental health more 
specifically. For example, in-depth ethnographic research in Ghana (Read et al., 
2009) and the Congo (Devisch et al., 2001) has revealed how caregivers commonly 
over-ride the autonomy of the individual in order to ensure receipt of care or 
protection of others. And this makes sense in both contexts where the notion of the 
mutual interdependence of people is widely valued, and the community’s well-being 
is frequently prioritized over individual rights. The researchers demonstrate how 
appeals to human rights in both of these settings are failing to achieve their 
anticipated effects, as they are not resonating with the concerns and hierarchy of 
values that commonly prevail. 
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Through these examples, we see that there are fundamental problems with the 
assumption of universality that underpins the notion of human rights. Human rights 
discourse does not belong to the realm of morality per se, but rather reflects a 
particular political morality that may not be shared by everyone, everywhere. 
However, through its underpinning assumptions, the notion of human rights is able to 
gain a universal force that is unconditional. As Wilson (1997: 4) argues, ‘Having 
established the nature of a universal human ontology, objectivity can be claimed for 
value judgements about political, economic, social and legal arrangements’. This is 
clearly reflected within research on mental health care provision in Africa, where the 
notion of human rights and associated UN conventions tend to be drawn upon as if 
they embody self-evident truths, requiring very little further elucidation. The slippery 
issues of dignity and justice are therefore decontextualized and engaged with in a 
 
‘one-size-fits-all’ manner by such research. 
 
 
 
To be sure, my argument is not one of relativism, a kind of ‘anything goes’. Forms of 
care that respect and dignify people with mental disability are worthy ideals. But 
what is ‘respectful’ and what enhances ‘dignity’ are not as self-evident as the notion 
of human rights would have us believe. At the same time, I am not suggesting that in 
 
‘Africa’ there are shared moral sentiments that are essentially different from 
sensibilities residing in ‘the West’ (wherever that may begin or end). Indeed, 
critiques of human rights discourse in Africa are often framed in this way, where it is 
argued that the liberalism and individualism inherent in human rights rhetoric make 
it inappropriate for people in Africa (e.g. Hadjor, 1998; Mamdani, 2000; Sardar, 
1998). In our increasingly globalized world, where there is growing mobility and 
exchange of ideas, societies, including those in Africa, most commonly have 
multiple and overlapping legal tongues and moral orders (Geertz, 2000). As such, 
ideas of individuality, autonomy and self-determination, to name a few, may 
certainly be relevant for some people, in some postcolonial African settings, even if 
such notions might originate outside of the continent. But they also might not be 
appropriate. There might be other, more suitable, ways of making commensurate 
demands for dignity and justice, formulated in different languages of freedoms and 
entitlements. However, the notion of human rights does not allow any space for these 
alternatives. As Englund (2000) so pertinently concludes from his analysis of human 
rights discourse in Malawi: 
 
127 
Human rights talk … threatens to overshadow other ways of conceiving 
human dignity … by attributing legitimacy to specific moral notions, thereby 
defining the contours of what is not only acceptable but also conceivable. (p. 
579) 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Before envisioning the global civilization of the future, one must first own up to the responsibility of 
creating a space at the margins of the present global civilization for a new, plural, political ecology 
of knowledge 
 
(Nandy, 1989: 266) 
 
 
In this article, I have problematized some of the dominant discursive constructions of 
scaling up the provision of mental health care in Africa within contemporary Global 
Mental Health research. I have demonstrated how two interrelated paradigms, those 
of scientific evidence and human rights, are strongly mediating research in this area. 
I have argued that despite their appearance, these paradigms are not neutral or given, 
but are underpinned by very particular, and somewhat questionable, assumptions 
about the ‘nature’ of reality, and how it can be known. I have revealed how both are 
deeply dependent on ideas of a universal reality, one which can be objectively and 
definitively captured by rational means. I have touched upon how these assumptions 
of ‘objectivity’, ‘universalism’ and ‘rationalism’ are indeed deeply embedded within 
the epistemologies that form the intellectual heritage of Western modernist and 
colonial thought, a knowledge tradition which produced particular ways of ordering 
the world. 
 
 
What I have tried to demonstrate is that through their inherently modernist 
epistemological assumptions, the paradigms of scientific evidence and human rights 
have in turn become the gatekeepers of knowledge within mental health care 
research. Only the enumerable, and which is in accordance with the language of 
human rights, is being considered as legitimate forms of knowledge and, by 
extension, valid forms of care. As demonstrated by much postcolonial thinking, this 
negation of ‘other’ ways of constituting knowledge is indeed what lies at the heart of 
the Western, modernist and colonial epistemological order. This order ultimately 
reproduces the illusion that the only worthy ways of thinking and being in the world 
are those which originate from a modernist and colonial form of consciousness (De 
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Sousa Santos et al., 2007 Sardar, 1998; Stengers, 2003, 2008; Turnbull, 2000). In 
other words, unless one speaks through this dominant epistemological order, one will 
not be heard. This form of exclusion of other kinds of voices, which arise from 
different epistemological spaces, is what is meant by the often used phrase ‘epistemic 
violence’ (Spivak, 1995) or ‘epistemicide’ (Harding, 1998). 
 
 
It is important to stress again, I am not implying that the dominant model of care 
being proposed, that of deinstitutionalization and integration, is flawed and should be 
discarded. Nor am I implying that the values of scientific evidence and human rights 
are necessarily ‘wrong’ or meaningless. Rather, what I am expressing discomfort 
with is the current dominance of these particular paradigms and their associated 
assumptions within research on mental health care provision in Africa. This 
hegemony is potentially disallowing other, possibly meaningful ways of knowing 
and thinking from entering the citadel of knowledge. 
 
 
As such, what other potentially positive kinds of care are being lost within the 
current epistemic edifice of ‘evidence-based knowledge’ and ‘human rights 
discourse’? What alternative forms of care, which cannot be conceptualized in terms 
of costs and tangible clinical outcomes, but which might be equally important, are 
being neglected? What other sorts of potentially beneficial treatments, which may 
foster dignity and justice in ways which do not necessarily ‘fit’ with dominant human 
rights discourse, are being overshadowed? How might these alternative ways of 
assembling the world change current conversations on mental health care and the 
 
‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa? 
 
 
In this article, I have touched on, very briefly, certain examples of such potential 
alternatives. In providing these examples, my point is that ‘other’ ways of knowing 
and being exist, and yet the dominant epistemological order underpinning mental 
health research in Africa is ultimately foreclosing greater research into these kinds of 
alternatives. Ultimately, through these examples I have attempted to shed light on the 
dangerous dissonances that may potentially exist between discursive construction 
that perpetuate certain visibilities and sayabilities, and the existence of considerably 
heterogeneous local practices and understandings. 
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The challenge I therefore see facing research on mental health care provision in 
Africa is to start opening up the space for more diverse ways of thinking, or what 
postcolonial scholar Ashis Nandy (1989, p. 266) terms ‘a new, plural, political 
ecology of knowledge’. Creating such a space requires considering how generative 
dialogues, across different knowledge traditions and moral landscapes, might be 
promoted, rather than closed down. It necessitates reflecting upon how the rubric of 
scholarly acceptability might be more inclusive, valuing different measurables, 
alternative evidentiaries and other ways of imagining on their own terms. 
 
 
Developing a more inclusive archive of knowledge on mental health care provision 
in Africa is not an uncomplicated task. Within a context of competing health 
priorities and limited resources, mental health is commonly not given precedence by 
politicians and senior health planners on the continent. As such, economies of scale 
in government, in decision-making by policy-makers and in assessments by donor 
agencies increasingly demand clear and simple strategies that are based on ‘hard’ 
scientific evidence. This is indeed appreciated by certain Global Mental Health 
researchers, who have emphasized that convincing governments and attracting 
donors to invest in mental health necessitate that there is a ‘consensus-based research 
agenda’ (Tol et al., 2012: 26), that there are ‘clear and consistent reasons and 
objectives’ (Thornicroft et al., 2010: 71) and that people ‘cast aside their differences 
to stand shoulder to shoulder to advocate for a shared cause’ (Patel, 2012: 9). 
 
 
These irreducible lacks and pressing demands pose several limitations. And yet at the 
same time, fully subscribing to the current pressures of the global knowledge 
economy is likely to have dire consequences. As illuminated by sociologist of 
knowledge David Turnbull (2000: 227), if we do not actively foster a multiplicity of 
voices, ‘we will condemn ourselves to an inevitable death brought on by the 
inflexibility and sterility of a monoculture … In the long run, social and cultural 
complexity cannot be winnowed away; it is all there is’. At the end of the day, 
unitary voices, single goals and definitive principles are bound to flounder, as they 
will inevitably do battle with complex realities and diverse contexts. What might 
therefore need rethinking are the sorts of causes that should be shared and the kinds 
of research agendas that should be promoted, and how these might celebrate, rather 
than thwart, heterogeneous solutions and cacophonous perspectives. 
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Abstract 
 
 
There is growing concern within the Global Mental Health arena that interventions 
currently being executed to scale-up mental health care services in Africa will be 
ineffective unless simultaneous steps are taken to address people’s help-seeking 
behaviour. Drawing upon two particular conceptual tools commonly used within the 
field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), those of a ‘classification system’ and 
‘the black box’, in this paper I look critically at discursive constructions of help-
seeking in Africa within mental health research over the last decade. I demonstrate 
how research in this area can be divided into two dominant traditions, which I term 
the ‘knowledge-belief-practice survey’ and ‘indigenous-knowledge-system’ 
approaches. Although the content and value-codes between them may differ, I show 
how these two traditions are in fact structurally very similar. They are both mediated 
by the same kind of system of classification, one which demarcates the world into 
homogenous entities and binary oppositions. This is one of the most stubborn and 
powerful forms of classification buried in the ‘black box’ of the modernist/colonial 
inherited knowledge archive. It is a system of ordering which is fraught with many 
questionable and Eurocentric epistemological assumptions. I consider whether there 
might be other ways of understanding help-seeking for mental illness in Africa 
without re-inventing dominant forms of Eurocentric power and privilege. I 
demonstrate how two particular studies might offer a fruitful terrain for engagement. 
In conclusion I discuss some of the potential challenges this alternative kind of 
research faces in gaining more power and influence within contemporary Global 
Mental Health discourse. 
 
 
Keywords: Africa; Help-seeking; Mental health research; Epistemological 
 
assumptions 
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Introduction 
 
“What, then, is the scope for decolonising methodologies that are so clearly linked to formations of 
power and knowledge, so deeply shaped by their links to post-colonial and still-imperial forms of 
governance?...In the long run, there is only one way of finding out: by actually trying to contest 
homogenising quantitative narratives by developing powerful and convincing counter-hegemonic 
accounts”. 
 
(Du Toit, 2005, p.14) 
 
 
 
Over the last decade, Global Mental Health (GMH) discourse has been especially 
vocal about the dire mental health situation in Africa (Cooper et.al, 2011). One issue 
that has received particular attention is what is understood as the low levels of mental 
health care service uptake (Eaton et.al, 2011; Saraceno et al., 2007). There is indeed 
growing concern within the global health arena that despite psychiatric services 
becoming more available and affordable in Africa, they are still significantly 
underutilized (Kohn et.al, 2004; Demyttenaere, 2004). GMH discourse is thus 
placing increased attention on the need to better understand and target people’s help-
seeking behaviour, so as to increase the uptake of services in Africa (Patel et.al, 
2010; Petersen et.al, 2011). 
 
 
This paper looks critically at discursive constructions of help-seeking in Africa 
within mental health research over the last decade. Rather than focusing primarily 
on the findings of such research, this paper is more interested in epistemological 
questions regarding the conventions of meaning-making that lie behind the 
knowledge that is produced, disentangling the power dynamics at play. In order to 
approach this task, I draw upon two particular conceptual tools commonly used 
within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), a broad theoretical corpus 
concerned with how health, bodies and disease are politically and discursively 
produced in medical science and practice (Law, 2008; Latour, 1999). In particular, I 
utilise Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Star’s (1999) idea of ‘classification systems’ and 
Bruno Latour’s concept of ‘the black box’ (1987, 1999). 
 
 
Classification, according to Bowker and Star (1999) is an essential and unavoidable 
part of our ability to navigate and decode the challenges of our lives. However, this 
does not mean that systems of classification are either given or innocent. As defined 
by these scholars, a classification system is “a set of boxes (metaphorical or literal) 
 
140 
into which things can be put to then do some kind of work” (ibid, p. 10). What this 
suggests is that classifications create boxes, and it is the design of these boxes which 
mediates what can be put into them. Surfacing the design plans which propel 
classification is, however, difficult as they are as invisible as they are powerful. As 
Bowker and Star (1999, p. 286) stress, “Many scholars see categories and 
classification as coming from an absent sense of ‘mind’, little anchored in the 
exigencies of work or politics”. Thus, what are concealed within classifications are 
the shared properties, which appear so natural and intrinsic, but which are in fact 
constructed ways of seeing and acting in the world. These are deeply buried in what 
Bruno Latour calls (1987; 1999) ‘the black box’. 
 
 
According to Latour (1987), the black box holds all the common sense assumptions 
that a culture shares which turns questions, priorities and interests into facts. As 
Latour (1987, p. 206) puts it, the box is “well sealed” and people generally do not 
“live in a world of fiction, representation, symbol, approximation and convention: 
they are simply right”. In other words, the coded principles of classification become 
so taken-for-granted, that almost by definition their underlying scaffolding 
disappears. According to Latour (1999, p.304) in later work, what this concealment 
enables is a focus on “inputs and outputs” and not on the complex processes that 
produce these effects. Those complex processes to which Latour refers, are all of the 
interests, values and politics that shape how we see and think in the world. These are 
what dictate the design and limit the options of classifications. And this process is 
normalised and archived in such a way as to be inherited and accepted as common-
sense reality. This includes common knowledge about Africa. 
 
 
Drawing on these ideas, this paper seeks to open up the ‘black box’ of the knowledge 
produced on help-seeking for mental illness in Africa by contemporary mental health 
research. It examines how the classifications within this research contribute to 
producing the knowledge that they are supposedly designed simply to store. The 
design plan of classification is multifaceted, usually characterised by an enmeshment 
of complex crosscurrents of interests and consequences. As Bowker and Star (1999, 
p.21) discovered regarding the classification of illnesses, there is “a panoply of 
tangled and crisscrossing classification schemes held together by an increasingly 
harassed and sprawling international public health bureaucracy”. This paper 
therefore aims to unravel the capillaries of power and interrelated knowledge 
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assumptions embedded in classifications of help-seeking, making their hidden ties 
visible. 
 
 
Research in this area can be divided into two dominant traditions, which I term the 
 
‘knowledge-belief-practice survey’ and ‘indigenous-knowledge-system’ approaches. 
Although the content and value-codes between them may differ, I show how these 
two traditions are in fact structurally very similar. They are both mediated by the 
same kind of dominant system of classification, one which demarcates the world into 
homogenous entities and binary oppositions. This system is in fact one of the most 
powerful and stubborn forms of classification buried in the ‘black box’ of the 
modernist/colonial inherited archive (Latour, 1991; Said, 1978). 
 
 
This paper thus asks whether there might be other ways of understanding help-
seeking for mental illness in Africa in ways which are not necessarily informed by a 
modernist/colonial form of consciousness. In other words, it considers how we might 
classify help-seeking behaviour without re-inventing dominant forms of Eurocentric 
power and privilege. If classification creates codes for meaning making that are as 
necessary as they are potentially harmful, the question is how we might “design 
classification systems that do not foreclose on rearrangements suggested by new 
forms of social and natural knowledge” (Haraway, 1991, p. 321). I highlight how two 
particular studies, which fall outside of the dominant research approaches, might 
offer a potentially fruitful terrain for engagement. Many of the critiques made in this 
paper are not particularly unusual or novel, but in fact reflect a long line of thinking 
within critical health sciences research and theory dating back to the 1980s. I thus 
conclude this paper by considering why, for the most part, this body of work 
continues to remain marginalized within contemporary research on help-seeking in 
Africa. 
 
 
Accumulating an archive of mental health research 
 
 
 
Various processes were undertaken to identify both qualitative and quantitative 
studies, published over the last decade, which have explored help-seeking for mental 
illness in Africa. The objective was not necessarily to be exhaustive, but to be able to 
provide a picture of some the main research approaches in this area. On-line searches 
were undertaken in Medline and PsychInfo databases using the key phrases: “mental 
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disorders”, “mental health”, “Africa” (including the names of all individual countries 
on the continent), “help seeking behaviour”, “health care seeking behaviour”, “help 
seek*”, “seek* help”, “seek* treatment”, “health care access”, “health care 
utilization”, “service uptake”, “treatment uptake”, “treatment barriers”. Where 
applicable, keywords were combined with Medical Subject Headings for the Medline 
databases and Subject Headings for the PsycINFO database. The reference lists of all 
applicable papers were scanned to identify further studies, and the authors of relevant 
papers were contacted. In addition, people known to be working in the field of 
Global Mental Health were contacted and asked if they could provide any relevant 
references. Some of the studies were also found by serendipity. Through my 
searches, I identified 48 relevant papers emerging from 14 African countries. 
 
 
Analysis 
 
 
 
Immersion in this archive suggested that research on help-seeking for mental illness 
in Africa could be characterised by two main approaches, which I term the 
 
‘knowledge-belief-practice survey’ and ‘indigenous-knowledge-system’ traditions. 
The relevant studies, listed under each category can be seen in the Appendix
24
. My 
analysis is divided into three parts, with the first two parts dealing separately with 
the main research approaches, followed by a final section in which I briefly explore 
how two particular studies fall outside of the main research traditions. Classifying 
these studies in this way is both performative and political. Classifications order 
things, and thus the particular non-coherences that do not fit into my schema, 
inevitably will be marginalized. The analysis might therefore be done quite 
differently, if ordered in an alternative way. What follows is therefore my situated 
interpretation (Haraway, 1991). 
 
 
Research Category 1: Knowledge-belief-practice survey approach 
 
 
 
The most prominent approach to studying help-seeking for mental illness in Africa is 
a perspective which I term the ‘knowledge-belief-practice survey’ tradition. Through 
the administration of large-scale, quantitative-type surveys, studies within this 
approach seek to understand the pathways people will take to seek help, and the 
 
24
 See appendix five of this thesis. 
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potential barriers that prevent or delay people from accessing services. The central 
focus is on exploring people’s beliefs about the causes and symptoms of, and 
appropriate forms of care for, mental illness. As such, the notion of ‘belief’, and 
particularly cultural beliefs, emerges as a fundamental category mediating 
interpretations within this research tradition; a primary box into which 
understandings of help-seeking are inserted (Bowker and Star, 1999). 
 
 
Indeed, the large majority of studies within this approach assert that people in Africa 
tend to hold “traditional beliefs” in “magic” and the “supernatural”, and as such, 
understand mental illnesses as “spiritual illnesses”. For example, in their study 
amongst people attending primary health clinics in Dar-es-Salaam, Ngoma et.al. 
(2003, p.353) assert “In Africa, mental disorders…are perceived as a source of 
misfortune; ancestors and witches are believed to have a crucial role in bringing them 
about”. By the same token, the following statement comes from Samouilhan and 
 
Seabi’s (2010, p.75) study of students’ beliefs about the causes of mental illness in 
 
South Africa: 
 
 
 
In African culture, religious and spiritual beliefs inform all other beliefs, 
behaviours and practices…The African worldview subscribes to the idea that 
mental illness is caused by witchcraft, by a failure to connect spiritually with 
the ancestors… 
 
 
These quotations aptly capture dominant sentiments across the majority of studies, 
with an abundance of statements that “the majority of the Ugandan population still 
harbours cultural beliefs about mental illness” (Ndyanabangi et.al., 2004, p.54); 
 
“Traditional notions…are widespread” (Deribew & Tamirat, 2005, p.157) and “The 
belief system of bewitchment/sorcery is still entrenched in the way of thinking and 
lifestyle of the African people” (Mkize &Uys, 2004, p.67). This apparent widespread 
belief in the supernatural is widely emphasized as the key reason for the pervasive 
patronage of ‘traditional’ forms of care in Africa. As unequivocally proclaimed by 
Bekele et.al (2009, p.481) in their research into the pathways to psychiatric care in 
Ethiopia: 
 
 
Seeking care from traditional healers for mental illness is a reflection of the 
prevailing belief among the Ethiopian population that mental illnesses are 
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caused by supernatural forces…As such patients usually resort to modern 
mental health-care services only after receiving traditional treatments. 
 
 
These kinds of contentions are ubiquitous across this tradition of research, with 
widespread comments such as: “People in Africa consult traditional healers because of 
cultural beliefs” (Mirza et.al, 2006, p.143); “Due to cultural beliefs about the causes of 
mental illness the mentally ill will consult a traditional healer first” 
 
(Ndyanabangi et.al., 2004, p.55); and “The cultural background of an individual 
determines who and where to go for help” (Mkize & Uys, 2004, p.67). 
 
 
A very particular understanding of human action, including care-seeking, is 
embedded in these assertions, one which assumes that people behave in essentially 
predictable and rational ways, shaped primarily by a set of beliefs held by the care-
seeker. And these propositions are assumed further to be determined almost 
exclusively by supposed ‘traditional’ African ‘culture’. Moreover, what is striking 
about these quotations is how the notion of African ‘culture’ is conceptualised as a 
homogenous entity, comprised of tidy and unchanging social boundaries. All 
Ethiopians, all Nigerians, all Senegalese people, all Africans for that matter, are 
binded seamlessly together, assumed to share the same beliefs and practices. Not 
only is supposed African ‘cultural beliefs’ constructed as internally monolithic, it is 
also tends to be represented as in direct opposition to supposed Western, 
biomedical knowledge. For example, Burns et.al. (2010, p.539) in their study of 
help-seeking in South Africa assert: 
 
 
While studies in high-income countries show that both psychotic patients and 
their relatives attribute their illnesses to biological or natural causes, it 
appears that their counterparts in LMICs invoke spiritual and traditional 
explanations. 
 
 
Similarly, Ngoma et.al. (2003, p.353) mentioned above proclaim: 
 
 
 
Traditional medicine and biomedicine differ in their concept of the nature and 
causes of mental illness. In Africa…such disorders may be viewed in terms of 
magical and religious causes, but rarely as diseases within the Western 
biomedical paradigm. 
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Analogous sentiments are expressed by Adewuya and Makanjuola (2009, p.124) in 
their research on mental health care among Nigerians: “A strong belief in 
supernatural causation may imply that offering Western medical care would be 
futile”. At the same time, Gureje and Lasebikan (2006, p.48) from their research in 
 
Nigeria conclude “Belief in the supernatural causation of mental illness…is likely to 
make persons with mental illness unwilling to seek formal service for mental 
disorders”. Similarly, Samouilhan and Seabi (2010, p. 75) referred to above proclaim 
 
“A strong belief in traditional ideology could lead to the rejection of formal mental 
health services”, whilst Coleman et.al. (2003, p.381) in their study of epilepsy in 
rural Gambia conclude “In most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, notions about epilepsy 
are rooted not in a medical model but in a spiritual model”. 
 
 
A line of demarcation is therefore constructed between Africa and the West, between 
supposed traditional African healing systems and beliefs, and apparent Western 
biomedical frameworks of knowledge and care. This bifurcation evolves further as it 
produces a proliferation of negative assumptions about African people and their way 
of life. Apparent African beliefs and practices are represented as inherently primitive, 
irrational and damaging, as opposed to Western biomedical truths which are 
valorised as essentially sophisticated and modern. For example Osungbade & 
Siyanbade (2011), conclude in their paper of help-seeking in a rural Nigerian 
community: 
 
 
The dominant tendency to use traditional treatment over modern medicine in 
many African countries is common and worrisome as it amounts to denial of 
prompt and appropriate treatment [my emphasis]. 
 
 
In a similar manner, Selassie (2008, p.1645) in his analysis of the management of 
epilepsy in sub-Saharan Africa proclaims: 
 
 
The causal link of epilepsy to natural spirits has neither scientific basis nor 
allows rational approach for intervention. To the contrary, it wastes valuable 
time and the meagre resources of the patients by interfering with a possible 
link with biomedical care providers until too late [my emphasis]. 
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These assertions are hardly value-free. Apparent traditional cultural beliefs and 
practices are given an inevitable appearance of primitiveness and inferiority, in stark 
contrast to supposedly enlightened, Western biomedical truths. Indeed, these value-
judgements are most pertinently revealed in the kinds of recommendations put 
forward by many of the studies, where it is explicitly asserted that interventions need 
to focus on ‘correcting’ supposedly false cultural beliefs and behaviours so they are 
more in-line with a biomedical system of knowledge and practice. It is widely 
emphasized that there is a need for education and awareness-raising campaigns, 
 
“aimed at modernizing general population causative models and attitudes” (Ohaeri 
and Fido, 2001, p.498). It is asserted that such programmes must “teach people about 
the real symptoms, causes and treatment of mental health problems” (Deribew and 
Tamirat, 2005, p. 153); “sensitize residents to Western knowledge” (Sharkawy et.al, 
2006, p.211), and “encourage utilization of modern treatment” (Osungbade and 
Siyanbade, 2011, p. 428). This is seen as essential in order to “change irrational 
perceptions” (Deribew and Tamirat, 2005, p.153), or else “those in need are likely to 
continue using the traditional pathways to care in preference to a new alien service” 
 
(Eaton and Agomoh, 2008, p.557). Not only is there a strong emphasis on educating 
the community, there are also widespread calls for the need to train and educate 
traditional healers. As Bekele et.al (2009, p.482) argue: 
 
 
It is important to train them [traditional healers] about early detection and 
timely referral of psychiatric patients…This will reduce the risk of disability 
and economic burden to the individual and country, especially by avoiding 
undue delay of treatment and expenditure on non-effective treatments [my 
emphases]. 
 
 
Or in the most unambiguous words of Mkize and Uys (2004, p.68): 
 
 
 
Health professionals should embark on educating traditional healers in the 
concepts of mental illness…and the recognition of signs for referral to health 
professionals, thus shortening the clients’ journey to proper health [my 
emphases]. 
 
 
Thus, pulling these various threads together, the knowledge produced by this 
research tradition is underpinned by a host of interrelated assumptions and meanings- 
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codes about the supposed nature of human action, about culture, and about 
medical science. These particular assumptions take on a ‘natural’ and self-evident 
quality with this research, ultimately ‘black-boxed’ within the supposed 
normalised categories of science, culture and belief. And yet these categories are 
far from natural or given, having been been the subject of much critique by a now 
veritable academic industry of STS, postcolonial and anthropological scholars. 
 
 
For example, the assumption within this research tradition that human action, 
including care-seeking, is inherently stable and rational, based upon the beliefs that 
people hold, has been rigorously disputed. Much critical work has demonstrated how 
far from operating in a mechanical, law-like, cause-and-effect manner, human action 
is profoundly complex and unpredictable, mediated by an array of contextual 
processes (Law, 2008; Mol, 2008). Indeed, in his analysis of some of the central 
epistemological presuppositions implicit in what he calls an ‘empiricist theory of 
medical language’, Byron Good (1994) highlights how the notion of ‘belief’ has 
come to function as a key analytical term within biomedical discourse. He shows 
how, deeply rooted in a rationalist philosophy of science, this concept of ‘belief’ 
reduces all of the contingencies and vicissitudes associated with illness and related 
behaviours to a set of propositions held by individual actors, in their minds. 
According to Good (1994), such reductionism has in turn so often led to misleading 
accounts of how and why people behave in the ways that they do, and inappropriate 
forms of medical practice. 
 
 
At the same time, the inherent assumption embedded within this tradition of research 
that ‘culture’ is a monolithic and distinct entity, comprised of tidy and unchanging 
social boundaries has also been widely destabilised. For example, it is argued that 
identities, cultures and structures of knowledge, including those on the African 
continent, are neither homogenous nor static. Rather, these are complex and 
disjointed social constructs which are constantly in flux, having assimilated and 
mutated over centuries (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012). As Lesley Green (2008, 
p.148) argues: 
 
 
To suggest that ‘culture’ has existed without internal differences of opinion, 
innovation, or contact with new ideas throughout human history is 
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demonstrably false…The idea that ‘a knowledge’ can be wholly ‘indigenous’ 
to ‘a people’…is just not a complete picture. 
 
 
Indeed, the work of Arun Agrawal (1995, 2002) is particularly illuminating in this 
regard. He demonstrates how the demarcation between Africa and the West, between 
traditional ‘African’ systems of knowledge and ‘Western’ knowledge frameworks is 
unsubstantiated. Providing diverse examples, he shows how over the last several 
centuries, ‘African’ and ‘Western’ forms of knowledge have experienced much 
contact, exchange and transformation, leading to extensive overlap between them. 
Agrawal (1995) unpacks in great detail three major themes that presumably separate 
 
‘African’ systems of knowledge and ‘Western’ knowledge frameworks: that of 
substantive differences; methodological and epistemological differences; and 
differences related to context. Drawing on a diverse range of theoretical traditions he 
shows how none of these claims have substantial grounds: “attempts to draw a strict 
line between Western and African knowledges on the basis of method, epistemology, 
context-dependence, or content…are ultimately untenable’ (Agrawal, 2002, p. 293). 
Ultimately, he shows how in conceiving ‘culture’ as a homogenous and distinct 
entity, all the multiplicity and dynamism of identities and systems of knowledge and 
practice are made invisible and erased. 
 
 
Furthermore, the assumption deeply embedded within this research tradition that 
supposed ‘traditional’ African cultural beliefs and practices are inherently primitive 
and irrational, whilst Western biomedical truths are intrinsically rational and superior 
has been the subject of much critique by various STS and postcolonial researchers 
(For example Connell, 2007; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; Latour, 1991). According 
to such scholars, our identification of ‘rational’ and ‘superior’ forms of knowledge 
and practices are never given or self-evident, but rest upon all kinds of values and 
assumptions around what ‘the modern’ comprises. For example, in his book We 
Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1991, p.76) argues that things are never innately 
 
‘modern’ or ‘pre-modern’, but only by means of a “harsh disciplining” and the “work 
of sorting out, cleaning up and dividing up”, are certain entities compelled to become 
modern, and others designated as archaic or irrational. For Latour then, we have 
simply been caught up in a process of classification and re-classification, and as 
such, if we change the “classification principle”, we can in turn get a “different 
temporality on the basis of the same events” (ibid, p.75). 
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Research on help-seeking within this tradition is thus underpinned by a host of 
questionable and Eurocentric assumptions. These assumptions coalesce around a 
very particular way of classifying the social world, one which tends to demarcate the 
world into homogenous entities and binary oppositions: ‘cultural beliefs’ versus 
‘biomedical truths’; ‘Africa’ versus ‘the West’, ‘traditional’ versus ‘modern’, 
‘primitive’ versus ‘civilized’. This system of ordering is indeed one of the most 
powerful and stubborn forms of classification buried in the ‘black box’ of the 
modernist/colonial inherited archive, including colonial medicine (Connell, 2007; 
Green, 2012; Said, 1978). As most pertinently demonstrated by Edward Said (1978) 
in his Orientalism, through the metalanguage of colonialism and modernity, 
imaginary lines were drawn and homogenous identities were constructed. In 
legitimizing tropes of otherness and polarizations of difference, these binaries served 
to unambiguously distinguish Europe from other societies, and validate its supposed 
 
“positional superiority” (Said, 1978, p. 7). 
 
 
 
Colonial medicine was indeed intimately entangled with this kind of thinking, 
characterized at least in part by the struggle between supposed ‘rational’ Western 
science and ‘primitive’ ‘traditional’ therapeutics (Comaroff 1993; Vaughan 1991). In 
its imaginary, ‘Western’ medical science, embodied the highest form of rationality 
and modernity, in contrast to the supposed backward and superstitious nature of 
 
‘indigenous’ cultural beliefs and practices. Put bluntly medical modernization of 
 
African populations entailed attempting to drive out supposed ‘primitive’ 
traditional therapeutics, and promoting forms of care which were based solely on 
biomedical theories and practices. 
 
 
The second dominant mental health research tradition on help-seeking, to which I 
now turn, attempts to contest many of these Eurocentric assumptions that weigh 
heavily on this first tradition of research. And yet although the context and value-
judgements may have changed within this research approach, the same way of 
ordering and classifying the social world remains firmly intact. This in turn, I 
suggest, ultimately limits the possibility of genuinely transcending the 
epistemological order of European Colonial Modernity and its suspect system of 
classification. 
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Research category 2: Indigenous-knowledge-system approach 
 
 
 
I term the second dominant body of research which seeks to understand help-seeking 
for mental illness in Africa the ‘indigenous-knowledge-system’ approach. This 
approach draws heavily on the ‘new cross-cultural psychiatry’ tradition, and in 
particular Arthur Kleinman’s (1980, 1988) ‘explanatory model’ framework. In the 
late 1970s and 1980s, Kleinman and colleagues criticised the tendency of 
epidemiological research world-wide to assume that Western psychiatric models and 
taxonomies are universally applicable. Heavily influenced by medical anthropology 
and sociology, these scholars condemned psychiatric research for assuming the 
inevitable superiority of Western biomedical frameworks and classification systems. 
Advocating a conceptual distinction between disease and illness, such scholars 
asserted that ‘disease’ is the malfunctioning of the body, whereas ‘illness’ comprises 
the lived experience of suffering (Kleinman, 1980; 1988). This subjective 
understanding of disease, according to such scholars, is mediated by people’s 
‘explanatory models’, which are “shaped by cultural factors governing perception, 
labelling, explanation, and valuation” and which play a fundamental role in 
determining how people understand and respond to disease (Kleinman et.al, 2006, 
p.141). For these scholars then, different cultures will have unique explanatory 
models that are distinct from, but equally legitimate to, Western psychiatric 
nosology. 
 
 
Drawing on this ‘explanatory model’ framework, and most commonly using 
qualitative methodologies, the second dominant research tradition focuses on 
exploring local people’s explanatory models, and how these shape their help-seeking 
behaviours. In line with the ‘explanatory model’ framework, it is commonly asserted 
within this body of research that African people have their own explanatory models, 
and own forms of healing, which are inherently different from Western views. For 
example, Crawford and Lipsedge (2004, p.143) conclude from their research 
amongst Zulu-speaking South Africans: 
 
 
Models of Western psychiatry tend to locate the source of psychological 
disturbance within the individual. In stark contrast, the Zulu tradition locates 
both the source of individual psychological distress and responsibility for its 
treatment firmly within the community. 
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Relatedly, Teferra and Shibre (2012, p.1) assert, based on their research on the 
 
‘explanatory models’ of mental illness in Ethiopia: 
 
 
 
There is a dichotomous belief regarding what causes severe mental 
disturbance: people living in western countries tend to focus on biological 
and psychosocial factors; whereas in non-western countries the focus is 
mainly on supernatural and religious factors…. 
 
 
In a similar fashion, Okello and Musisi (2006, p. 70) conclude from their research 
amongst Bagandan Ugandans, “Although the symptoms of depression were seen as 
constituting an illness, its conceptualization, name, causation and treatment were not 
deemed to fit into conventional western biomedical psychiatry”. By the same token, 
 
Mosotho et.al. (2011, p. 447) and Mbanga et.al. (2002, p. 69) emphasize respectively 
that an important finding from their research in South Africa “is the marked variation 
in manifestation of the symptoms of the anxiety among Sesotho speakers in 
comparison with Westerners” and that “Attitudes towards and beliefs about 
schizophrenia… differ substantially from those described in previous work in the 
West”. 
 
 
What tends to emerge within this research is that these local explanatory models are not 
only distinct from, but are just as valid to those arising in the West, or as Okello and 
Musisi (2006, p.61) put it, are of “equal value to western biomedical psychiatry”. 
 
Such assertions of equality are most pertinently revealed in the recommendations put 
forward by many of the studies. Rather than stressing the need to educate people and 
modify their beliefs, as was characteristic of the previous research tradition, it is 
widely asserted that the onus lies on service providers, who need to better appreciate 
local explanatory models. As Johnson et.al (2009, p.276) from their research on 
depression in Uganda argue: 
 
 
It is neither appropriate nor effective to simply transport Western-based 
methods of conceptualizing and treating mental illness to African 
countries….professionals in Uganda and elsewhere should be educated about 
cultural conceptions. 
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Similarly, Mosotho et.al (2011, p.447) in their study of anxiety among Sesotho 
speaking South Africans proclaim: 
 
 
There should be no room for cultural arrogance. Africans are neither 
 
Americans nor Europeans…African people should be treated within the 
framework of their own culture and belief systems. 
 
 
Thus, traditional beliefs are categorised as entities that should be recognized and 
celebrated, rather than disparaged and modified. Supposed ‘traditional’ healing 
practices are classified in a similar light. Many scholars within this research tradition 
praise the work of traditional healers, portraying them as competent care-providers. 
For example Mosotho et.al (2011, p.446) quoted above assert: 
 
 
Spiritual and/or traditional healers have played a significant role in combating 
a range of diseases that have affected African people for centuries….they 
therefore deserve a place next to mental health professionals trained in the 
western tradition. 
 
 
Similarly, Crawford and Lipsedge (2004, p.143) cited above argue: 
 
 
 
Traditional healers are highly respected members of the community and 
provide great stability … [They] have a deep understanding and knowledge 
of the Zulu peoples’ historical, religious and cultural beliefs… 
 
 
Thus, here we find some quite different content and meaning-codes to the previous 
research tradition. According to the large majority of studies within this tradition, 
there may be ways of understanding and responding to mental illness that are 
different to biomedical frameworks, but which are not necessarily inferior. Research 
within this approach thus shuffle and complicate the content of what falls under ‘the 
modern’ and ‘the pre-modern’, refusing to place ‘African’ cultural beliefs and 
healing systems in one column and ‘Western’ biomedical knowledge and practices in 
the other. And yet the knowledge produced within this approach is in fact 
structurally still very similar to the previous tradition. Although the values have 
changed, the logic has not. 
 
153 
Once again, help-seeking behaviour is understood to be determined first and 
foremost by people’s cultural beliefs. Like the first research tradition, human action 
is thus assumed to be essentially predictable and rational, determined primarily by 
cultural beliefs. And once again, this notion of ‘cultural belief’ tends to be 
categorised in monolithic terms. Essentialist claims are widely made within the 
studies, with common phrases such as: “the African people” (Mosotho et.al, 2011, 
p.447), “the Zulu peoples’ cultural beliefs” (Crawford and Lipsedge, 2004, p.143), 
 
“African people should be treated within the framework of their culture and belief 
systems” (Mosotho et.al, 2011, p.447), or as Okello and Musisi (2006, p. 61) most 
explicitly state: “People from different cultural contexts and traditions define and 
experience reality in very different ways, including their views about mental 
disorders”. Thus, as with the previous research tradition, ‘Africa’ tends to be 
classified as a homogenous entity, with the subjectivities and systems of knowledges 
prevailing on the continent binded seamlessly together. 
 
 
Moreover, similar kinds of rigid polarizations and binary oppositions that we saw in 
the first research tradition are strongly retained. Once again, strong lines of 
demarcation are constructed between supposed Western biomedical models and 
apparent indigenous African healing and belief systems. There is ubiquitous talk 
within the studies about “models of Western psychiatry….in stark contrast to the 
Zulu tradition” (Crawford and Lipsedge, 2004, p.143), or that “Traditional beliefs 
should be given equal value to western biomedical psychiatry”, and how “Western-
based methods of conceptualizing and treating mental illness” should not be 
“transported to African countries” (Johnson et.al, 2009, p.276). Indeed the primary 
focus of research within this tradition is to distinguish apparent African traditional 
understandings and healing systems from those which supposedly reside in the West, 
in an attempt to legitimize and celebrate the former. 
 
 
At the same time, the explanatory model approach upon which these studies are 
based is structured by an inherent distinction between supposed disease and that of 
illness. That is, at the core of this approach is the assumption that ‘real’ and objective 
disease is distinguishable from the ‘subjective’ experience and meaning of illness. 
This dualism of objective disease and subjective experience of illness has been the 
subject of much critique by critical STS and anthropological scholars (Craffert, 1997; 
Good, 1994; Mol, 2008). According to such scholars, this symmetry, now at the heart 
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of most sub-specialities of medicine, is deeply rooted in the shifts that occurred in 
medical science during the 18
th
 century and the rise of the ‘medical gaze’. More 
specifically, with the discovery of autopsy and rise of modern pathology, it became 
possible for the physician to identify disease in a way totally independent of the 
patient’s experience of it. From this point, disease was increasingly seen as 
autonomous from patients’ experienced sense of it, and the patient’s capacity for 
self-knowledge and interpretation was isolated away from the body. As such, disease 
entities were conceptualised as resident in the physical body; whether grossly evident 
as the widely reproducing cells in cancer, or more subtly evident through their effects 
as in the disordered thoughts and feelings of schizophrenia or major depression. Put 
differently, disease was assumed to be biological, universal and ultimately 
transcending social and cultural context. Although the experience and understandings 
of illness may vary by social and ecological context, real disease or pathology does 
not. 
 
 
And yet this dualism has so often been found to be incongruous with what critical 
STS and anthropological researchers are observing in the field (Craffert, 1997; Good, 
1994; Mol, 2008). Such research reveals that people do not just represent and make 
meanings of disease through socio-cultural processes. Rather, the very nature of 
disease, and associated signs, symptoms and definitions are constituted by the 
complex social-cultural milieu in which people live. As such, disease and illness are 
essentially intermingled, at once biological, moral, spiritual, emotional, social, 
cultural and political. Ultimately, as revealed by such researchers, abstracting the 
world of physical objects and physiological processes from social and meaningful 
phenomena has frequently led to distorted forms of medical understanding and 
practice. 
 
 
In sum, although the second research approach attempts to destabilise many of the 
Eurocentric assumptions of the first research tradition, in retaining the same form of 
classification, one which is based on essentialised categories and rigid binary 
oppositions, it ends up reproducing the very epistemological framework it seeks to 
contest. This in turn ultimately limits the possibility of an effective subversion of the 
modernist/colonial epistemological order and its many questionable assumptions. As 
Green (2012, p.4) most pertinently articulates, “In uncritically accepting the 
conceptual structure of modernity, the capacity to offer different thought is 
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curtailed”. To use her analogy, “transposing the colours on the chess board does not 
change the frame”. 
 
 
An alternative approach? 
 
 
 
The question is then, might we be able to find other ways of understanding help-
seeking for mental distress in Africa which are based on alternative kinds of 
classification systems that are neither Eurocentric nor Afrocentric? Might we be able 
to change the frame, rather than just the content, of conversations on help-seeking? 
And how might this transform the way in which we understand how people do, and 
potentially could, seek support for mental illness in Africa? 
 
 
Two particular studies, grounded in more critical and constructivist perspectives, and 
employing in-depth ethnographic methodologies, may offer a potentially fruitful 
terrain for engagement. For example, Ursula Read (2009, 2012) conducted fourteen 
months of ethnographic research amongst people with mental illness and their 
families living in rural communities in Kintampo, Ghana which included, inter alia, 
an exploration of help-seeking behaviour. She found that people with mental illness 
drew upon, and experimented with a kaleidoscope of healing modalities and 
therapeutic resources in fundamentally pragmatic and diverse ways. In particular, 
her research revealed that a preference for one form of care over another was driven 
less by beliefs about the nature of illness and its causation, and more about a 
practical attempt to restore well-being and attain positions in which valued forms of 
subjectivity could be exerted. And these subjectivities emerged as multiple and 
diverse, frequently based upon potentially conflicting rationalities and deeply 
entangled with socially meaningful processes. 
 
 
For example, Read found that many people discontinued antidepressant or 
psychotropic medications not because they did not know about the potential benefits, 
but because these treatments frequently led to adverse effects that disrupted their 
ability to work, created dependencies and contributed to all kinds of family conflicts. 
Similarly, the widespread patronage of traditional healers was often less about 
 
‘cultural beliefs’, and more to do with the manner in which the forms of care 
provided by such healers frequently incorporated some of the fundamental and 
irreducible parts of wellness and healing for many people. Ultimately, this research 
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suggested that a focus on ‘beliefs’, defined in generic terms, tends to obscure the 
many crucial aspects of wellbeing and recovery that are important to patients and 
their families and which shape the therapeutic choices they make. 
 
 
In a similar manner, René Devisch et.al (2001) explored the dynamics surrounding 
help-seeking practices, including those related to mental illness, of residents living in 
Kinshasa, Congo. They found that help-seeking was inherently idiosyncratic and 
fragmentary, consistently shifting between a plurality of therapeutic settings. Service 
users and their families tended to visit and consistently move between both 
biomedical forms of care and indigenous healing practices. And both of these healing 
systems were seen to provide partial and transitory solutions, both being sources of 
constraint and opportunity, comfort and discomfort. Through the choices made, the 
health-seeker attempted to find solutions that ‘fitted’ with their identities and moral 
landscapes. And such subjectivities and value hierarchies were intimately shaped by 
local conceptualizations of community and personhood, understandings which were 
in turn deeply embedded in the spiritual, the corporeal and the social community. 
Ultimately, Devisch and colleagues argue that without a complex understanding of 
how relatedness and intersubjectivity shape conceptualisations of ‘wellness’ and 
‘recovery’, it is hard to grasp the logic behind the therapeutic itineraries that people 
follow. 
 
 
These two studies thus employed detailed and careful ethnographic methods in order 
to build up a comprehensive and particularized familiarity with the social life and 
practices of those studied. Rather than focusing solely on ‘cultural beliefs’, these 
scholars attempted to tap into the tremendously complex political, social and 
structural environments in which help-seeking arise. Moreover, rather than assuming 
a kind of homogeneity and distinctiveness of entities which can be captured through 
rigid categories, such research was premised on the assumption that identities and 
actions are fluid and interdependent. People were understood to move between 
multiple healing modalities, to hold diverse beliefs and values and to possess an 
assortment of needs and priorities, none of which could not be fully understood or 
spelled out in rational terms. Understandings and behaviours thus materialized as 
multiple and circumstantial matters that were difficult to pin down and generalise 
precisely because they were interdependent and socio-political questions about 
multifaceted individuals in complex social milieu. Similarly, all healing practices 
157 
surfaced as partial and limited; as diverse entities filled with both gaps and 
contradictions. No one mode of healing was assumed to be inevitably superior to 
another, but all healing systems were understood as somewhat incomplete and 
indeterminate. 
 
 
As such, this research resisted bounded and totalizing accounts of how people do, 
and should, seek support for mental illness. No simple explanations and definitive 
solutions were provided. Rather, what emerged most strongly by this research was 
the need for in-depth and more provisional understandings of local circumstances 
and conceptualisations of wellbeing and recovery; for more partial forms of 
categorizing and ultimately more nuanced kinds of recommendations. Accounts such 
as these therefore have crucial implications for the prospect of building 
understandings of help-seeking for mental illness that are more robust, more 
localized, and more connected to local histories and relationships. In changing the 
ways in which cultural geneses and influences were categorised, this research begins 
to shift the grounds on which questions about the nature of help-seeking may be 
posed and explored. Ultimately, such research holds great potential for articulating 
help-seeking for mental illness in postcolonial Africa through more appropriate 
configurations and possibly along new epistemic lines. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
 
 
In this paper I have opened up the ‘black box’ of knowledge on help-seeking for 
mental illness in Africa within contemporary mental health research, making visible 
and interrupting the dominant classifications and categories mediating the knowledge 
produced. I have argued that contemporary research in this area can be understood as 
dominated by two main approaches, approaches which are structurally very similar. I 
have demonstrated that while there are obvious differences between them, both 
approaches are structured by the same kind of system of classification, one which is 
deeply inserted within the knowledge tradition of modernity and colonialism. Both 
research traditions have a single, monolithic benchmark by which to judge and value 
the world; they share a view of identities, cultures and knowledge that denies change, 
complexity and multiplicity, as well as the movement of people and things in more 
than one direction; they both possess a rationalist understanding human behaviour as 
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mechanical and based upon law-like principles of cause and effect; and they are both 
premised on Africa’s distinctiveness and essential difference. 
 
 
The dominance of this particular system of ordering has worrying implications. For 
example, the first research tradition’s widespread calls for education programmes 
which correct people’s supposed ‘irrational’ beliefs and behaviours and teach 
traditional healers apparently ‘proper’ modes of caring, tends to reproduce old forms 
of oppressive power and medical elitism. This in turn risks subjugating, rather than 
empowering, both mental health service users and providers (Kirmayer, 2012; 
Levine, 2012). Indeed, these particular proposals are deeply embroiled with the 
growing calls within Global Mental Health discourse for greater ‘mental health 
literacy’ amongst service users and the general population (Ganasen et al., 2008; 
Petersen et al., 2011). The concept of mental health literacy ultimately translates into 
being literate in a biomedical system of knowledge (White & Sashidharan, 2014). 
These kinds of proposals also share much with the growing trend within low-and-
middle income countries that is attempting to bring traditional healers ‘in line’ with 
biomedical science by testing the efficiency of their practices through the principles 
and methods of science. This has been described as a kind of ‘Randomized 
Controlled Crime’, as ‘alternative’ healing systems are tolerated only so long as they 
can be shown to have a scientific basis (Adams, 2002, p. 679; also Levine, 2012). 
 
 
At the same time, the recommendations made by the first research tradition face the 
danger of failing to achieve their anticipated effects, as they are based upon 
knowledge which may insufficiently capture how and why people actually seek help 
for mental illness. Is it possible that the current underutilization of services in Africa 
is less about people’s supposed erroneous beliefs, and more about a potential 
disconnect between how research is understanding people’s needs and behaviours, 
and the actual ways of life and forms of meaning-making that prevail within the 
community? Is it conceivable that the high usage of ‘traditional’ healers, which this 
research tradition strongly suggests, is not because people are ‘ignorant’, but because 
the care provided by such healers might be valuable to those who access them? 
 
 
The second research tradition attempts to understand, and validate alternative ways 
of knowing and being which may lie outside of biomedical metaphysical realities. 
However, the problem with the proposals put forward by this research is that they 
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tend to romanticise and valorise all that goes under the name of ‘traditional 
medicine’ or ‘traditional beliefs’, whilst delegitimising supposedly Western 
biomedical forms of mental health care. This could have potentially very dangerous 
consequences, as the case of HIV/AIDS in South Africa most pertinently suggests. 
 
Here, supposed ‘African medicine’ was advocated as the antithesis of ‘Western 
science’, undergirding the state’s policy to deny HIV-positive people antiretrovirals, 
which cost millions of South Africans their lives (Green, 2012). The idea that 
biomedical forms of care are irrelevant and inappropriate for people with mental 
health problems in Africa, as the second research tradition suggests, could indeed 
have similar dire repercussions. People may be refused psychotropic medications, 
treatments which have been shown to have very real and significant benefits for 
many people with mental illness in Africa, particularly those of a more severe nature 
(Patel and Thornicroft, 2009). 
 
 
Therefore, what all of this implies is that there is a need for research on help-seeking 
in Africa to rethink how it might conceptualise the needs and priorities, the forms of 
meaning-making and the ways of responding to mental illness that prevail within 
communities. It necessitates considering how research might genuinely tap into, and 
potentially legitimise, epistemologically diverse socio-moral frames of illness and 
recovery on their own terms, and within their own metaphysical worlds. This is not 
an easy task, one which raises all sorts of slippery epistemological questions around 
how medical evidence is produced and legitimised (Levine, 2012). Ultimately, these 
kinds of questions need to be opened up for further consideration and debate within 
the Global Mental Health arena. 
 
 
This paper has suggested that two particular studies, which lie outside of the 
dominant research approaches, might offer useful resources in this regard. Through 
careful and in-depth ethnographic methodologies, such research developed theory-
rich knowledge on help-seeking for mental illness in Africa which was deeply 
entangled with local realities, lexicons and matrices. The researchers began with very 
different assumptions, from those presumed within the epistemological order of 
European Colonial Modernity, about the kinds of selves, objects and their relations, 
and how they can be known. Thinking critically and reflexively about the larger 
organizing principles guiding their research, both of these studies sought to rethink 
how society, social change, human behaviour, agency, culture, identities and so forth 
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might be thought about and captured. Ultimately, it is research such as this that could 
help create a space for a more democratic archive of knowledge on service uptake in 
Africa, one which is based on alternative and more appropriate knowledge codes and 
classifications. This might in turn enable us to work, function and identify ourselves 
and others in worlds very different from the ones created by current seats of power. 
 
 
What I am articulating in this paper is not particularly unusual or novel, but in fact 
reflects a long line of thinking within critical health sciences research and theory. 
Indeed, there is a rich legacy of critical debate dating back to the 1980s within 
medical anthropology (for example Good, 1994; Helman, 1994; Singer and Baer, 
1995) and what might be termed the ‘psy-disciplines’, including psychology and 
psychiatry (for example Danziger, 1997; Inglby, 1981; Swartz, 1998) which have 
problematized the assumptions of universalism and rationalism underpinning 
biomedical systems of knowledge and practice. Moreover, this body of work has 
destabilised the essentialist undertones of the ‘indigenous knowledge systems’ 
approach and questioned the ability of this perspective to dismantle the biomedical 
hegemony. And these scholars have time and again stressed the need for more 
nuanced and critical forms of (mental) health research which are based on alternative 
ways of knowing to those arising from the modernist/colonial epistemological order. 
 
 
And yet in spite of these calls, and promise of these more critical health traditions, 
they are to a large extent still marginalised in the public health arena, still relegated 
to a fairly well defined circuit of institutions and journals. As revealed in this paper, 
contemporary research on help-seeking for mental illness in Africa appears to be no 
exception. It is pertinent to ask, why this might be so. Paradoxically, many of the 
problematic features highlighted in this paper are precisely those which are attractive 
to governments and donor institutions. The present-day logic of the global 
knowledge economy increasingly requires information that might be useful for the 
processes of government and planning, and is thus able to make social and political 
spaces legible in relatively homogenous and universalising ways (Du Toit, 2005). 
Economies of scale in government, in decision making by policy-makers, in 
assessments by donor agencies, more and more depend upon uncontroversial, policy-
relevant forms of knowledge which are based on replicable methodologies and 
categorical schemas. These pressures have in fact recently been alluded to by key 
proponents of Global Mental Health, who have argued that complexity and nuance is 
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unlikely to convince governments and attract donors (Patel, 2014; Saraceno et al., 
2007). Indeed, as asserted at the 2006 annual conference of the Association of 
African Psychiatrists and Allied Health Professions: 
 
 
Many donors and policy makers are not convinced that mental health care is 
worth the investment. It is our task…to provide the kind of ‘hard 
evidence’…to help to persuade donors and policy makers that investing in 
mental health care is not a ‘luxury’, but a bare necessity (Ventevogel, 2006, 
p.273). 
 
 
It is therefore not an uncomplicated task to create a space for more fluid and 
provisional accounts on help-seeking, accounts which cannot be abstracted from the 
complexity of local context and cannot easily be transported from one context to 
another. And yet I believe the costs of failing to open-up this space is likely to be 
high, as most pertinently illustrated by James Scott’s (1998) enquiry into why so 
many efforts to better the human condition have gone tragically awry. In his analysis, 
Scott provides examples of all sorts of social, economic and health-related projects 
which have ended up wasting considerable amounts of money on inappropriate 
interventions, as they were based on decontextualized and standardized forms of 
information and schemas. As such, this paper is a plea for mental health researchers 
to resist fully subscribing to the current demands of the knowledge economy by 
fostering and celebrating other ways of knowing and imagining how people do, and 
potentially could, seek help for mental illness in Africa. This is turn might go some 
way towards helping to reduce the current ‘gap’ in mental health care so many 
countries on the continent face. 
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Abstract 
 
In this paper I problematize knowledge on reducing the ‘gap’ in mental health care 
produced by 14 national mental health policies in Africa. To contextualize this 
analysis, I begin with a historic-political account of the emergence of the notion of 
Primary Health Care (PHC), and its entanglement within the decolonization forces of 
the 1960s. I unpack how and why this concept was subsequently atrophied, being 
stripped of its more revolutionary sentiments from the 1980s. Against this backdrop, 
I show how, although the 14 national mental health policies are saturated with the 
rhetoric of Primary Health Care and associated concepts of community participation 
and ownership, in practice they tend to marginalize local meaning-systems and 
endorse an essentially top-down framework heavily informed by colonial medicine. 
The policies thus end up reproducing many of the very Eurocentric assumptions that 
the original Primary Health Care notion sought to transcend. More specifically, the 
paradigms of evidence-based research/practice and individualised human rights 
become the gatekeepers of knowledge. These two paradigms, which are deeply 
embedded within contemporary Global Mental Health discourse, are legislating what 
are legitimate forms of knowing, and by extension, valid forms of care. I argue that a 
greater appreciation of the Primary Health Care concept, in its earliest formulation, 
offers a potentially fruitful terrain of engagement for developing more contextually-
embedded and epistemologically appropriate mental health care policies in Africa. 
This in turn might help reduce the current ‘gap’ in mental health care so many 
countries on the continent face. 
 
Keywords: Africa; Treatment gap; Global mental health; policies; 
 
Epistemological assumptions 
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Introduction 
 
 
Psychiatry in underdeveloped countries could profit…from avoiding the mistakes already committed 
in very advanced countries of the world. When we, however, try to abstract a lesson from European 
and American experience we must make sure that it will apply in the contemporary African 
situation…This is no easy matter, but we are getting more and more convinced that an independent 
diagnosis of our position may prove more profitable in the end than a borrowed remedy. 
 
(Lambo, 1960:1703) 
 
 
Over the last decade, the mental health situation in the global South has gained 
renewed attention as an important public health matter within the international arena 
(Global Mental Health Group, 2007; Patel, 2014). One issue of particular concern is 
what is understood as a considerable number of people with mental health problems 
in low-and-middle income countires not receiving care, now referred to as the mental 
health ‘treatment gap’ (Petersen et al., 2011; WHO, 2001). This issue has in turn 
given rise to a ‘broad new social movement’, led by the international psychiatric 
community but incorporating a broad coalition of actors and agencies (Horton, 2007: 
806). This movement is implementing all sorts of research projects and interventions, 
backed by significant amounts of global funding, geared towards reducing this ‘gap’ 
in mental health care (Cooper, 2014). 
 
 
Under the banner of this movement, strong appeals have been made to African 
countries to develop national mental health policies to guide their health care systems 
in addressing the ‘gap’ in mental health care (Faydi et.al, 2011; Omar et.al., 2010; 
WHO, 2001). These calls have been widely responded to, with the continent 
witnessing a major acceleration in national mental health policy development. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2011) nineteen African 
countries had a mental health policy in 2010, the vast majority of which had been 
approved or revised since 2005. In light of this growth in policies, a burgeoning body 
of research has emerged which is focused on evaluating the content of such policies 
and/or the processes followed in their development (Faydi et.al, 2011; Omar et.al, 
2010; Ssebunnya et.al, 2012). Notwithstanding the importance of these issues, what 
have received far less attention, if any at all, are the epistemologies and associated 
politics, underpinning these policies. 
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As such, this paper looks critically at thinking around reducing the ‘gap’ in mental 
health care within 14 national mental health policies in Africa. Rather than focusing 
primarily on the content of these policies, my analysis is more interested in 
epistemological questions regarding the conventions of meaning-making that lie 
behind the knowledge that is produced by the policies, disentangling the power 
dynamics at play. In order to contextualise this analysis, I begin this paper with an 
historic-political account of the origins of the notion of Primary Health Care (PHC), 
and associated ideas of community participation and ownership. I unpack how the 
emergence of this concept was deeply intertwined with the forces of decolonization 
during the 1960s, and drew heavily on the grass-roots public health initiatives being 
pioneered in various low-and-middle income countries. At the heart of these 
initiatives was an attempt to destabilise the epistemologies underpinning colonial 
medicine, by developing contextually-embedded health interventions which draw on 
local resources and forms of meaning-making. Since the 1980s, although Primary 
Health Care has increasingly formed part of official public health jargon, it has 
tended to be stripped of its more complex and revolutionary policy implications. I 
explore how and why it was so quickly atrophied, ultimately representing only a 
brief, and primarily rhetorical disruption to, the paradigm of colonial medicine. 
 
 
This analysis provides a historic-political platform from which to understand the 
nature of contemporary policy thinking on the ‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa, 
and in particular its embeddedness within more general global health trends. Turning 
to the 14 national mental health policies, I demonstrate how they are saturated with 
the rhetoric of Primary Health Care. And yet in reality, beneath the bold rhetorical 
statements, the policies do not involve any real public participation and ownership. 
Rather, ideas of community participation and ownership tend to play out as 
essentially matters of education and training in the supposedly proper nature of 
mental illness and apparently appropriate forms of care. And constructions of what is 
 
‘proper’ and ‘appropriate’ across the 14 policies are guided by two main paradigms: 
those of scientific evidence and human rights. These paradigms of thought are indeed 
two of the main conceptual frameworks shaping contemporary Global Mental Health 
discourse (Global Mental Health Group, 2007; Mari and Thornicroft, 2010; Patel, 
2014). I demonstrate how such paradigms are both underpinned by several 
contentious and Eurocentric assumptions, an argument which has been made by a 
number of critical cultural psychiatrists (Bemme & D’souza, 2014; Ingleby, 2014; 
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White & Sashidharan, 2014) and social science scholars (De Sousa Santos et al., 
2007; Sardar, 1998). 
 
 
To be sure, this is not an argument against the potential importance of scientific 
evidence and human rights. Rather, this paper is critiquing the hegemonic way in 
which these ideas are mediating policy thinking around legitimate forms of care, and 
the consequent marginalization of others ways of thinking, based on alternative 
epistemologies and knowledge politics. It is expressing discomfort with the policies 
espousal of a top-down model of care, guided by centrally-defined, Eurocentric 
criteria, somewhat masked by grassroots rhetoric. Ultimately, it is problematizing the 
way in which the policies end up reproducing many of the very Eurocentric 
assumptions that the notion of Primary Health Care, in its earliest formulation, 
sought to transcend. I conclude this paper by proposing that a return to the original 
notion of Primary Health Care might offer a potentially productive terrain of 
engagement for thinking about the development of more contextually-embedded and 
epistemologically appropriate mental health care policies in Africa. 
 
 
Collection and analysis of the national policies 
 
 
 
My analysis focuses on the knowledge produced on the ‘gap’ in mental health care of 
14 national mental health policies: Ethiopia (2012); Gambia (2007); Ghana (1996) 
Lesotho (2005); Liberia (2009); Namibia (2005); Nigeria (2011); Rwanda (2012) 
Sierra Leone (2012); South Africa (2013); Tanzania (2006); Uganda (2011); Zambia 
(2005); Zimbabwe (2004). These policies are those which I was able to access 
between December 2011 and January 2013. To my surprise, national mental health 
policies in Africa are not readily available in the public domain, and thus locating 
them was not a simple matter. This was confirmed by the then Director of the 
 
WHO’s African Regional Office, who indicated that obtaining mental health policies 
in Africa requires negotiating directly with the Ministries of Health (MoH) (Personal 
communication, 4 October, 2011). Accessing the policies thus involved over a year-
long process of communication with the MoHs in these different countries, who 
frequently themselves were unaware how to retrieve a copy of their own policy. In 
certain instances, when the policy was located, it did not exist in electronic form, and 
thus needed to be photocopied and posted to me as a hard copy. These difficulties 
around attaining the policies raise all sorts of questions around whose voices and 
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interests might be embodied in these policies, and the degree of ownership local 
governments genuinely have. I will return to these questions in the conclusion of this 
paper. 
 
 
My analysis of these policies draws on theoretical insights from two broad areas of 
study, namely those of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Postcolonial 
Studies. STS is a multi-disciplinary theoretical corpus concerned with how health, 
bodies and disease are politically and discursively produced in medical science 
policy and practice (Law, 2008; Latour, 1999). Postcolonial Studies is likewise a 
broad intellectual enterprise that is similarly interested in the basis of knowledge 
structures and the representational work that knowledge does. However, this field 
tends to direct its critique towards the relationship between colonisers and colonised, 
and the epistemological and cultural effect this relationship has on the production of 
knowledge (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1995; De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; 
Moore-Gilbert, 1997; Said, 1978). 
 
 
For my analysis, I draw upon specifically the Kuhnian concept of a paradigm (Kuhn, 
1962) and Bruno Latour’s notion of ‘the black box’ (1987, 1999), and situate these 
notions within a Postcolonial space of thinking. According to Thomas Kuhn (1962), 
a paradigm serves as a conceptual prism through which people make sense of the 
world. It constitutes a world view or what he also calls a ‘disciplinary matrix’, a kind 
of constellation of communal commitments and presuppositions. Conjointly, these 
elements provide ‘abstracted rules’ (ibid: 47) or accepted norms around what counts 
as significant questions, what modes of analysis are appropriate and what kinds of 
solutions are acceptable. What this suggests is that paradigms are not inevitable 
mappings of the world, but are constructed within, and emerge out of, particular 
socio-economic and political milieu. What makes paradigms such elusive entities for 
analysis, however, is that they are as invisible as they are powerful. As Kuhn 
emphasises (ibid: 37), ‘One of the things a scientific community acquires with a 
paradigm is a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for 
granted, can be assumed to have solutions’. Thus, what are concealed within 
paradigms are the shared properties, which appear so natural, but which are in fact 
constructed ways of seeing and acting in the world. These are deeply buried in what 
 
Bruno Latour calls ‘the black box’. 
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According to Latour (1987) the black box holds all the common sense assumptions 
that a culture shares which turns questions, priorities and interests into facts. As 
Latour (1987: 206) puts it, the box is ‘well sealed’ and people generally do not ‘live 
in a world of fiction, representation, symbol, approximation and convention: they are 
simply right’. Thus, our paradigms of knowledge become so taken-for-granted, so 
intrinsically accepted as ‘given’, that almost by definition their underlying 
scaffolding disappears. According to Latour (1999: 304) in later work, what this 
concealment enables is a focus on ‘inputs and outputs’ and not on the complex 
processes that produce these effects. Those processes are all of the interests, values 
and politics that shape how we see and think in the world. Through such ‘black-
boxing’, these processes are normalised and archived in such a way as to be inherited 
and accepted as common-sense reality. 
 
 
Thus drawing on these ideas, and situating them within a Postcolonial perspective, 
my analysis sought to open up the ‘black box’ of knowledge on reducing the ‘gap’ 
in mental health care produced by the national mental health policies of 14 African 
countries. It attempted to make visible the dominant paradigm(s) of thought 
mediating the knowledge produced by these policies, exploring how they may 
remain bound to Eurocentric content and orientation. It sought to explore how these 
dominant structures of knowledge may be marginalising other ways of thinking 
about and addressing the ‘gap’ in mental health care, which may lie outside of a 
particularly Eurocentric form of consciousness. 
 
 
Primary Health Care: Its emergence and how it was subsequently atrophied 
 
 
 
Before turning to these policies, I first briefly touch upon the more general trends in 
global public health discourse since the 1960s, and in particular the emergence of the 
notion of Primary Health Care. This will provide a historic-political platform from 
which my analysis of the 14 contemporary mental health policies can be understood. 
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Origins of Primary Health Care: Decolonization and nationalist movements of the 
1960s 
 
 
The emergence of the notion of Primary Health Care, and associated ideas of 
community participation and ownership, was deeply intertwined with the forces of 
decolonization and spread of nationalist, anti-imperialist and leftist movements 
during the 1960s. Within this political context, the knowledge politics underpinning 
the epistemological order of European modernity and colonialism were increasingly 
being questioned (Cueto, 2004; Walt & Vaughan, 1981; Werner and Sanders, 1997). 
This order had produced particular ways of thinking, merging around a shared set of 
abstractions, inter alia rationalism, science, liberalism, universalism, human rights, 
and progress. 
 
 
So for example, it was a knowledge tradition in which scientific modes of thinking 
became crystalized as the ultimate form of rationality, the guarantor of universal truths 
and progress (Cooper, 2014; Sardar, 1998; Turnbull, 2009); it was one in which 
questions of justice and morality were increasingly subsumed within the notion of 
human rights, with its universal and individualistic epistemological assumptions 
(Cooper, 2014; De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; Pannikar, 1984). And what was central to 
this epistemological order, was the way in which it tended to negate its 
 
‘others’, assuming that alternative ways of thinking and acting, which may lie 
outside of its own consciousness, are ultimately illegitimate (De Sousa Santos et al., 
2007; Sardar, 1998). The paradigm of colonial medicine was intimately entangled 
with this kind of thinking, characterized at least in part by a struggle between 
supposed ‘rational’ Western biomedicine and ‘primitive’ ‘traditional’ therapeutics 
 
(Comaroff, 1993; Vaughan, 1991). In its imaginary, ‘Western’ medicine, with its 
scientific rationalism and universal ethical codes, embodied the highest form of 
rationality and modernity, in contrast to the supposed backward and superstitious 
nature of ‘indigenous’ medical beliefs and practices. 
 
 
Within the context of the liberation ferment of the 1960s and early 1970s, it was 
these particular paradigms that came under increased attack by international and 
African academics alike. Scholars of the time began to denounce the notion that in 
order for African countries to act effectively upon contemporary conditions, they 
needed to ‘catch up’ with the geopolitical North, following the same trajectory of 
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development (Walt &Vaughan, 1981). Key international health agencies and policy-
thinkers began to interrogate colonial public health’s preoccupation with the 
transmission of biomedical practices, and its denigration of ‘other’ healing 
epistemologies (Werner and Sanders, 1997). More and more scholars stressed the 
indignity of health care being ‘owned’ by particular groups, and the form and 
objectives of these systems being imposed upon populations on quasi-rational 
grounds (Cueto, 2004). There was thus increased talk about the ‘wide and deep-
seated error in the way health services are provided in developing countries’, with a 
growing interest in new kinds of health care models, based on alternative kinds of 
epistemologies (Newell,1988: 904). 
 
 
It was within this context that various countries within Asia and Africa starting 
pioneering what can be understood as ‘alternative’ kinds of health care initiatives, 
such as the now well-known Bare Foot Doctors programme in China (Baum, 2007; 
Cueto, 2004; Werner & Sanders, 1997). Known as Community-Based Health 
Programs, these programmes were not just health initiatives, but were part of the 
larger anti-imperialist struggles by marginalized people for greater voice and 
independence. Led by groups of community health workers, these grassroots 
initiatives sought to address key health issues by drawing on local resources and 
socio-moral frames of illness and recovery. The focus was on using these 
understandings in ways which encouraged community ownership and participation in 
the development and delivery of health care services (Werner & Sanders, 1997). In 
the realm of mental health care specifically, a number of innovative initiatives began 
to emerge, including the ‘Aro village psychiatry’ programme developed by Nigerian 
psychiatrist and activist Thomas Lambo. Employing what he called a kind of 
 
‘methodological syncretism’, Lambo’s village sought to integrate different care 
modalities in innovative ways, or what he describes as an attempt to fuse the ‘secrets 
of the spirit world’ with the ‘best of science’(Bass, 1994: 77). Similar kinds of 
mental health care initiatives started emerging elsewhere in Africa during this time, 
including for example in Senegal, Ghana and Sudan (Alem et.al, 2008). 
 
 
Alma Ata Declaration: The crystallization of Primary Health Care 
 
 
 
The successes of these programmes were increasingly contrasted with the major 
public health initiatives being instigated by US agencies and the WHO since the 
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1950s, initiatives which were seen to be failing to achieve their anticipated effects in 
the developing world (Cueto, 2004; Newell, 1988; Walt &Vaughan, 1981). The late 
1960s and early 1970s was thus characterised by a rising tide of critique of, and 
experimentation with alternatives to, the Eurocentric paradigms of health and 
development which had dominated since the colonial era. 
 
 
Such sentiments culminated in the now landmark international conference that took 
place at Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan in 1978 (WHO & UN Children’s Fund, 1978). At 
this event, a Declaration was passed which articulated the notion of Primary Health 
Care, a broad philosophy for thinking about the development and delivery of health 
care services. This philosophy drew heavily on the ideas underpinning the 
Community-Based Health Programs, with their emphasis on accessibility, medical 
pluralism and community ownership (Baum, 2007). As defined at Alma Ata, PHC 
involves the provision of health care as close as possible to where people live, to be 
delivered by a range of epistemological diverse practitioners. Highly critical of 
medical and professional elitism, the Declaration highlighted how health 
professionals should be responsible for describing possible interventions and their 
implications, but should not choose (Newell, 1988; Werner & Sanders, 1997). 
Rather, such interventions should evolve from local socio-economic and political 
conditions, and respond to the expressed needs of the community (Schaay & 
Sanders, 2008). The complexities of what the Declaration was attempting to capture 
are exemplified by Newell (1988: 905), one of the architects of Primary Health Care: 
 
 
A PHC system can still be classed as successful even if the illnesses and 
deaths targeted continue to occur if that society truly has a choice but decides 
to take up other priorities knowing the implications…This is completely 
different from the view that the targeted health priorities are an abomination 
because they are so easily dealt with, and it is intolerable that they should 
continue when effective technologies and sufficient resources exist to deal 
with them…The advocate of PHC will reply that even if these actions and 
interventions are applied and achieved, the health system may still be classed 
as a failure…If what results is still an oppression, does not deal with that 
society's priorities, and is inconsistent with the way of life and the dignity of 
that population, then it is not successful. 
 
176 
It is thus clear that the notion of PHC had strong socio-political underpinnings, 
intimately linked to issues of power and voice. Questions about the form and goals 
of health care were primarily about the authority and ownership in knowledge-
production and decision-making (Baum, 2007; Werner & Sanders, 1997). The 
Declaration thus represented a remarkable moment when the dominant paradigm of 
colonial medicine was being interrogated and new ideas, based on alternative kinds 
of epistemological politics and moral landscapes, were being formulated. It was also 
a particularly unusual moment in that its conceptual roots lay with the ideas 
emerging from the grassroots health care programmes of the geopolitical South, 
rather than based on concepts originating from the global North. It thus represented a 
challenge to the global politics of knowledge production, in which social theory 
tends to be built on a ‘one-way flow of information from the metropoles to the 
geopolitical peripheries’ (Connell, 2007:12) or as Comaroff and Comaroff 
 
(2012:113) put it, where the ‘global South’ is seen as ‘that half of the world about 
which the ‘global North’ spins theories’. 
 
 
The rise of neoliberalism and the corruption of Primary Health Care 
 
 
 
As the 1980s unfolded, all sorts of global public health initiatives were launched 
under the Primary Health Care banner, with the concepts of ‘community care’, 
‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ now forming part of the official jargon (Werner 
and Sanders, 1997). In practice however, these notions tended to be stripped of their 
more complex and potentially revolutionary policy implications (Cueto, 2004). 
Considerations of power and voice that were at the heart of the original Primary 
Health Care notion were increasingly placed on the periphery, with the privileging of 
technical service packages which could achieve measurable outcomes in the short-
term (Schaay & Sanders, 2008). While community-involvement and health worker 
diversity was encouraged, the focus was increasingly on training and education in 
order to make the delivery of services possible (Baum, 2007; Werner & Sanders, 
1997). Contemporary Global Mental Health initiatives appear to be no exception. 
Although Global Mental Health discourse and practice consistently refers to the need 
for greater community involvement, in reality, their role tends to be that of assisting 
in the implementation of an externally imposed medico-scientific and human rights 
agenda (Campbell and Burgess, 2012; Mills and Fernando, 2014). 
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It is pertinent to ask why the concept of PHC was so quickly corrupted, particularly 
in light of the fervent tide of radical thinking of the 1960s in which it arose. 
According to Werner and Sanders (1997:19) the revolutionary nature of the Alma 
Ata was unlikely to sit comfortably with global power structures, including the 
public health establishment, ‘who for so long had maintained a powerful monopoly 
on the knowledge and power of healing’. Furthermore, almost immediately after 
 
Alma Ata, the global economic boom of the 1960s started receding, with the 1980s 
bringing about a combination of global recession, suffocating foreign debt and 
worsening poverty. This situation saw the emergence of a new political context 
dominated by more conservative, neoliberal ideas, heavily informed by European 
modernist thinkers (Castells, 2001; Pillay, 2003). Led by the examples of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the focus became on rationalizing public systems 
and developing clearly definable targets which would minimize costs and 
maximize outputs in the short-term (Castells, 2001; Sanders et.al., 2008). Such 
thinking very quickly spread to the developing world by the US-dominated 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank as conditions for loans, loans 
which by now many developing countries were dependent upon (Castells, 2001; 
Pillay, 2003). And as the 1990s unfolded, and continuing into the present, these 
international financial agencies have played an increasingly powerful role in 
directing health care systems in developing nations (Baum, 2007; Cueto, 2004). 
Within this climate, the anti-imperialist and leftist sentiments of the 1960s have 
increasingly waned. And Alma Ata has ultimately proved incompatible with this 
ascendance of neoliberal ideas. 
 
 
Analysis: The national mental health policies 
 
 
 
In light of these trends in global public health discourse, I now turn to the national 
mental health policies emerging from 14 African countries. Looking at these policies 
as a whole, they all follow a very similar format, beginning with a socio-
demographic description of the country, followed by an account of the national 
health care system. Thereafter, an epidemiological profile of mental illness in the 
country is commonly provided, where after a detailed summary of the national 
mental health care system is given. This summary, somewhat mechanistic and 
technocratic, includes inter alia, information on current national mental health 
legislation; details around financial and human resources dedicated to mental health; 
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descriptions of national mental health administration arrangements, service 
organizations and management structures; and information on mental health care 
training programmes and research activities in the country. 
 
 
Having provided this background, all of the policies then go on to describe their 
vision, outlining the specific values, goals and action strategies endorsed. Here, all 
14 policies state that a Primary Health Care approach will be adopted. Thereafter, the 
focus is on elucidating how such a model of care will be developed on a national 
scale. In such accounts, the rhetoric of community participation and empowerment 
emerges most explicitly. However, when one looks more closely at the descriptions 
of these notions, they emerge as essentially matters of education and training in 
 
‘appropriate’ kinds of knowledge and ‘proper’ sorts of care. And conceptualisations 
of what are ‘appropriate’ and ‘proper’ materialise as based on two main paradigms: 
those of evidence-based knowledge/practices and human rights. How do these ideas 
play out within the policies? 
 
 
Explicit endorsement of Primary Health Care, community ownership and local 
empowerment 
 
 
All 14 policies state explicitly that the overarching policy framework is the Primary 
Health Care approach. For example, South Africa’s (9) policy states: ‘In line with the 
values of the Alma Ata Declaration…this document sets out the provision of a 
mental health system…based on Primary Health Care principles’. Similarly, 
Uganda’s policy (2) highlights ‘The Alma Ata Declaration and subsequent WHO 
recommendations have provided the guiding philosophy for the development of this 
policy’. Echoes are present across the 14 policies, where it is emphasized that ‘the 
guiding principle of this policy’ (Tanzania: 4) or ‘the underpinning philosophy for 
the development of this policy’ (Liberia: 2) is ‘the Primary Health Care strategy’ 
 
(Tanzania: 4; Zimbabwe: 5), ‘a primary health model of care’ (Lesotho: 27; Liberia: 
32), a ‘Primary Health Care system’(Ethiopia: 2; Namibia: 9; Sierra Leone: 6) and 
one which ‘promotes community mental health at the grassroots-level’ (Rwanda: 4). 
Across the policies, it is emphasized that this approach is ‘the most viable way of 
closing the huge treatment gap’ (Lesotho: 27; Sierra Leone: 6), ‘the best way to 
address the large mental health treatment gap’(Liberia: 32; Namibia: 12) and ‘will 
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address the mental health care access gap that currently exists in the country’ 
 
(Nigeria: 2). 
 
 
 
Many of the policies provide a formal definition of a PHC approach, where the ideas 
of community involvement and ownership feature most prominently. It is ascertained 
that such a framework of care is ‘an approach to the delivery of services which 
emphasizes decentralization and community participation’ (Zambia: 14) or prioritises 
 
‘community involvement and participation’ (Liberia: 7; Namibia: 2; Uganda: 13). It 
is emphasized that PHC ‘refers to care which is based on the needs of the 
population…and requires the active participation of the community’ (Ethiopia: 17) 
and necessitates the ‘decentralization of mental health care, allowing for more 
participatory decision making…including the engagement of consumers and family 
members’ (Gambia: 8). 
 
 
Much attention is placed on further unpacking these particular ideas, with all 14 
policies containing a relatively large section, variously entitled ‘Community 
 
Involvement and Participation’. Here a wide range of different groups residing 
within the community are outlined, and descriptions are provided on how these 
various groups should be empowered to participate in the development and delivery 
of mental health care services. For example, comments such as these are ubiquitous 
across the policies: ‘Encourage active collaboration between all sectors involved in 
mental health, including strong community participation in mental health’ (Namibia: 
 
10), ‘People with mental disorders and their families must be empowered and 
actively involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of mental health 
services’ (Sierra Leone: 10); ‘Mental health care users should be involved in the 
planning, delivery and evaluation of mental health services’ (South Africa: 21); and 
 
‘Community involvement and participation are paramount to the success of mental 
health care delivery’ (Zimbabwe: 7). 
 
 
Beneath the Primary Health Care rhetoric: A focus on education and training 
 
 
 
When looking more closely at descriptions of empowerment and participation, 
however, there appears to be very little real influence and genuine authority on the 
part of the community. For example, Gambia’s (20) policy states [my emphasis]: 
 
‘Many people have very little knowledge about mental disorders and are unaware 
of 180 
the availability of simple and effective preventive, treatment and rehabilitative 
measures’. The policy then provides the following bulleted set of ‘action strategies’ 
 
[my emphases]: 
 
 
Families of people with mental disorders should be considered as partners in 
mental health care and therefore actively participate in it, being educated and 
trained; 
 
Individuals with mental disorders, families and communities should be 
participants in mental health education programs; 
 
Media will be engaged to promote awareness and the active participation of 
the community 
 
 
In a similar way, within in Uganda’s (16) policy, under the policy goal ‘To promote 
and strengthen the involvement and participation of all stakeholders in mental, 
neurological and substance abuse control services’, the following bulleted points are 
listed [my emphases]: 
 
 
Develop initiatives aimed at raising public awareness about mental and 
neurological health, and substance abuse problems; 
 
Carry out community sensitization about mental, neurological and substance 
abuse 
 
Develop Information, Education and Communication materials…to create 
awareness of neurological and substance abuse 
 
 
Analogous sentiments are contained in Liberia’s (31) policy, where the under the 
 
heading ‘Community involvement and participation’ the following are stated: 
 
 
 
The mentally ill and their families will be engaged and consulted when 
designing programs 
 
There will be education for families and mentally ill patients about the nature, 
care and suitable treatment options for mental diseases 
 
Teachers will be educated, so they can provide social skills training 
and rudimentary counselling in their schools; 
 
There will be public awareness programs to sensitize the community 
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In a similar manner, having spoken about the necessity of facilitating ‘active community 
participation’, Zambia’s (9) policy goes on to describe in detail how ‘The 
 
Government shall therefore encourage use of mass media and advertising strategies 
to place mental health on the community health agenda’, while Zimbabwe’s (7) 
policy asserts that ‘It is hoped that as the public becomes more informed, this will 
result in an empowerment process whereby members of the community will 
appreciate their role in the promotion of mental health and the prevention of mental 
illness’. Relatedly, Rwanda’s (15) policy talks about the need to ‘involve the 
community more’ and ‘ensure that the community becomes responsible for mental 
health care’ and that ‘information dissemination and community sensitization will be 
promoted in this regard’. Numerous similar examples could be provided in this 
regard. The point is that within the section on ‘community participation and 
ownership’, the focus for all 14 policies is on unpacking the development and 
implementation of ‘education programmes’, ‘awareness-raising strategies’ and ‘mass 
media campaigns’. As such, ‘ownership’ and ‘empowerment’ emerge as essentially 
that of informing people about the supposed ‘true’ nature of mental illness and 
‘appropriate’ forms of mental health care. 
 
 
Within discussion on community participation and ownership, ‘traditional’ healers, 
as a particular group within the community, receive a significant amount of attention. 
 
According to all 14 policies, ‘traditional’ healers are widely consulted by people with 
mental disorders and their families, with ubiquitous statements that ‘traditional 
healers are commonly the first points of contact for many people with mental 
disorders’ (Gambia: 35; Uganda: 15), ‘are currently the first point of contact for most 
people who develop a mental health problem’ (Lesotho: 11; Nigeria: 14) and ‘are 
usually consulted by people with mental health problems before they seek help from 
conventional health practitioners’ (Zambia: 5). 
 
 
Having highlighted the widespread use of traditional healers, it is thereafter 
commonly asserted that collaboration with such healers is essential. Bold statements 
such as these are common across the policies: ‘Traditional healers…will be involved 
in prevention, detection, rehabilitation and social inclusion of persons with mental 
illness’ (Ethiopia: 19); ‘Traditional healers should be involved in the care of people 
with mental disorders, in collaboration with formal mental health care system’ 
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(Gambia: 7; Lesotho: 17) or as Sierra Leone’s (11) policies unambiguously asserts, 
 
‘Collaboration with traditional healers will be a priority’. 
 
 
 
However, once again, these notions of collaboration and involvement emerge as 
essentially matters of education and training. For example, according to Nigeria’s (7) 
policy [my emphases]: 
 
 
Dialogue and exchange of ideas may be helpful (within the context of the 
overall Governmental approach to regulate traditional health practitioners 
and encourage professional standards and accountability) with a view to 
exploring the possibility of collaborative ways of working which may 
eventually include the use of diagnostic algorithms by traditional healers to 
assist them in making appropriate referrals. 
 
 
Such sentiments aptly capture dominant conceptualisations of what ‘involvement’ 
and ‘collaboration’ with traditional healers might entail. For example Liberia’s (71) 
policy emphasizes how ‘Along with Community health workers…traditional healers 
will be encouraged to participate in seminars and workshops about the recognition of 
psychiatric disorders’, while Ethiopia’s (24) policy highlights how ‘traditional 
healers, who account for a significant extent of mental health care, will be sensitized 
and trained to improve their skills and services’. Relatedly, when talking about the 
‘need to involve the community more’ in the provision of mental health care, 
 
Rwanda policy (14) asserts that it is necessary to ‘define dialogue mechanisms with 
traditional-practitioners to establish contact with the aim of ensuring 
complementarity and to mitigate charlatanism’. In a similar manner, Gambia’s 
 
(35/36) policy describes an initiative introduced by the MoH that sought to 
 
‘collaborate’ with traditional healers. The policy explains, ‘Essentially traditional 
healers, through the program are introduced to modern medications and treatment 
methods’. The policy concludes by emphasizing that the programme has been 
 
‘extremely successful’, with ‘improved awareness and knowledge about mental 
disorders…and their appropriate treatment amongst traditional healers’. 
 
 
It is therefore clear that beneath the bold rhetoric, ideas of community ‘involvement’, 
‘ownership’ and ‘empowerment’ tend to lack any real and meaningful substance, 
with very little genuine attempt to properly understand and respond to the 
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experiences and understandings of local people. Rather, these notions emerge 
primarily as matters of education and training across the 14 policies. As such, the 
policies seem unable to know patients and their families as anything but ignorant, 
and in need of psychoeducation in ‘proper’ knowledge. They appear unable to 
conceive of ‘traditional’ healers as anything other than in need of training in 
‘appropriate’ forms of diagnosis and care. And as the policies unfold further, it 
becomes clear that what are conceived of as ‘appropriate’ forms of care, are those 
which are based solely and unequivocally on two main paradigms: those of evidence-
based knowledge/practice and international human rights standards. 
 
 
Evidence-based knowledge/practice 
 
 
 
The notion of evidence-based knowledge/practice permeates the policies, centrally 
embedded within a variety of topics addressed by the policies. For example, the 
following kinds of statements are ubiquitous across the policies: ‘It is vital that 
service delivery is evidenced-based’ (Zambia: 12), ‘practice must be based on 
scientific evidence …and adapted to scientific evolution in the field of mental health’ 
 
(Rwanda: 17), ‘The MoH is committed to the provision of evidence-based care’ 
 
(Nigeria: 2),‘Mental health services should offer a range of interventions in keeping 
with evidence-based care’ (Namibia: 9),‘the highest quality services will be provided 
in accordance with the best evidence-based medicine’ (Liberia: 29) and that ‘services 
shall reflect the highest standard possible according to current scientific knowledge’ 
 
(Gambia: 6; Uganda: 13). Indeed, the following verbatim statement occurs in 
 
Lesotho’s (22), Sierra Leone’s (19) and Gambia’s (12) policy: ‘High quality care 
means that the latest evidence-based interventions are provided for mental health at 
all service levels’. 
 
 
Ensuring that ‘the latest evidence-based interventions’ are provided requires, 
according to the policies, that services are developed primarily through ‘a decision-
making process for which there is consistent scientific evidence showing that a 
particular approach will improve outcomes’ (Liberia: 11; Namibia: 2), or as 
 
Ethiopia’s (19), Liberia’s (31) and Zimbabwe’s (6) policies state verbatim: 
 
‘Scientific evidence will inform decisions for services and interventions’. Similarly, 
 
Gambia’s (7) policy emphasises how ‘Scientifically validated evidence will be the 
primary source of information used to inform decision-making for services’. 
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 For the policies, not only should services be developed through evidence-based 
procedures, they should also be delivered through ‘evidence-based’ protocols. 
 
Indeed, many of the policies place a considerable amount of attention on the 
development and subsequent training of health care workers in ‘evidence based 
guidelines’ (Ethiopia: 12; Nigeria: 11; South Africa: 20; Uganda: 5) or ‘evidenced-
based protocols’ (Gambia: 10) or ‘evidenced-based tools’ (Rwanda: 13) or 
 
‘evidenced-based treatment guidelines, protocols and standard operating’ (Sierra 
Leone: 9). For example, Nigeria’s (5) policy explains: 
 
 
Good practice guidelines are an invaluable adjunct to improving care and 
establishment of good practice at all times…Evidence based guidelines for 
both primary care and specialist sectors shall be prepared. 
 
 
In a similar manner, having spoken about the concept of ‘local autonomy’, whereby 
‘the planning, delivery and management of mental health services should be 
decentralised to local, community levels’, Lesotho’s policy (22/23) explains: 
 
 
Clinical protocols will be developed and extended to all sectors to enable 
staff to deliver appropriate evidence-based interventions…These protocols 
will apply to all levels of care…Once the clinical protocols have been 
established all health service staff will be trained and oriented in the use of 
these protocols for routine service delivery. 
 
 
In addition to services needing to be developed and delivered through ‘evidence-
based’ practices, ensuring the provision of ‘evidence-based interventions’ is seen to 
also require consistent monitoring and evaluating through evidence-based 
procedures. As Sierra Leone’s (19) policy states: 
 
 
High quality care means that the latest evidenced-based interventions are 
provided for mental health services at all service levels. It also refers to a 
quality improvement monitoring mechanism…Care protocols and basic 
quality standards for services will therefore be developed at all levels of care. 
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This statement reflects the common view across the 14 policies, where it is 
highlighted that evidence-based monitoring and evaluation procedures are the 
 
‘lifeblood of an effective mental health service’ (Lesotho: 19), and are ‘essential for 
the ongoing delivery of evidence-based services’ (Ethiopia: 4). In fact, all of the 
policies contain a relatively large section, variously entitled ‘Monitoring and 
 
Evaluation (M&E)’. Here meticulous details are provided on what such monitoring 
and evaluation should entail, essentially that of defining and collecting standardized 
mental health indicators and using these ‘for a continuous process of service 
measurement and improvement’ (Liberia: 66). For example, Lesotho’s (22) policy 
states: 
 
 
It is essential that the quality of mental health services is improved and 
maintained…Towards this end, national standards for mental health will be 
developed...facilities will be regularly reviewed, assessed and accredited, 
using these quality standards…The mental health competencies of all health 
care staff need to be assessed, using the standards. 
 
 
In a similar fashion, Gambia’s (13) policy explains: 
 
 
 
Ongoing validation of services and interventions should be implemented and 
used to refine services and interventions…and inform evidence-based 
decisions.… 
 
 
It is thus clear that the notion of ‘evidenced-based’ knowledge/practice emerges 
across the policies as central to what it means for services to be ‘appropriate’ and of 
a ‘high quality’. According to the policies, services should be developed through 
evidence-based decision-making processes, should be delivered by health care 
workers trained in evidence-based clinical protocols and should be consistently 
monitored through evidence-based procedures of standardization and measurement. 
Ultimately, ‘appropriate’ care materialises as essentially ‘evidence-based’ care. 
 
 
Although this notion of evidence-based knowledge/practice takes on a kind of self-
evident quality within the policies, it is in fact underpinned by several, somewhat 
contentious epistemologies. Elsewhere, I (Cooper, 2014) and others (Bemme & 
 
D’souza, 2014; De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; Ingleby, 2014; Sardar, 1998; White & 
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Sashidharan, 2014) have problematized the paradigm of evidence-based 
knowledge/practice in considerable detail. In summary, this paradigm is underpinned 
by a set of now well-known positivist assumptions, with an emphasis on empiricism, 
rationalism and value-free enquiry. That is, it assumes that the world can be 
objectively and incontrovertibly known through the principles and methods of 
science, and in particular, a well-designed randomized clinical trial. Put differently, 
it is assumed that knowledge which is valid and meaningful includes only those 
aspects of ‘reality’ which are directly observable and measurable as tangible 
indicators and outcomes. 
 
 
These kinds of assumptions are deeply rooted within the epistemological order of 
Western modernity, and associated paradigm of colonial medicine. As I have been 
emphasizing, the thinking space of Western modernity was characterized by a strong 
commitment to science, with conceptions of ‘truth’ and ‘validity’ increasingly 
governed by the principles of science. Deeply entangled with this order, colonial 
public health tended to promote only those forms of care based on scientific theories 
and practices, with the denigration of other kinds of care modalities, based on 
alternative kinds of epistemologies (Comaroff, 1993; Vaughan, 1991). 
 
 
Thus, through their ubiquitous endorsement of evidence-based care, the policies 
reproduce the assumption that the only appropriate kinds of services are those which 
are based on scientific evidence. In other words, service development decisions, 
delivery practices and care evaluation procedures are understood as valid only insofar 
as they are informed by a scientific rationalism. As a consequence, other potentially 
meaningful ways of knowing and being, which may lie outside of scientific 
metaphysical realities, are automatically delegitimized and disavowed within the 
national policies. 
 
 
All of this is not to suggest that scientific knowledge and practices are unimportant 
or not potentially meaningful. Indeed, the tremendous advantages coming out of 
industry, medicine, and technology in many African countries could not have 
occurred without scientific procedures (Latour, 1999). In addition, this is not an 
argument against the importance of evaluation and accountability in service 
provision. Indeed, the ways in which mental health care services globally have often 
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led to abuse and neglect, as much as to care, is a very frightening reality 
(Demyttenaere, 2004). 
 
 
What is being problematized here, however, is the way the current evidence-based 
edifice, in which the policies are inserted, assumes that only certain kinds of 
knowledge, and only particular sorts of evaluative practices are legitimate. 
Ultimately, the policies are implying that very little of value can be known outside of 
the metacodes of science, indeed one of the great enchantments of the 
modernist/colonial epistemological order (De Sousa Santos et al., 2007; Sardar, 
1998). The question is then, what alternative sorts of knowledges and practices, 
which may not be based on scientific rationalism, but which may be important to 
service users and their families, are being silenced? How might these ‘other’ 
understandings and ways of being, change the way in which ‘appropriate’ kinds of 
services are conceptualised, developed and assessed? 
 
 
Human rights 
 
 
 
Constructions of appropriate services within the policies are based upon another, 
interrelated paradigm, that of human rights. Across all of the policies, it is explicitly 
stated that the development and delivery of services should be consistent with human 
rights standards. More specifically, 7 of 14 policies indicate that the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) should be used as 
the guiding framework in this regard. Indeed, statements such as these are scattered 
across the 14 policies: ‘services will uphold and protect the human rights of people 
with mental disorders’ (Lesotho: 16), people should be ‘cared for…with due regard 
to their rights as human beings’ (Nigeria: 5); ‘treatment will be consistent with 
international conventions on human rights’ (Ethiopia: 20, Liberia: 29); or ‘as laid out 
in international human rights conventions’ (Lesotho: 16). 
 
 
After indicating that services should be in accordance with international human 
rights standards, the policies tend to provide a long list specifying which particular 
rights should be promoted and upheld by mental health care services. These lists 
appear almost as blueprints of the rights outlined by the UNCRPD, including 
exhaustively, but variously phrased: the right to be treated in the least restrictive 
environment, rights related to involuntary admission, rights related to seclusion and 
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restraint, and rights to confidentiality, informed-consent, non-discrimination, privacy, 
and autonomy. For example, the follow excerpt comes from Sierra Leone’s 
 
(15) policy, which aptly reflects the common way in which human rights features 
in the policies: 
 
 
Treatment should promote and respect the human rights of people with 
mental disorders…People with mental health problems and their families 
must be informed about their treatment and rehabilitation and must have the 
liberty to give consent to their care…Clinical guidelines including 
confidentiality issues and informed consent…will therefore be developed. 
 
 
Another example comes from Gambia’s (6) policy, again pertinently capturing 
dominant policy sentiments: 
 
 
People with mental disorders should enjoy full human rights...Mental health 
treatment and care should promote and protect the autonomy and liberty of 
people with mental disorders…People with mental disorders have the right to 
be treated in the most effective, least restrictive and least intrusive 
manner…Care delivered to people with mental disorders should be strictly 
confidential. 
 
 
And a further illustration from Liberia’s (30) policy: 
 
 
 
Treatment will be consistent with international conventions on human 
rights…This will include the right to essential and appropriate mental health 
care; treatment will promote autonomy and not be custodial; the seriously 
mentally ill will be treated in a safe and the least restrictive environment; the 
use of physical restraints will be discouraged; confidentiality will always be 
upheld and adhered to. 
 
 
Numerous similar examples could be provided. The point is, for the policies, 
 
‘appropriate’ forms of care are essentially those which are based on human rights 
codes, and in particular, the principles of ‘autonomy’, ‘liberty’, and ‘privacy’. In 
discussions around human rights, many of the policies acknowledge that there are 
diverse understandings of, and healing modalities for, mental illness. However, it is 
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stressed that these should be tolerated only if they are in line with human rights 
standards, or as South Africa’s (20/21) policy puts it, ‘There are varying cultural 
expressions and interpretations of mental illness, which should be respected, insofar 
as they protect the human rights of the mentally ill’. 
 
 
Through its emancipatory rhetoric, promoting the ideals of freedom, privacy and 
choice, human rights are generally accepted as good things. If we move beneath face-
value understandings, however, like ‘evidence-based knowledge/practice’, the 
paradigm of human rights is also underpinned by several polemical knowledge 
assumptions. And these epistemologies are deeply inserted within a 
modernist/colonial thinking space, as I have demonstrated in detail elsewhere 
(Cooper, 2014). In summary, in its theoretical origins and embodiment within 
contemporary international conventions, the paradigm of human rights tends to 
assume a universality of human nature (De Sousa Santos et al.,2007; Pannikar, 
1984). That is, one which is endowed with universal dignity and knowable by an 
equally universal organ of knowledge, that of rationality. Human rights discourse 
also has a strong individualistic undertone, with the assumption that human beings 
are essentially individual, autonomous entities (Sadar, 1998). This set of assumptions 
is succinctly captured by De Sousa Santos et al (2007: 13): 
 
 
The concept of human rights is based on a well-known set of presuppositions, 
all of which are distinctly Western and liberal in origin, namely: there is a 
universal human nature that can be known by rational means; human nature is 
essentially different from and higher than the rest of reality; the individual 
has an absolute and irreducible dignity ... the autonomy of the individual 
requires that society be organized in a non-hierarchical way, as a sum of free 
individuals. 
 
 
A human rights paradigm is thus underpinned by very particular assumptions about 
personhood and dignity, and how they can be known. However, these understandings 
may not be universally shared. As I have demonstrated in detail elsewhere (Cooper, 
2014), a large body of critical social research in Africa, including in relation to 
mental health, has demonstrated that understandings of human dignity and morality, 
and by extension a ‘human’, are considerably varied and diverse. Such research has 
revealed, for example, that for many people in Africa, selfhood and dignity are 
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understood as conditions which are acquired, rather than ‘given’, and thus place great 
value on the gradual social maturation of people as constantly evolving. Relatedly, in 
such circumstances, personhood is frequently recognised as deeply intertwined with 
the spiritual, the corporeal, and the social community, rather than being about an 
autonomous individual. Ultimately, this research has revealed that attempts to bring 
about social justice through the utilization of human rights rhetoric have frequently 
been unsuccessful, as they are incompatable with locally relevant meanings and 
value hierarchies. 
 
 
To be sure, my argument is not one of relativism, a kind of ‘anything goes’. Forms of 
care that respect and dignify people with mental disability are worthy ideals. But 
what is ‘respectful’ and what enhances ‘dignity’ are not as self-evident as the notion 
of human rights would have us believe. Ultimately, human rights discourse does not 
belong to the realm of morality per se, but rather reflects a particular political 
morality that may not be shared by everyone, everywhere. Through its underpinning 
assumptions however, the notion of human rights is able to gain a universal force that 
is unconditional. Consequently, ‘other’ ways of making commensurate demands for 
dignity and justice, which may be formulated in different languages of entitlement, 
are ultimately marginalized by the paradigm of human rights. As exemplified in the 
national mental health policies, only those kinds of services which are based on 
international human rights standards, and in particular the inherently individualistic 
and liberal codes of ‘autonomy’, ‘liberty’ and ‘privacy’ are deemed ‘appropriate’. 
 
The slippery issues of dignity and justice are therefore decontextualized, and 
ultimately engaged with in a ‘one-size-fits-all’ manner by the policies. As a 
consequence, alternative kinds of values and moral systems, which may not be in 
accordance with international human rights standards, but which may be important to 
service users and their families, are ultimately silenced by the policies. And these 
 
‘other’ understandings of justice and dignity might fundamentally change the way 
in which ‘appropriate’ kinds of services are conceived of and evaluated. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper I have argued that the 1960s represented an extraordinary moment in 
history when the hegemonic paradigms of the health care professions were being 
interrogated, and alternatives were being sought. It was out of this context that the 
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concept of Primary Health Care (PHC) arose, a notion which was based on ‘other’ 
kinds of epistemologies and moral landscapes to those which had dominated since 
the colonial era. Sadly, however, the emergence of PHC can be understood as 
representing only a brief and primarily rhetorical disruption to, the paradigm of 
colonial medicine. Since the 1980s, it has been taken up and promoted in ways which 
scarcely resemble its original formulations. In this paper I have demonstrated how 
national policy thinking around reducing the ‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa is 
no exception to this trend. 
 
 
I have shown how although formally espousing a grassroots, Primary Health Care 
approach to mental health care service development and delivery, in reality, the 
policies achieve the opposite: the marginalization of local values and meanings and 
the endorsement of an essentially top-down framework which is heavily informed by 
the knowledge politics of colonial medicine. In particular, the paradigms of 
evidence-based science and individualised human rights become the gatekeepers of 
knowledge within the policies. These legislate as to what are legitimate forms of 
knowing, and by extension, valid forms of care. Such thinking shares much with 
contemporary Global Mental Health discourse where, as Vikram Patel (2014:10), 
one of the key architects of the Movement for Global Mental Health unequivocally 
states, ‘While there must always be space for discourse and conflicting ideas, these 
must be based firmly on an equal commitment to science and to the right of people 
who are demonstrably unwell to receive care’ (see also Cooper, 2014; Global Mental 
Health Group, 2007; Mari and Thornicroft, 2010). Ultimtely, intimately entanged 
with these Global Mental Health sentiments, the policies end up reproducing many of 
the very Eurocentric epistemologies that the PHC concept, in its original formulation, 
sought to transcend. 
 
 
This has very real consequences in relation to the ‘gap’ in mental health care which 
the policies are seeking to address. The policies might find that when the services 
being promoted are implemented, they still remain underutilized. Indeed, a growing 
body of epidemiological research is showing that despite government-funded mental 
health services becoming more available in Africa, they are still considerably 
underutilised on the continent (Kohn et.al, 2004; Demyttenaere, 2004). As I have 
suggested elsewhere (Cooper, in press), might such low levels of service uptake 
point to a potential disconnect between dominant constructions of ‘appropriate’ 
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services, and the common ways of life and forms of meaning-making that prevail 
within the community? Might the high usage of ‘traditional’ healers, which all of the 
policies strongly emphasise, be because the care provided by such healers is valuable 
to those who access them, rather than as a result of people’s supposed ignorance, as 
so many of the policies suggest? Ultimately, as suggested by Ecks and Basu (2009), 
might the whole ‘gap’ in mental health care be reconceptualised if ‘other’ social 
resources and ‘alternative’ forms of healing are thought about differently? 
 
 
All of this suggests that rather than focusing on ‘educating’ and ‘sensitising’ people 
in biomedical science and international human rights discourse, mental health 
policies in Africa might benefit from encouraging a better appreciation of, and more 
appropriate response to, the values and priorities of those they are attempting to help. 
Similarly, rather than concentrating on ‘training’ traditional healers in the supposedly 
‘correct’ approaches to mental health care, the policies might profit from fostering a 
greater understanding and recognition of these ‘other’ healing practitioners. 
Importantly, this does not translate into testing the practices of such healers with 
scientific methods associated with objectivity and scientific protocols, including 
clinical trials. This approach is becoming a growing trend within Africa in an attempt 
to establish collaboration between ‘biomedical’ practitioners and ‘traditional’ healers 
 
(Lang, 2014; Levine, 2012; Turnbull, 2009). Such initiatives have indeed been 
described as a kind of ‘Randomized Controlled Crime’, as ‘alternative’ healing 
systems are tolerated only so long as they can be shown to have a scientific basis 
(Adams, 2002: 679). As such, policies may need to rethink how diverse forms of 
meaning-making and the ways of treating mental illness might be potentially 
legitimised on their own terms, and within their own metaphysical worlds. This is not 
an easy task, one which raises all sorts of slippery epistemological questions around 
how medical evidence is produced and legitimised (Levine, 2012). These kinds of 
questions need to be opened up for further consideration and debate within the 
mental health policy arena in Africa. 
 
 
These sorts of questions were indeed exactly what Nigerian psychiatrist and 
activist Adeoye Lambo was grappling with when he pioneered his innovative ‘Aro 
village psychiatry’ programme. Warning African psychiatrists about the dangers of 
implementing a ‘borrowed remedy’, Lambo (cited in Bass, 1994: 69) emphasised 
that ‘Just as there is no one single religion, so too is there no one single way to 
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practice medicine. There are many medicines’. And according to Lambo, the best 
‘practices of medicines’ are those which are intimately entangled with local realities, 
lexicons and matrices and properly respond to such contexts, whatever the setting. 
 
This vision of Lambo’s was precisely what the original PHC concept was trying to 
capture. As such, it might offer a potentially productive terrain of engagement for 
thinking about the development of more contextually-embedded and 
epistemologically appropriate mental health care policies in Africa. 
 
 
This paper is aware of the dangers of representing ‘Africa’ as dependent borrowers 
and dupes of so called Western systems. However, the key argument still holds: that 
mental health care policy-thinking on the continent is deeply intertwined with strong 
epistemic power relations and economic forces operating on a global scale. Indeed, I 
had not intended, initially, to present my analysis of the 14 policies together as a 
single narrative. And yet delving into these policies, I was again and again surprised 
by the large degree of homogeneity between them, with so many statements 
frequently occurring verbatim across the policies. I was also constantly struck by 
how similar the policies were to Global Mental Health discourse, in many ways 
embodying a kind of blue-print of the policy recommendations that are being 
advocated within the international arena (See for example Mari & Thornicroft, 2010; 
Patel & Eaton, 2010; WHO, 2003). 
 
 
This high degree of uniformity raises all sorts of questions around exactly whose 
voices are reflected, and whose interests are embodied in these policies. My 
difficulties in obtaining the policies, and related unawareness of the existence of their 
own national mental health policy by so many Ministries of Health, raise further 
questions around how these policies were developed and whose opinions they might 
actually reflect. I can only speculate on these kinds of questions here. The point is 
that local Governments on the continent may have somewhat limited power in 
directing the nature of their own national mental health policies, and might ultimately 
be constrained in their ability to promote alternative models of mental health care. 
However, to end on a more positive note with the words of Adeoye Lambo 
(1960:1703), who in the emancipatory spirit of the 1960s stressed, ‘It is no easy 
matter, but we are getting more and more convinced that an independent diagnosis of 
our position may prove more profitable in the end than a borrowed remedy’. 
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Abstract 
 
A strong movement has emerged recently which is highlighting the high levels of 
untreated mental illness in Africa and making proposals for reducing this ‘gap’ in 
mental health care. This movement has been criticised for insufficiently attending to 
the epistemologies embedded in its recommendations, and inadequately considering 
the views of practitioners ‘on the ground’. Employing a narrative-based approach, I 
accessed the stories about the mental health ‘treatment gap’ of 28 psychiatrists all 
working in public mental health care settings in South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria or 
Ethiopia. Rather than focusing on the content of these stories, I was more interested 
in their underpinning meaning-codes and epistemological politics. Dominant 
thinking about the ‘treatment gap’ was heavily informed by a biomedical paradigm, 
and associated epistemological order of European Colonial Modernity. There were, 
however, cracks in this master narrative, which crystalised in the stories that were 
told by three particular psychiatrists. Their narratives operated within an alternative 
paradigm, one which appears to be informed by the tradition of phenomenology, and 
in particular the ideas associated with French philosopher Merleau-Ponty. This more 
marginalised thinking may offer important insights into reducing the mental health 
 
‘treatment gap’ in Africa in ways very different from those created by current seats 
of power. 
 
Keywords: Mental health treatment gap; Africa; Psychiatrists; Narrative 
 
analysis; Epistemologies 
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Introduction 
 
Spider 
 
For me, the knowing came when psychodelia slapped me loose 
 
and pitched me screaming as I flailed widely in desperate search for reason. 
But watching 
 
I realised how I floated on gentle webs of being 
and inhaling 
 
smiled deeply as butterflies billowed by. 
 
 
(Poem created by one of the psychiatrists in this study) 
 
 
 
Over the last decade, the mental health situation in Africa has gained renewed 
attention as an important public health concern within the global arena (Global 
Mental Health Group 2007). One issue of particular concern is what is understood as 
the high levels of untreated mental illness, now referred to as the mental health 
 
‘treatment gap’ (WHO 2001, 2008). Concerns about this large ‘gap’ in mental health 
care has in turn given rise to a “broad new social movement” led by the international 
psychiatric community, but incorporating a broad coalition of actors and agencies, 
which is focused on ‘narrowing’ this gap (Horton 2007, p. 806). Under the banner of 
this movement, a plethora of global research projects, interventions and policies have 
been developed and implemented which are receiving significant amounts of funding 
from a range of international agencies and governments (Cooper 2014). 
 
 
These initiatives have, however, been met with various dissenting voices, with 
growing controversy over the conceptualisation, goals and imagined outcomes of this 
movement (Mills and Fernando 2014; Summerfield 2012). In particular, it has been 
argued that insufficient critical attention has been placed on the underpinning 
epistemologies of Global Mental Health discourse (Bemme and D’souza 2014; 
 
Swartz 2012). Moreover, concerns have been raised about the somewhat ‘top-down’ 
approach of Global Mental Health initiatives, which are seen as inadequately 
incorporating the views of people who are directly involved with the provision and 
uptake of mental health care in Africa (Cooper 2014; Campbell and Burgess 2012; 
Timimi 2011). 
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In light of these concerns, I employed a narrative-based approach to access the 
stories of 28 psychiatrists about the mental health ‘treatment gap’. These 
psychiatrists were all working in public mental health care settings in South Africa, 
Uganda, Nigeria or Ethiopia. Rather than focusing primarily on the content of such 
stories, I was more interested in epistemological questions regarding the conventions 
of meaning-making that lay behind the stories that were told. That is, I sought to 
open-up the ‘black box’ (Latour 1999) of these stories, unearthing the underpinning 
knowledge assumptions and capillaries of power. The underlying premise of this 
research is that such assumptions, which are frequently deeply hidden, have profound 
consequences. They help to shape the kinds of questions that can be asked and thus 
the solutions that can be generated (Weed 1995). As such, unless we examine the 
epistemological assumptions mediating the psychiatrists’ narratives, the kinds of 
strategies they propose through their stories might prove to be ineffective and 
inappropriate (Krieger 2000). Possibly even more serious, without looking critically 
at the knowledge politics underpinning the practices the psychiatrists advocate, these 
practices face the danger of oppressing particular people and subjugating certain 
voices, rather than supporting them (Kirmayer 2012). 
 
 
Through the stories they told, the majority of psychiatrists produced a particular way 
of thinking about the ‘gap’ in mental health care and its potential reduction, one 
which draws heavily upon a biomedical master narrative. This dominant narrative 
structure has been shown to be deeply entangled with the epistemological order of 
modernity and colonialism, and associated Eurocentric tendencies (Bracken et.al. 
2012; Clark 2014; Deacon 2013; Good 1994). This was, however, not the whole 
story; there were cracks in the master narrative. Beneath the audacious and relatively 
unequivocal statements made, certain psychiatrists conveyed a degree of 
ambivalence and uncertainty with regards to their knowledge claims. These cracks 
crystalised in the stories that were told by three particular psychiatrists, stories which 
fundamentally contested the master narrative and its underpinning epistemologies. 
These three psychiatrists operated within an alternative knowledge framework, one 
which appeared to be informed by the tradition of phenomenology, and particularly 
the ideas associated with French philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1962, 2004). This 
alternative paradigm might enable mental health service providers to function in 
worlds very different from the ones created by current seats of power, and go some 
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way towards reducing the current ‘gap’ in mental health care so many countries on 
 
the continent face. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
Our lives are full of stories: we read and tell and listen to them; we watch them unfold in art, ritual, and 
social life; we perform them ourselves; they give form and meaning to our daily existence. 
 
(Montgomery 2006, p.47) 
 
The psychiatrists 
 
 
 
In total, 28 psychiatrists, comprising 19 men and 9 women, were included in the 
study. These psychiatrists were purposively sampled from four African countries: 8 
from South Africa, 6 from Uganda, 7 from Nigeria and 7 from Ethiopia. The 
commonality between the psychiatrists was that they were all working in 
Government-funded, public sector and urban-based mental health facilities. 
Furthermore, all of the psychiatrists were African nationals. Seven of the 
psychiatrists had undertaken their psychiatric training in Europe, 5 in the United 
States with the rest having obtained their training in Africa. The psychiatrists from 
South African were all based in Cape Town, those from Uganda were situated in 
Kampala, the Nigerian psychiatrists were all working in Lagos and those from 
Ethiopia were all located in Addis Ababa. Eighteen of the psychiatrists worked in 
standalone psychiatric hospitals, while the rest were based in psychiatric units 
located in general hospitals or clinic-based settings. 
 
 
Gaining access to these psychiatrists was facilitated by the fact that I had previously 
worked on the Mental Health and Poverty project, a project which focused on 
evaluating and developing mental health policy, legislation and services in a variety of 
African countries
25
. Through this project, I developed professional links with various 
psychiatrists in the South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria and Ethiopia, who I contacted and 
asked whether they would be willing to participate in this study. Further psychiatrists 
were recruited through snowballing techniques. The sample of this study is relatively 
small. However, the size of this sample must be viewed in 
 
 
25
 http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Project/50165/ 
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light of the paucity of psychiatrists available in Africa. Current available estimates 
indicate that there are only 22 practicing psychiatrists in Uganda (Kigosi et.al 2010); 
40 in Ethiopia (Ethiopian MoH 2012) and fewer than 100 in Nigeria (Issa 2005). The 
availability of public sector psychiatrists in South Africa is relatively higher, with 
estimates that there are approximately 0.28 psychiatrists per 100 000 population 
(Lund et.al 2009). I do not wish to suggest, however, that the views expressed by the 
psychiatrists included in my research characterise the sentiments of all psychiatrists 
in these four countries, let alone the continent as a whole. The stories that were told 
were specific and local, about particular sites and situations. However this does not 
mean that their significance is necessarily restricted to the local. As Mol (2008) and 
Turnbull (2000) found when using stories as a form of knowledge production, it is 
somewhat paradoxically because of their specificity and attention to detail that 
stories have the power to travel, to offer wider insights that may be transported to 
other contexts. 
 
 
A critical narrative-based enquiry 
 
 
 
Although varied and diverse, a narrative-based enquiry is based firmly on the 
premise that stories are primary meaning-making structures. That is, they constitute 
fundamental ways of knowing and creating identities, of ordering our interactions 
with each other and the environment (Turnbull 2000; 2004). Although there is 
considerable debate around the nature and role of narrative, there is some general 
agreement that might be summarised in Lamarque’s (1990, p.131) characterisation 
 
[my emphases]: 
 
 
 
In the most general terms to narrate is to tell a story...narration involves the 
recounting of events...narrative imposes structure, it connects as well as 
records...Stories don’t just exist, they are told, and not just told but told from 
some perspective or other. 
 
 
A similar kind of description is provided by Pluciennik (1999, p.656): 
 
 
 
The distinguishing features of narratives as opposed to other forms of writing 
would seem the sequentiality and emplotment...Out of the selective 
 
(re)description of objects, elements, events, conditions, and characters and 
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myriad possible relationships between them…it is the plot, the thread of the 
story which emphasizes particular paths, possibilities and plausilities… 
 
 
Narratives thus organise things in space and time, creating links and connections 
between places, people, events and actions. Importantly, what both of these 
descriptions suggest is that narratives are not innocent tools, providing neutral 
accounts of a supposed pre-existing reality. Rather, narratives are constructed, 
creatively authored, and replete with values and assumptions. When telling stories, 
people must select which details to recount, what to emphasise, and how to connect 
the different elements, all of which involve particular choices (Turnbull 2000; 2004). 
As such, narratives express particular ways of seeing the world and treating 
evidence. They frame the world in Kuhnian style (1962) paradigms, determining 
what sorts of questions are valid, what kinds of answers might be legitimate and what 
kinds of knowledge counts. A narrative based enquiry thus primarily concerns itself 
with unpacking the particular ways of seeing and knowing that are brought into being 
through our narratives, and which alternatives are potentially silenced (Reissman 
2008). 
 
 
Furthermore, what both Lamarque and Pluciennik’s descriptions suggest is that 
despite their particularity, narratives are not only individual, but are also socially 
organised phenomena. Even the most personal accounts rely on and invoke a body 
of tellable story forms, an established canon of story lines and rhetorical tropes. 
 
“Culture speaks itself through an individual’s story”, as Riessman (1993, p.5) puts it, 
with all stories told within a tradition of other narratives. Narratives are thus 
constructed in particular socio-cultural contexts and draw upon available social 
resources to make meaning. Within this wider fabric of tellable stories, some 
paradigms come to dominate, and are thus reproduced within seemingly unique, 
personal narratives. However, at the same time that personal narratives tend to 
reinforce certain hegemonic knowledge orders, they may also provide openings for 
creativity and invention in reshaping the social world. In other words, at times 
subversive stories can be told, stories which defy and transform (Ewick and Silbey 
1995). Ultimately, in illuminating dominant narrative codes, and unearthing more 
marginalized ones, narrative-based research can become a form of epistemological 
politics (Turnbull 2000; 2004). 
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Proceeding from this view of narratives as socially-embedded, meaning-making 
structures, I conducted individual interviews with each psychiatrist in an attempt to 
elicit stories or ‘whatever comes to mind’. I began each interview by indicating that I 
was interested in their understandings of why people who need mental health care 
may or may not be getting the care they need. Thereafter, I asked extremely broad, 
and open-ended questions which were structured as ‘narrativised’ topics or story-
telling invitations (Hollway and Jefferson 2000). These questions included, for 
example, if they could describe how they came to be working at the hospital, what a 
typical day involves, what sorts of challenges they face, what kinds of patients they 
are currently seeing and have seen in the past, and incidents with patients they found 
challenging, positive and/or memorable. Where thoughts were expressed in relatively 
general or abstract terms, I tried to anchor these to specific incidents which had 
actually happened, encouraging the psychiatrists to describe examples from their 
daily experiences. 
 
 
Throughout the interviews, I opened up spaces for extended turns and associative 
shifts in topic, encouraging one story to lead to others even if they appeared to be 
non-linear, partial and fragmentary. I ended up asking very few of the questions that 
I had devised prior to the exchanges, with the majority of psychiatrists telling long 
stories in response to a few brief questions. I was indeed struck by the psychiatrists’ 
tendency to open up and provide rich and detailed stories, with each interview lasting 
between 1½ hours to 4 hours. Most interviews were thus characterized by a continual 
elaboration of the themes and ideas that they presented in their own accounts. This 
was important as I felt that I was gaining access to the participants’ own meaning 
frames, as we followed their own associative trails and unfolding logic (Riessman 
2008). 
 
 
A critical narrative-based analysis 
 
 
 
All of the interviews were transcribed verbatim and then analysed through a thematic 
analysis approach. Thematic analysis is a useful method for identifying and 
describing recurring patterns in texts that have a common storied form (Riessman 
1993; 2008). I used this approach to illuminate themes related to my specific 
research question regarding how psychiatrists think about the ‘gap’ in mental health 
care. As my primary interest was in the underpinning epistemological assumptions 
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and politics of such thinking, I supplemented my analysis with a Parkerian discourse 
enquiry approach (Parker 1992). This approach understands language as an 
ideological tool, and aims to expose the ways in which language serves to 
 
(re)produce, maintain or transform different ‘realities’ and power relations. In 
particular I used Parker’s three auxiliary criteria- discourses support institutions; 
reproduce power relations; and have ideological effects- in order to locate the 
psychiatrists’ stories within broader social resources and dynamics of power. 
 
 
Far from being seamless accounts, stories are filled with gaps, inconsistencies and 
contradictions, and making these visible requires constantly moving between the 
parts and the whole of the interview(s) (Hollway and Jefferson 2000). As such, I paid 
attention to the specific narratives within each individual interview. My focus was on 
the manner in which the stories were told, the way events were constituted, and how 
facts were assembled and links were made. I explored how through stories the 
psychiatrists generated, and came to terms with, contradictions, tensions, and 
predicaments, and how moral lines were drawn and conclusions were made. I also 
paid attention to the emotional aspects of each specific story, identifying, for 
example, moments of hesitation, pauses, metaphors, stress and intonation, and 
laughter. Indeed emotions constitute a fundamental part of stories, where the teller 
frequently wishes the listener to feel their truth, and become emotionally engaged 
(Kleres 2010). I explored how these narrative configurations and emotional tones 
were shaped by particular social resources; the storehouse of plots called upon and 
the underpinning values and politics of these collective plots. In order to identify 
patterns and commonalities, as well as points of disjuncture, I consistently located 
the insights emerging from the specific stories within the form of each individual 
interview as a whole. Evidence from the individual interviews was then 
contextualized within the themes and ideas that were emerging across the interviews 
(Riessman 1993; 2008). 
 
 
Analysis Part I: A biomedical master narrative 
 
 
‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means exactly what I 
choose it to mean- neither more nor less’. 
 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master- that’s all’ 
 
(Carroll, 1872, p.72) 
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 In the stories that the psychiatrists told, a number of interrelated assumptions 
emerged about the nature of mental illness, about human behaviour, about 
biomedical science and about the goals of mental health care. These assumptions 
coalesced to produce a particular way of thinking about the ‘gap’ in mental health 
care, one which is deeply embedded in a biomedical paradigm. This paradigm of 
thought has been problematized in considerable detail by a now veritable academic 
industry of critical social science scholars (Bracken et.al. 2012; Clark 2014; Deacon 
2013; Good 1994). In particular, they have demonstrated how this paradigm is 
intimately entangled with the epistemological order of modernity and colonialism, 
including colonial medicine. They have shown how this conceptual framework is 
based upon a host of questionable assumptions and Eurocentric tendencies, and have 
consequently often resulted in distorted forms of medical understanding and practice. 
 
 
In brief, a biomedical paradigm is premised upon a rationalist version of reality, one 
which assumes that the world, both social and natural, functions on the basis of 
predictable and universal principles of cause-and-effect. So, for example, human 
action is understood as intrinsically stable and predictable, guided by an inherent 
logic to maximize perceived benefits. Similarly, disease is assumed to be a 
universally recurrent entity which produces distinct signs and symptoms. And this 
entity is conceived of as distinguishable from the subjective experience of illness. Put 
differently, although experiences and understandings of illness may vary, it is 
assumed that ‘real’ disease ultimately transcends socio-cultural context. The primary 
tasks of clinical medicine, according to this paradigm, should be oriented towards 
diagnosing and treating the signs and symptoms of suppose ‘real disease’. It is 
assumed further that clinicians are able to perform these tasks through the principles 
and methods of biomedical science. In other words, biomedicine is constituted as 
possessing the capacity to objectively know, and accurately treat, the supposedly 
natural order of pathology. 
 
 
Biomedicine is thus normative within this paradigm of thought. Other ways of knowing 
and being are essentially distinguished from, and evaluated in terms of, their proximity 
to biomedical knowledge and practice. Whereas biomedicine is seen to provide 
supposed accurate knowledge of real disease, people are assumed to hold subjective 
beliefs about illness, opinions with potentially suspect grounds in apparent 
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objective reality. Ultimately, within this paradigm, rational beliefs and behaviours 
are those which are in line with the principles and methods of biomedical science. 
 
 
Colonial medicine was intimately entangled with this kind of thinking, characterized 
at least in part by the struggle between supposed ‘rational’ biomedicine and 
apparent ‘primitive’ ‘traditional’ therapeutics (Comaroff 1993; Vaughan 1991). In 
its imaginary, ‘Western’ medical science embodied the highest form of rationality 
and modernity, in contrast to the supposed backward and superstitious nature of 
 
‘indigenous’ cultural beliefs and practices. Put bluntly, medical modernization of 
 
African populations entailed attempting to drive out supposed ‘primitive’ 
traditional therapeutics, and promoting forms of care which were based solely on 
biomedical theories and practices. 
 
 
A biomedical paradigm of thought is thus underpinned by a host of rationalist 
assumptions, Eurocentric tendencies and binary oppositions. This particular way of 
thinking about and ordering the world is strongly reflected and reproduced in the 
stories the large majority of the psychiatrists told about the ‘gap’ in mental health 
care. For the purpose of analysis, I structure these stories around two dominant 
themes, and unpack how this biomedical paradigm manifests and cuts across both 
themes. These themes are the lack of access to mental health care services and the 
lack of uptake of available mental health care services. 
 
 
Lack of access to mental health services 
 
 
 
Many psychiatrists began our interview by asserting strongly that the tremendous 
lack of material and human resources dedicated to mental health care is one of the 
main factors contributing to the large gap in mental health care. As described by one 
psychiatrist from South Africa: 
 
 
It comes down to simply there are not enough hospitals and clinics to treat 
people, simply not enough beds, not enough qualified health care personnel, 
or medications. So we are paralyzed in properly tackling the enormous need 
that is out there. 
 
 
Similarly one psychiatrist from Ethiopia emphasised: 
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The core problematic revolves around the large number of people who have 
easily definable mental health problems but do not have access to the services 
they need. We know what will help, we know how to get them better, but 
unfortunately we just don’t have capacity to do this. 
 
As reflected in these excerpts, the psychiatrists talked about the issue of limited 
resources in relatively certain terms, so often highlighting the ‘easily definable’ 
nature of mental illness and how they ‘know what will get people better’, but 
‘simply’ lack the resources to do so. Many psychiatrists explained further, again in a 
somewhat unequivocal manner, how this incapacity has resulted in a situation 
whereby people are forced to seek support from other sources. As the psychiatrist 
from Ethiopia cited above elaborated with conviction: 
 
 
So of course, they are then going to look for help elsewhere…help that is 
closer and more accessible…And this is why so many of our patients use 
traditional means, because they just don’t have access to modern means… 
 
 
Many other psychiatrists drew a similar conclusion, frequently emphasising that 
 
“people have no choice but to look elsewhere, to find other means, like holy water 
sites or prayer houses” that “people obviously then get help elsewhere from a range 
of more folk kinds of help” or “so our patients seek support through other means, 
such as faith healers and traditional healers”. Indeed, aptly depicting the views of so 
many psychiatrists, one psychiatrist from Nigeria asserted, again in relatively 
unequivocal terms: 
 
 
I have no doubt that if we can provide a service that is close to where people 
live, where they don’t have to wait for hours…we will significantly reduce 
this enormous gap in treatment…People will get the treatment they need 
and they won’t need to go elsewhere for help. 
 
 
For many of the psychiatrists then, ensuring that people ‘get the treatment they need’ 
within a context of scarce resources necessitates “thinking creatively” or “thinking 
out of the box” in order to “find innovative ways” or “novel strategies for extending 
the reach of our services”. Innovation, for the large majority of psychiatrists, tended 
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to emerge as two-fold. Firstly, it materialised as about equipping non-specialist 
health workers in primary health care and community settings to provide mental 
health care. Secondly, it was emphasised that there is a need to better collaborate 
with ‘traditional’ healers in the delivery of care. Although couching these two 
strategies within somewhat pioneering terms, elaborations of what such initiatives 
would entail were, however, deeply steeped in biomedical epistemologies. 
 
 
In terms of the first strategy, numerous psychiatrists unambiguously stated that 
 
“Integrating mental health into primary health care is the way to go, the only way 
forward” and “we need task-shifting strategies in primary and community care”. The 
potential of this kind of approach emerged most prominently when many 
psychiatrists described what for them a typical day at work entails. Within such 
accounts, there was a tendency to emphasise the ‘clear-cut’ nature of mental illness 
and the ‘straight-forward’ nature of the functions they perform, with the common 
conclusion that patients can therefore easily be dealt by non-specialist health 
workers. Indeed, the following narrative emerged repeatedly across the interviews: 
 
 
Most of what I do is really about making diagnoses, administering treatment, 
tracking the symptoms, following up to check that they don’t have excessive 
side-effects…And going back to what I was saying earlier, you don’t need 
specialist to do these kinds of things…non-specialists can be taught to do 
these things… (Ugandan Psychiatrist) 
 
 
Another psychiatrist from South Africa explained: 
 
 
 
The majority of people I see are actually quite straightforward…I get the 
details of the problem, come to some sort of working diagnosis, and then 
usually put them on medication, and often also provide some kind of 
therapeutic intervention…So, really, I am seeing people which could easily 
be dealt with by other people…With the right kinds of training and 
guidelines, non-psychiatrists could easily take on these tasks… 
 
 
This psychiatrist from South Africa went on to describe the World Health 
 
Organization’s MHGap Intervention Guide, highlighting how this “what-to-do 
manual” is a good example of the kind of clinical guidelines non-specialist could use 
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to help them perform the necessary tasks: 
 
 
 
So, the patient will say I am not sleeping well, I have lost my appetite, my 
weight is dropping. The nurse can then turn to the page of the manual where 
you have the symptomatology of sleeplessness or loss of concentration, and 
the manual explains what the symptom represents and lists what next 
questions to ask and actions to take. So all the nurse really has to do is 
following these steps… 
 
 
As depicted in these excerpts, the psychiatrists talked about the management of 
patients with mental illness as a relatively uncomplicated endeavour, primarily a 
matter of making diagnoses, administering treatment and monitoring side-effects. For 
the psychiatrists then, it is possible and desirable to model the scenarios a health care 
worker may face, and accurately stipulate a set of clear-cut steps on how to act. What 
is implicit in this particular understanding is that ready diagnoses exist, effective 
interventions are known and mental health care goals are well-defined, that is, 
defining and treating the signs and symptoms of illness. In other words, it is assumed 
that if health care workers have the supposedly correct facts, they can easily deduce 
the best path of action to take, an understanding which is indeed fraught with the 
kind of rationalism so characteristic of biomedical epistemologies. 
 
 
The second innovative strategy suggested by many of the psychiatrists for increasing 
the availability of mental health care services involved the necessity of collaborating 
with traditional healers. ‘Collaboration’, however, for the large majority of 
psychiatrists emerged as essentially matters of education, training and monitoring. 
After indicating that there is a need for partnerships with traditional healers, so many 
psychiatrists provided detailed accounts of the supposedly harmful and abusive 
nature of such practitioners. Comments were made about the “terrible kinds of 
human rights violations that go on in those kinds of places” or the “enormous 
abuses” that take place amongst traditional healers. Other psychiatrists spoke about 
the distrust such healers often have for health services: “Many healers are suspicious 
of us…they think we might take their livelihoods away, because they make money 
out of this. So they aren’t willing to hand over potentially lucrative clients to us”. For 
most of the psychiatrists then, ‘working with’ traditional healers tended to translate 
in essence into that of training and supervision and encouraging referrals: 
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 Part of the solution requires working together with traditional healers…But it 
would be our responsibility to supervise them if we going to work together. 
So if a patient comes to you, and they on these medications, encourage them 
to continue the medication, encourage them to come see us [Nigerian 
Psychiatrists, my emphases]. 
 
 
And as articulated by another psychiatrist from Uganda: 
 
 
 
We need to think about better collaborating with traditional healers…It is not 
easy though… Like, changing, you know, is not easy…Sometimes what they 
are doing is really quite abusive…There are so many cases of extremely 
harmful practices, like restraining people, chaining, cutting...So we need to 
engage with them to try to minimize these practices and emphasize the need 
for them to refer [my emphases]. 
 
 
As such, through the stories that the psychiatrists told, they were unable to know 
traditional healing systems as anything other than ineffectual, abusive and corrupt 
and in need of education and supervision. Ultimately, listening to the psychiatrists’ 
narratives, I could not help but think of colonial medicine’s trope of ‘Africa’s 
traditional therapeutics’, therapeutics which were incontrovertibly relegated to the 
realm of primitivism, degeneration and irrationality (Comaroff, 1993; Lucas and 
Barrett, 1995; Vaughan, 1991). 
 
 
The lack of uptake of available mental health services 
 
 
 
For many of the psychiatrists, the lack of access to mental health services was not the 
only reason for the large ‘gap’ in mental health care. The underutilisation of 
available services was seen as an additional contributing factor: 
 
 
At the same time that there’s a real problem with access, there’s the other 
problem that even though there is a lack of services, those services that are 
available are still not being used. Like people might live within walking 
distance to a clinic, yet they don’t come… [Nigerian psychiatrist]. 
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The interviews were replete with accounts such as these, with many psychiatrists 
describing, with much exasperation, how frequently people do not take up available 
services, come late, drop out of care or stop following their treatment regimes. In 
accounting for this situation, most psychiatrists attributed it to the inadequate levels 
of knowledge, or what was commonly referred to as insufficient “mental health 
literacy” amongst service users, their families and the general population. Indeed, 
the psychiatrist from Nigeria cited above went on to explain why he thought people 
‘just don’t come’: 
 
 
I think a lot of it has to do with a lack of mental health literacy…Often people 
don’t know that this is a real illness...They don’t know about services, well 
the right kind of services…And they don’t evaluate their symptoms 
appropriately…sometimes I wish psychiatry was like other medical 
disciplines, where you could put up a scan and say ‘look at the deficit. This is 
not what your brain used to look like and you need to let us fix this deficit’. 
 
 
As suggested by this psychiatrist, ‘appropriate’ forms of thinking and the ‘right’ 
kinds of services are those which understand mental illness as a universally recurrent 
and ‘real’ entity, one that is no different from other medical conditions. Similarly, 
another psychiatrist from South Africa described a study which involved providing 
out-patients with free medication, as well as transport money and a small stipend to 
attend fortnightly clinic check-ups. He was bewildered as to why many of the study 
participants failed to come to the services and frequently stopped their medication. 
Again, this was attributed to their lack of supposedly ‘appropriate’ kinds of 
knowledge: 
 
 
And yet in spite of all of this, so many dropped out of the study…in many 
ways it’s bizarre, even funny. We are paying them to come, and giving free 
medication, but they don’t come and they stop their meds (laughs)…But I 
think a lot of the time it comes down to not knowing how important it is to 
take treatment…But there are also other issues, all the spiritual stuff, like the 
belief that this is a calling and by taking the medication or seeing us you’re 
resisting the calling… [South African psychiatrist]. 
 
 
This reference to “the spiritual stuff” was a particularly persistent issue that emerged 
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within the psychiatrists’ stories about the widespread lack of ‘mental health literacy’ 
and consequent failure to take up services. The interviews were saturated with 
comments about people believing that “their affliction lies within the supernatural 
realm and so the cure is sought from healers” or that “Because they believe the 
problem is caused by spirits they go where they believe the spirit can be removed”. 
Indeed, people’s spiritual beliefs became a key analytical category for many of the 
psychiatrists, one which tended to be juxtaposed with supposed biomedical 
knowledge: 
 
 
It is very common for people not to come to psychiatric services, or present 
late, and then drop out. And of course it’s rooted in beliefs around the 
causes of disease. Many don’t believe it’s a medical disease. They think it’s 
a bad omen…So because of that, they think coming to us would be a waste 
of time… [South African psychiatrist]. 
 
 
For many of the psychiatrists then, in addition to expanding the availability and 
accessibility of services, reducing the current ‘gap’ in mental health care also 
necessitates educating people about the ‘proper’ nature of mental illness and 
‘appropriate’ forms of care. And what is proper and appropriate emerged as 
essentially forms of knowledge and practice which are based on the principles and 
methods of biomedical science. Indeed, ubiquitous comments were made by the 
psychiatrists about the need to “create increased awareness across society”, 
undertake “mass education initiatives” and “mental hygiene programmes”. It was 
emphasized that “people need to know that mental health disorders are no different 
from physical problems” and that “mental illness is not spiritual, but a real illness 
that is preventable and curable”. It was stressed how people require “information on 
the proper causes, symptoms and appropriate treatment options” and “knowledge 
about appropriate and sensible pathways to care”. Many psychiatrists emphasized 
how such education also needs to form an integral part of the care provided to service 
users and their families [my emphases]: 
 
 
You need to constantly talk to the patients and tell them that this is not a 
spiritual thing but a real medical illness…You need to tell them that there’s a 
real chance that if they don’t come to us, don’t take their treatment, they 
won’t get better [Ugandan psychiatrist]. 
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 This was echoed by another psychiatrist from South Africa [my emphases]: 
 
 
 
You need to help them understand that this is a real illness. Even sit the whole 
family down, because often families collude with the patients. But it isn’t 
easy. Some families refuse to co-operate with us, because they don’t think 
their child is ill. They think that it’s spiritual…In those cases, it’s a lot harder. 
But we try work with that. Well, work around that (laughs)… 
 
 
When I asked this psychiatrist if she could provide an example of where she “worked 
around that” she recounted the following: 
 
 
Recently a patient believed her illness was a calling to become a healer. And 
no matter what we said, she and her family just didn’t believe she was 
psychotic, even though it was evidently clear…So in these kinds of cases it is 
about being pragmatic…you know focusing on what will get this person 
better… 
 
 
This notion of ‘being pragmatic’ by ‘focusing on what will get this person better’ 
was in fact alluded to by numerous psychiatrists. Many explained that changing 
people’s beliefs is challenging, and so rather than “fighting with patients and their 
families”, health care providers need to place their attention primarily on “the things 
that really matter”. And these ‘things’ tended to emerge as primarily about 
identifying and addressing the signs and symptoms of illness: 
 
 
I used to spend lots of time trying to get patients to understand the nature of 
their illness. But I came to appreciate that people have all sorts of 
understandings, which aren’t going to change…So, explaining these things to 
people now feels a bit meaningless, well it doesn’t seem to mean much to me 
anymore (laughs)…So I now focus rather on the important things that people 
need to know and remember…The simple stuff really, like about warning 
signs, signs of relapse, the importance of treatment adherence… [Ethiopian 
psychiatrist]. 
 
 
What is therefore evident is that for the psychiatrists, patients’ own understandings 
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and experiences of illness are either invalid and in need of correction, or alternatively 
irrelevant and need to be ‘worked around’. In both cases, the implicit assumption is 
that there is a clear distinction between the real world of physiological objects and 
the personal experiences of this reality; between the objectivity of biomedical 
knowledge and the subjectivity of beliefs. And the primary goal of clinical care is to 
utilise the principles and methods of biomedicine in order to identify and address the 
underlying signs and symptoms of supposed real disease. 
 
 
In summary, and tying the various threads together, through the stories that the 
psychiatrists told, mental illness emerged as an entity which is “easily definable” or 
“straightforward” or “clear-cut”, and first and foremost a “real disease”, one which 
can be abstracted from subjective meanings and experiences. The principles and 
methods of biomedicine were constituted as normative; the paragon of objectivity 
and rationality. They were seen as providing the means for attaining the goals of 
care, goals which emerged as essentially self-evident- that is, identifying and 
addressing the signs and symptoms of real pathology so that people might become 
disease-free. ‘Other’ ways of thinking and being, which may lie outside of a 
biomedical form of consciousness, were in turn indisputably relegated to the realm of 
irrelevance, fiction or primitivism. 
 
 
As such, although proposals for reducing the ‘gap’ in mental health care were 
couched in the progressive terms of ‘innovation’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘pragmatism’, 
ultimately such recommendations did not embody any real kind of departure from a 
biomedical mode of thinking. They were still based upon the host of Eurocentric 
tendencies and binary oppositions that lie at the heart of this master narrative: the 
objective versus the subjective; knowledge versus belief; the rational versus the 
irrational; the modern versus primitive. And they were still premised upon the 
rationalist fantasies of the world so characteristic of biomedical epistemologies. That 
is, it was ultimately assumed that if services are made more available, and people are 
made aware of the ‘true’ nature of mental illness and the benefits of biomedical 
services, they will inevitably seek such services. And people will get better. And the 
 
‘gap’ in mental health care will be reduced. 
 
 
This is, however, not the whole story; there were cracks in this master narrative. 
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 Analysis Part II: Cracks in the master narrative 
 
 
There is a crack in everything. That’s how the light gets in 
 
 
(Leonard Cohen, Anthem) 
 
 
Beneath the audacious and relatively unequivocal statements made, certain 
psychiatrists conveyed a degree of ambivalence with regards to the underpinning 
knowledge claims of the dominant biomedical paradigm. These, somewhat 
momentary incidents of uncertainty, tended to emerge towards the end of the 
interview or whilst chatting in the corridors when I was leaving. For example, after 
thanking one psychiatrist from Nigeria for the interview, he casually remarked: 
 
 
I must just say though, I do have a great anxiety that even if we develop more 
health centres and more train more people to deliver mental health services, 
we still not going to solve the problem. Like will people come to those 
services? That remains a question…. I do worry that five years down the line 
we will look back and say why didn’t we do things differently then. But don’t 
quote me on that (laughs). 
 
 
During my interview with this psychiatrist, he had made many bold statements about 
the nature of the problem and how it should be addressed. I was therefore struck by 
the level of doubt he expressed in this final remark. I was also intrigued by his 
trepidations around voicing this perspective, indicating that I should not quote him 
on these kinds of uncertainties he had. In a similar manner, towards the end of our 
interview, another psychiatrist from Ethiopia made the following comment: 
 
 
It does concern me though that mental health care is becoming so clinical. I 
am not sure that that really satisfies the patients. I mean, what we are 
offering, and obviously we do offer help, but I think that we are inclined to 
overestimate what we can do….in reality, we are really struggling to do 
something that is sometimes maybe marginally effective. Maybe I shouldn’t 
be saying this on tape (laughs). But I do feel that a lot of what we are dealing 
with really are so intractable for people. There no magic solutions out of it. 
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So maybe our expectations need to change, so we don’t always feel so 
defeated when they come up against the real world of unsolvables. 
 
 
Once again, the uncertainty conveyed here, and apprehension around expressing it, is 
clearly evident. An analogous kind of apprehension was expressed by another 
psychiatrist from South Africa. During my interview with this psychiatrist, she 
received a phone call and asked whether I would mind stepping outside. After about 
20 minutes she invited me back in the room and exclaimed: 
 
 
Shame, this poor mother. I mean, well (sighs)…I suppose so many of the 
families we see, and our patients, are really dealing with a lot. You know, 
having to hold a lot of distressing, even horrific things. And obviously, we 
have to hear and receive it all with respect and with you know, sensitivity. 
Often we feel, well I certainly feel, sometimes that I am being, perhaps, I 
might be accused of being dismissive, or I am, you know, not acknowledging 
enough the content that they would like to bring…And of course this causes a 
lot of anxiety for us. Well for me at least. 
 
 
This psychiatrist went on to describe, in a fair degree of detail, the kinds of anxieties 
she feels when dealing with patients and their families, and suggested that these 
apprehensions have an effect on the kinds of care that is provided: 
 
 
You know, that power you get as a doctor is sometimes irresistible in treating 
your own anxiety….So, assert the power and everything is going to be OK. 
And that’s why maybe we become very paternalistic with patients and their 
families, trying to tell them that this is what it is and this is what they must 
do. And there are good reasons for it, I mean in crisis, you have got to keep 
your head, and the best way of keeping your head is making clear decisions. 
 
If you don’t have an absolute decision in your mind, you feel uncomfortable. 
 
Frightened maybe. 
 
 
 
It is thus clear that appearing intermittently in the cracks of the stories that were told, 
certain psychiatrists expressed a degree of ambivalence with regards to the more 
dominant knowledge claims about the nature of mental illness, the goals of mental 
health care and the capacity of biomedical science. These somewhat fleeting 
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moments of tension crystallised in the stories which were told by three particular 
psychiatrists, who appeared to operate within an alternative knowledge framework. 
In what follows is a detailed analysis of the kinds of stories these three psychiatrists 
told.
26 
 
 
Jeff: “Treatment becomes a restoration of harmonies, rather than the imposition of 
silence” 
 
 
Jeff is a psychiatrist who has been working in an acute male in-patient ward of a 
large public psychiatric hospital in Cape Town for over 20 years. During my 
interview with him, we spent a lot of time talking about the specific patients he is 
seeing. During such discussions, he spoke about one particular man, whom he has 
been seeing for the past six years, and used this patient to illustrate some of his 
thinking around the ‘gap’ in mental health care. In beginning his story about this 
man, Jeff describes: 
 
 
This young gentleman was really suffering when I first saw him. He was 
being controlled by a couple who were manipulating everything of his- his 
thinking, his capacity to swallow, to breath. And what really fascinated me 
was he would say to me, kind of waving his finger, ‘Jeff, I know you think 
that this is schizophrenia. I know you think that I am mad and so vat die pille 
 
[translation: take the pills]. But you just don’t get it. It’s real. It’s true’. 
 
 
 
In talking about this man, I was immediately struck by form of narration Jeff 
employed. Rather than using a third person perspective, Jeff was telling me this story 
in the first person, suggesting the utterly real nature of this man’s experience. In fact, 
 
Jeff explicitly stated that these experiences were indeed very real: 
 
 
 
Most certainly, I do think this man is ill, and we can say that he is deluded in 
some way. But how inadequate that is to understand, and then help him with 
this utterly real experience. It is really happening for this gentleman. And just 
the depth of this is hard to imagine, even impossible to conceive of how 
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dreadful it must be to live in a world where you have no privacy, no longer 
the author of ones’ actions. 
 
 
Jeff spent much time talking about both the authenticity and incomprehensibility of 
this man’s experience, and how, more than just being philosophically interesting, it 
also raises questions about how one might think about helping this man. Rather than 
telling people what to do and focusing on “fixing things”, Jeff explained that what is 
of primary importance is the necessity of acknowledging this person’s very real 
experience. Acknowledgement for Jeff emerged as a somewhat complex 
phenomenon: 
 
 
I think in some way acknowledgement includes a deep appreciation that 
mental illness is an intimately personal and private experience, and that the 
person suffering has endowed it with meaning. But it also involves 
acknowledging the limits of what we know. Like what this gentleman was 
experiencing was beyond my ability to imagine. And this is true for a lot of 
what we encounter in our work. We actually don’t really understand a huge 
amount. The causes, the pathophysiology, and effective treatments ultimately 
still remain elusive. Total mysteries. So let’s not pretend that we know what 
needs to be done. 
 
 
Jeff spoke in detail about his concerns that inappropriate claims are being made at 
the moment about what is known, and what should be done. For him, the desperate 
desire to address the large ‘gap’ in mental health care is resulting in widespread 
 
“claims of certainty when there is no certainty, assumptions of the inevitability of 
forthcoming answers to current mysteries”. According to Jeff, if one starts off from 
such a place of conviction, there is the great danger that one will provide potentially 
inappropriate forms of care and alienate patients, who are in turn unlikely to 
welcome such services. As he emphasized, “When one starts off from a place of utter 
certainty, from a place of knowing, it becomes very difficult to properly 
acknowledge the person’s experience, and as such, we end up prematurely 
foreclosing and limiting the scope of treatment”. Referring back to this man, Jeff 
explains how he spent much time just listening to him, and trying to understand his 
predicament. Jeff also frequently met with his family and explained how “This 
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provided invaluable, utterly crucial insights…you know there is always a lot we can 
learn from families…they don’t need to be educated”. 
 
 
Through such careful listening and learning, Jeff came to appreciate that this man 
was “desperately trying to make sense of his world, and these meanings were central 
for him”. According to Jeff, what might be understood as the clinical features or 
symptoms of this man’s illness, may have in fact been an attempt on this man’s part 
to understand and live with his experience, or as Jeff puts it, “a way of deriving 
some kind of meaning, in the attempt to live with an anomalous set of experiences 
that might otherwise be intolerable”. Jeff went on to describe in detail how this man 
consistently expressed ambivalence about taking medication, and how he came to 
realise that: 
 
 
It was as if his delusions offered some kind of meaning for him, forming 
some complex part of his processes of reintegration. And I came to 
appreciate that these meanings needed to be acknowledged and respected and 
possibly even enhanced, rather than merely neglected and 
eliminated….Using medication to supress these symptoms would have 
somehow denied this man of his reality…Created a kind of void for him. 
 
 
In qualifying his statement, Jeff insisted that he is not suggesting that medication 
should be dismissed, as it is able to provide very powerful relief for many people. 
Rather, what was at stake for Jeff is the need to rethink the ultimate aims of care: 
 
 
People are living with these realities, and will probably continue to do so in 
one form or another because a lot of what we are dealing with are actually 
chronic…So my job is not to rip this reality apart, to eliminate it, but to 
acknowledge it, and understand what sense you are making of it…To use a 
musical analogy, treatment becomes a kind of restoration of harmonies, rather 
than the imposition of silence…And for me, this is about moving beyond the 
banalities of treatment to thinking about what might be meaningful for you; 
what might be pleasurable or worthwhile getting-up for in the morning. 
 
 
The ‘restoration of harmonies, rather than the imposition of silence’ is a provocative 
and powerful metaphor, one very different to the language of cure. For Jeff, the 
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deeply personal and ultimately enduring nature of mental illness means that generic 
forms of treatment and quick fixes are not appropriate. Rather, it is about providing 
individualised and meaningful forms of care. Jeff ended by emphasising how 
thinking in terms of ‘harmony’ rather than ‘silence’ is not an easy task, one which 
ultimately requires a considerable amount humility, wisdom and expertise on the part 
of psychiatrists: 
 
 
As psychiatrists the desire to act, to want to wish the symptoms away is 
extremely powerful. It is surely understandable to wish people’s pain and the 
delusions away. But as I so often say to my students, you have to learn to let 
go, learn to just accept and make peace with what is. This involves 
humility…It involves facing the fact that we are not god. But I think in 
accepting suffering, you also encounter its limits. And in turn I think you are 
able to help people, and they are more willing to accept that help. 
 
 
Kenneth: “How to put the pieces of their lives together. That’s what seems to 
matter” 
 
 
Kenneth is a psychiatrist working in Lagos who three years ago was tasked with 
developing two voluntary, out-patient psychotherapy groups for people diagnosed 
with depression and psychosis. Kenneth explains how although he facilitates both of 
the groups and they take place at one of the state-funded psychiatric hospitals, they 
are “essentially patient-run, with the patients dictating the structure and nature of the 
groups”. When describing these groups, Kenneth spoke about his initial surprise 
about the high levels of patient uptake of these groups: 
 
 
In the beginning, when I was introducing these groups to my colleagues, 
everyone had mixed feelings about it, as people thought the patients just 
wouldn’t come…But the patients come. The attendance rate of both groups is 
nearly 100% every week. And it’s remarkable because some of the patients 
travel quite a distance to get here for it. 
 
 
Kenneth went on to describe another issue that surprised him, what he referred to as 
the “high levels of knowledge” amongst the attendees of the group. What intrigued 
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Kenneth, however, was that that “for them it’s not really about that, you know 
knowing those kinds of things”. As he explains: 
 
 
People always seem a lot less interested in you know, the diagnosis, the 
treatment, even the side-effects, and a lot more on what it all means for them. 
 
How to put the pieces of their lives together. That’s what seems to matter. 
 
How to make sense of what is happening to them… 
 
 
 
This issue of searching for meaning came up again and again in the stories Kenneth 
told about these groups. For example, Kenneth described how many of the 
attendees frequently speak about visiting a traditional healer and the valuable forms 
of meanings such practitioners provide: 
 
 
It seems that when they go to the healer, he tries to help them understand what 
might be happening to them…he invests their affliction, their symptoms with 
significance. Like hearing voices becomes ancestors speaking…And in this way, 
maybe their experiences change from being something problematic, to a more 
confirming and meaningful experience. And maybe this brings them some kind 
of relief to the pain and conflict they are experiencing… 
 
 
In a similar manner, Kenneth recounted an incident that occurred during one of the 
groups, one which he “will always remember”: 
 
 
During the meeting, this guy suddenly went into labour and started lying on 
the floor, screaming and having the whole labour pains…And all the patients 
kind of gathered round, and they wiped his brow and everybody was running 
to get towels and trying to calm him down and everyone was laughing and 
clapping…And of course that just passed, and we all just got on with things. 
 
 
When I asked Kenneth if he could say more about why this incident stuck out for 
him, he explained: 
 
 
I suppose just the way people accepted and supported this man. You know, 
really comforted him…Like nobody was saying ‘you mad you 
mad’…Everyone just accepted this man…I suppose a lot of the time when 
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they come to us I don’t think they feel all that supported or comforted…Many 
of our patients actually hate us. They think we are tyrants. They want to get 
away from us. And maybe they are right… 
 
 
For Kenneth then, patients’ may be less interested in, and motivated by, a desire to 
identify and treat the signs and symptoms of their illness, and more about having 
forms of care which are confirming and meaningful; which provide nurture and 
support. Ultimately, what Kenneth appeared to be suggesting is that the 
underutilization of mental health services may be less about people’s supposed lack 
of knowledge, and more related to the inadequacy of services in addressing the actual 
needs and priorities of those they are attempting to help. 
 
 
Sheila: “Every healing system has potential goods and bads” 
 
 
 
Finally, there was Sheila, a psychiatrist who manages one of the in-patient departments 
for women at a large psychiatric hospital in Cape Town. During our interview, she 
spoke in detail about a particular case which she described as “an enormously moving 
and humbling experience…which has become a source of great wisdom for me”. This 
case involved a woman who was admitted to hospital after she disclosed to a social 
worker that she wanted to kill her baby. When Sheila met this woman, she thought that 
this woman had a clear case of postnatal depression, and therefore prescribed psycho-
education for her and weekly role modelling sessions in order to enhance the mother-
infant bonding. After six months, the mother appeared much better, and was therefore 
discharged. One week after she was discharged, however, the mother poisoned her baby 
and was subsequently imprisoned. 
 
 
With great sadness, Sheila recounted how over the years she visited this woman in 
prison, and “gained a better understanding of what she was trying to tell me, but 
sadly my insight came too late”. When she took the time to properly listen to this 
woman during the prison visits, she learnt that she was a married woman from an 
extremely impoverished family. In needing additional income, this woman accepted 
a man’s offer to pay her for a sexual favour, through which her baby was conceived. 
 
As this baby was not her husband’s blood-child, it was subsequently rejected by her 
family. The baby was therefore not introduced to his ancestors, and would therefore 
be unable to go through the formal rituals of childhood and adolescence, and would 
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ultimately never be considered a true man in the community. Sheila described how 
when she initially saw this woman, she had not properly understood “the more 
profound layers of meaning of her struggle than merely a nonattachment to her 
baby”: 
 
 
My view in retrospect was a rather superficial and simplistic one…as though 
it would suffice to teach her about the importance of attachment…Had we 
looked more carefully at the pieces of the puzzle, perhaps this devastation 
could have been prevented. 
 
 
She went on to describe how a superficial understanding of patients is not enough if 
one is to fulfil the function of a therapist and patient manager: “we need to properly 
see our patients, or else we will inevitably fail them”. According to Sheila, genuinely 
 
‘seeing’ patients necessitates health care providers taking a more humble and less 
assuming approach, or as she puts it “it means starting off on the same level, rather 
than from a superior, inflated position…it means accepting that maybe our patients 
have real insights that we need to take seriously”. Sheila described further how when 
this mother was admitted, she kept emphasising to the nurses that she needed to 
speak with a traditional healer, something which was generally dismissed. Sheila 
explains how this experience “opened my eyes to the important role traditional 
healers might be able to play…they could have helped us with understanding and 
maybe addressing this woman’s situation”: 
 
 
I actually presented this case at the traditional healers’ conference last year. 
 
And just to say, I was the only psychiatrist there. Like there is all this talk of 
the need for collaboration but this was a conference, organized by traditional 
healers, and no psychiatrists came…Anyway, it was amazing…some of the 
healers came to me afterwards, they were very moved, and they said to me 
that, next time, you phone us. We will work together. 
 
 
Sheila spoke in considerable detail about how in attending this conference she came 
to realise that, despite ubiquitous talk of the need to work with traditional healers, 
there has been very little attempt on the part of mental health professionals to 
genuinely understand the practices of such healers, on their own terms. She went on 
to describe how since this conference, she has sought to better appreciate and work 
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with various traditional healers. For example, she described a particular case, which 
involved a suicidal 12-year old girl who was having very disturbing dreams calling 
her to become a healer: 
 
 
I phoned one of the healers I had met at the conference, and consulted with 
him, and asked how often they have a 12-year old with a calling. He said it is 
very rare. But said I should get the mother to phone him, which I did…They 
had a long conversation, after which he was convinced that the dreams were 
not a real calling. So, they did what they needed to do…They did a blocking 
ceremony and he counselled the girl...I’m not sure what the advice was, but 
the anxiety left. 
 
 
In talking further about the need for psychiatrists to be more open to “genuinely 
working with healers”, Sheila emphasised: 
 
 
Obviously there are charlatans amongst traditional healers, but there are also 
some precarious psychiatrists. Every healing system has potential goods and 
bads. But we just automatically assume ours is more civilized…We are so 
arrogant and as a result, we never really learn the potential of some healers… 
 
 
A critical, phenomenological paradigm 
 
 
 
During the interviews with Jeff, Kenneth and Sheila, I was taken on a journey to a 
place which felt far away from the world of biomedical science. I heard about 
intractable suffering, about unimaginable experiences, about ancestors and blocking 
ceremonies, about caring and about limits. In the stories these psychiatrists told, very 
different sorts of assumptions and thinking about the ‘gap’ in mental health care from 
what we saw previously emerged. These psychiatrists operated within an alternative 
knowledge framework, one which could be understood in terms of the tradition of 
phenomenology (Husserl 1972), and in particular the kind of thinking associated 
with French philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1962; 2004). 
 
 
At the core of a phenomenological perspective is an attempt to understand and do 
justice to the enigmatic ways in which people live and give meaning to their worlds 
(Jackson 1996; Matthews 2002). It is based upon the premise that all forms of 
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knowledge and experience are potentially significant and consequential, and should 
thus be taken seriously in their own right (Husserl 1972; Merleau-Ponty 1962; 2004). 
It is also based upon the assumption that our ways of knowing and being in the world 
are inherently complex and unpredictable and thus defy the ahistorical and 
universalistic form of rationalism exemplified by biomedicine. We are “active, 
purposive beings who have thoughts about the world, respond to it emotionally and 
imaginatively and who act on it sometimes deliberately, sometimes unthinkably” 
 
(Matthews 2002, p.49). From this perspective, in order to understand and do justice 
to the complex and enigmatic ways in which people act and give meaning to their 
life-worlds, necessitate that we try to loosen our ties with the dominant scientific 
theoretical structures that shape how we look at the world (Merleau-Ponty 1962; 
2004). This does not mean abandoning scientific knowledge and practices, but rather 
about challenging the “dogmatism of science that thinks itself capable of absolute 
and complete knowledge” (Merleau-Ponty 2004, p.45/43). 
 
 
These kinds of assumptions resonate strongly with the stories Jeff, Kenneth and 
Sheila told. In their narratives, mental illness materialised as inherently enigmatic 
and enduring, and most importantly, a deeply personal and private phenomenon. 
Indeed, what was most striking about the stories they told was that they were not 
chiefly interested in evaluating the supposed ‘truthfulness’ of their patients’ 
experiences or meanings, leaving such questions respectfully aside. Rather, they 
practiced a kind of “practical relativism” (Jackson 1996, p. 10) characteristic of 
phenomenological philosophies, whereby the emotional, the moral, and the 
subjective were conceptualised as potentially real and important forms of knowing 
and being. 
 
 
In taking people’s experiences and meanings seriously, on their own terms, these 
three psychiatrists came to appreciate that people’s understandings and behaviours 
are deeply complex and varied, affected by all sorts of social, cultural and emotional 
realities and rationalities. More specifically, what emerged most prominently in the 
stories I was told, was that contrary to what one might assume, the wish to eradicate 
symptoms and become ‘disease-free’ may not be what is most desirable, and may not 
be what ultimately motivates service users’ actions. Rather, what may be more 
important includes, for example, finding meaning, acquiring a space for suffering, 
developing ways of living with difficult experiences, affirmation, acceptance and 
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comfort, and forms of care which are sensitive to the socio-cultural attachments 
people hold and supports the collectivities to which they belong. 
 
 
The importance of these ‘alternative’ kinds of priorities and value-hierarchies has 
also been suggested by a number of ethnographic studies conducted with people with 
mental illness, and their families, in various low-and-middle income countries (See 
Cooper 2014 for a detailed description of this research). This research revealed how 
a focus on signs and symptoms defined in generic terms may not capture those 
aspects of well-being and recovery that are most significant to patients and their 
families, and which fundamentally shape their care-seeking itinaries. These may 
include, for example, a concern for the moral dimensions of sickness and suffering, a 
restoration of social functioning, the attainment of positions in which valued forms of 
subjectivity can be exerted, and the value of spiritual strength and coherence. What 
was revealed by the stories Jeff, Kenneth and Sheila told was these more qualitative 
and less tangible ‘things’ are not ‘decorative’ additionals that might make care 
practices more pleasant or humane. Rather, these things may inform the logic behind 
the therapeutic choices people make, the extent to which the care provided will be 
beneficial and, as exemplified by the case recounted by Sheila, may ultimately be 
implicated with matters of life and death. 
 
 
In appreciating the idiosyncratic and complex nature of human beings, Jeff, Kenneth 
and Sheila also consistently act against the rationalist fantasies of biomedicine. 
Indeed, I was struck by how they regularly spoke about the uncertain and limited 
nature of biomedical knowledge and practices. For them, this partiality was not 
because there is currently incomplete knowledge, something which will be rectified 
in time as biomedicine progresses. Rather, bodies and minds and needs and actions 
are complex and thus transcend the capacity to be fully be understood and known in 
rationalist terms. At the same time, the often chronic nature of mental illness means 
that there is invariably a limit to what can be done. For these psychiatrists, when 
dealing with complex, mysterious and chronic conditions, total control is ultimately 
never possible. This kind of understanding is what lies at the heart of Merleau- 
 
Ponty’s phenomenological perspective, one which appreciates that the world in 
which we inhabit “lends itself to unending exploration; it is inexhaustible… always 
incomplete, temporal and indeterminate” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 378). 
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In resisting bounded and totalizing accounts which create an illusion of certainty and 
order, these three psychiatrists were able to imagine that ‘other’ healing modalities and 
therapeutic resources may benefit. The polarization constructed by so many of the 
psychiatrists between supposed rational biomedical science and irrational 
 
‘traditional’ practices was considerably blurred by them. In the stories these three 
psychiatrists told, I heard about the “limits” of biomedical knowledge and practices, 
and about “the important role traditional healers might be able to play”. I was told 
about the potential “charlatans amongst traditional healers” but also about the 
possible “tyrannical” and “precarious” nature of many psychiatrists. Ultimately, as 
 
Sheila so succinctly put it, “every healing system has potential goods and bads”. 
 
 
 
It is thus clear that the host of binary oppositions we saw previously were profoundly 
contested in these stories. No distinctions were made between interior experiences 
and external objects, between the subjective and objective, between knowledge and 
beliefs, between doctor as knower and patient as known, and between the rational 
and irrational. In obliterating these polarizations, Jeff, Kenneth and Sheila produced 
a very different kind of understanding from what we saw previously about the ‘gap’ 
in mental health care, and how it can be potentially reduced. 
 
 
Rather than educating patients and their families, what emerged as most important 
was the need for service providers to understand and legitimise people’s own ways of 
knowing and being on their own terms, and within their own metaphysical world. For 
these psychiatrists, a lot is involved with being able to properly and genuinely see 
what people are communicating. It requires careful and meticulous listening to, and 
learning from, what patients and their families may be saying and trying to convey. It 
requires attuned attentiveness to the specific contingencies, predicaments and 
demands that patients present and which make-up their unique social worlds. In other 
words, rather than patients’ experiences and meanings being ‘worked around’, or 
worse yet corrected, as was suggest by the large majority of psychiatrists, these need 
to be properly seen and heard. And these need to be incorporated into the very 
definition of disease and the way it is addressed. Crucially, it is not about excluding 
the importance of neurological and intra-organic signs and symptoms that can be 
targeted through medication. Rather, it is about is rethinking how people’s needs and 
motivations, and the ultimate goals of mental health care are conceptualised in the 
first place. 
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 At the same time, these psychiatrists highlighted the need to incorporate 
epistemologically diverse healing modalities and therapeutic resources when 
thinking about mental health care provision. Such incorporation is, however, not 
about bringing other healing practitioners ‘in line’ with the knowledge and practices 
of biomedicine, as was suggested by the majority of psychiatrists. Rather, it is about 
genuinely appreciating that ‘other’ healing paradigms may be helpful to people with 
mental illness and their families. This is also not necessarily about the syncretism or 
integration of different healing traditions. Rather, it involves different practitioners, 
who may have epistemologically diverse ways of knowing and practising, being 
willing to enter into genuine collaborations of mutual respect and learning. 
 
 
Crucially for Jeff, Kenneth and Sheila, properly appreciating the ways of knowing 
and being of patients, families and alternative healing practitioners necessitates that 
psychiatrists cultivate a particular way of being. That is, a way of being which 
sincerely appreciates limitations and which ultimately learns to let go, giving up the 
dream of complete order and control. This way of being reflects what Merleau-Ponty 
(1962, p. xxiii) was getting at when he spoke about phenomenology as a “manner or 
style of thinking”, which is imbued with an attitude of “wonder” and “curiosity” and 
which can assist us in “relearning to look at the world”. That is, in unfixing habitual 
frames of thinking and relating, the possibility emerges for the production of 
potentially news forms of knowledge and practices, based upon alternative kinds of 
politics and epistemologies. This might enable mental health care service providers 
to think and function in worlds very different from the ones created by current seats 
of power. And this in turn might go some way towards the provision of more 
appropriate forms of care, ultimately helping to reduce the current ‘gap’ in mental 
health care so many countries on the continent face. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The real chance to make a difference... lies in a modest willingness to live, to know and to practice in 
 
the complexities of tension. 
 
(Law 1999, p.12). 
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This study explored narratives around the ‘gap’ in mental health care amongst a 
selection of psychiatrists working in public health care facilities in different urban 
settings in Africa. The aim was to surface and destabilise some of the 
epistemological assumptions and power dynamics underpinning these stories. 
Thinking amongst the majority of psychiatrists was deeply inserted within a 
biomedical mode of thinking, one which is based upon many questionable 
assumptions, binary oppositions and Eurocentric tendencies. There were, however, 
cracks seeping through this master narrative. Although certain psychiatrists conveyed 
a degree of tension with regards to the dominant knowledge claims, there were three 
particular psychiatrists who operated in a qualitatively different kind of paradigm. 
What they articulated was not like biomedical science. But nor was it necessarily 
opposed to it. Their understanding sought to transcend it. 
 
 
For them, the current ‘gap’ in mental health care may be less about a lack of services 
per se, as the majority of psychiatrists suggested, and more about a potential lack of 
particular kinds of services and particular forms of care. Indeed, although the 
majority of psychiatrists couched their proposals for reducing the ‘gap’ in mental 
health care in somewhat revolutionary terms, ultimately their recommendations did 
not embody any real departure from a biomedical mode of thinking. Such 
recommendations strongly echo contemporary Global Mental Health discourse, 
which is calling for decentralisation and task-shifting initiatives within primary 
health and community care settings, and for greater ‘mental health literacy’ amongst 
service users and traditional healers (Global Mental Health Group 2007; Patel et al 
2011; Petersen et al 2011). Such discourse is increasingly being criticised for 
promoting forms of care in Africa that are still deeply steeped in biomedical 
epistemologies (Cooper 2014, In press a, b; Campbell and Burgess 2012; Mills and 
Fernando 2014). Many of the psychiatrists in this study were indeed intimately 
involved with various Global Mental Health projects in their respective countries 
when I interviewed them. This may, in part, explain the strong synergy between the 
psychiatrists’ narratives and more general Global Mental Health discourse. 
 
 
According to the three psychiatrists in this current research, increasing the 
availability of services necessitates first and foremost rethinking the nature of the 
kinds of services that are expanded, and the associated epistemologies upon which 
these are based. Put differently, there needs to be a better congruence between 
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understandings of ‘legitimate’ services and ‘appropriate’ behaviours, and the ways of 
life and forms of meaning-making that commonly prevail amongst the people which 
services are attempting to reach and help. For these three psychiatrists, both the 
utilization and benefit of mental health care services are intimately entangled with 
the extent to which such services genuinely understand, and attend to, service users’ 
needs and priorities on their own terms, and within their own metaphysical worlds. 
And this ultimately encompasses more, and is more difficult, than just reducing 
symptoms and eliminating disease, as the majority of psychiatrists suggested. 
 
 
These kinds of sentiments have recently been expressed by certain critical 
psychiatrists and anthropologists. For example, in their Psychiatry beyond the 
current paradigm, Bracken and colleagues (2012, p. 431) argue that there is a need 
for “a fundamental re-examination of what mental healthcare is all about…a radical 
shift in our understanding of what is at the heart (and perhaps soul) of mental health 
practice”. For these psychiatrists, this change in thinking is not about abandoning the 
tools of empirical science or rejecting medical and psychotherapeutic techniques, but 
about developing more nuanced forms of medical understanding and practice. Such 
an approach, involves “starting to position the ethical and hermeneutic aspects of our 
work as primary…engaging with the non-technical dimensions of our work such as 
values, meanings, relationships, politics and the ethical basis of care and caring” 
 
(ibid, p. 432). In a similar manner, Arthur Kleinman (2012) recently made a plea for 
medical education, practice and research to better foster what he refers to as 
 
“caregiving” or the “art of medicine”. For Kleinman, caring and taking care implies 
acknowledging the personhood of sufferers, affirming their condition and supporting 
their concerns about living, self, and dignity. According to Kleinman (2012, p.1551): 
 
 
If caregiving is absent from discourses on health care then nothing else seems 
to matter. Even questions of ‘quality’ in health care become distorted. And 
the result is that all of us are demeaned and the profession of medicine and 
the processes of health care are transmuted into something that is hollowed of 
its humanity and moral value. 
 
 
Attempts to acknowledge and attend to the personhood of patients is, however, a lot 
more complex than how it is currently being conceived of within contemporary 
public (mental) health discourse. The notions of ‘patient-centredness’ or ‘the patient 
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perspective’ have for some time now been a key feature of public health research and 
practice, in an attempt to better understand and incorporate the subjective views and 
concerns of patients (Armstrong 1984). There is, however, the danger that the 
 
‘patient perspective’ becomes yet another objectified variable. That is, it becomes a 
stable and predictable ‘thing’ which people ‘have’ and which can be generically 
captured and responded to (Armstrong 1984). As a result, all of the complex and 
multiple ontologies of being, hierarchies of values and socio-cultural systems that 
shape the nature of suffering and associated responses, are reduced to a bundle of 
standardized variables and discrete interventions (Kirmayer 2012; Mol 2008; Velpry 
2008). Ultimately, trying to squeeze all of this complexity into simple diagnostic 
algorithms and standardized management guidelines is not to make it rigorous, but to 
mystify it, potentially producing misunderstanding and misappropriation (Kirmayer 
2012; Mol 2008; Velpry 2008). At the end of the day, we are once again brought 
back to a distinctively biomedical mode of thinking about and providing care. 
 
 
Thus, although more of the ‘patient perspective’ is clearly needed when thinking about 
the expansion and delivery of mental health care services, as suggested by the three 
psychiatrists in this current research, this cannot be approached through crude 
reductionist models. Rather, what may be most important is that practitioners cultivate 
a particular way of being, one which engenders greater uncertainty and doubt. This 
resonates with psychologist Leslie Swartz’s (2007) problematization of the notion of 
‘competence’ being widely promoted within Global Mental Health discourse, and the 
sense of comfort and complacency it generates. Rather than advocating for greater 
‘cultural competence’, Swartz highlights the “virtues of feeling culturally 
incompetent”, and how fostering such a stance of discomfort amongst mental health 
care service providers could fundamentally alter the way in which care is provided. 
Somewhat paradoxically then, what Swartz and Jeff, Kenneth and Sheila in this study 
are suggesting, is that uncertainty might be a precondition for assisting practitioners to 
negotiate more responsive and appropriate kinds of care. The trepidation conveyed by 
various psychiatrists in this study when expressing some of their doubts suggests that 
uncertainty may still too often be viewed as a problem, a shameful experience that 
should be quietly acknowledged behind closed doors. These silent uncertainties may 
thus require a space in which they can be articulated and seen. At the end of my 
interview with Jeff, he recited a poem he had recently created and which I have cited in 
the epigraph of this paper. 
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Now, having explored in detail the stories the psychiatrists told, I feel it is apt to 
reiterate the significance of Jeff’s poem, which ultimately captures so much of what 
is at stake here: 
 
Spider 
 
For me, the knowing came when psychodelia slapped me loose 
 
and pitched me screaming as I flailed widely in desperate search for reason. 
But watching 
 
I realised how I floated on gentle webs of being 
and inhaling 
 
smiled deeply as butterflies billowed by. 
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 9. A CONVERSATION ACROSS KNOWLEDGE SOURCES: 
 
IN SEARCH OF ‘AFRICA-FOCUSED’ MODELS OF SCHOLARSHIP ON 
 
THE MENTAL HEALTH ‘TREATMENT GAP’ IN AFRICA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
“In the late seventies I was a student of medicine and gradually got angry at the way suffering is handled 
in the caring professions. I realised that, basically, I wanted to react by yelling. By screaming out a 
revolting, inarticulate, harsh yell… Yelling, for all its loudness, doesn’t carry very far though. 
 
But what other repertoires of relating to suffering are there?” 
 
(Mol, 2001, p. 3) 
 
 
In her poignant paper Instead of Yelling, Annemarie Mol (2001) describes her early 
experiences of studying medicine, and her frustrations around the ways in which 
suffering was being handled. Her encounters with the caring professions made her 
want to respond by yelling: “By screaming out a revolting, inarticulate, harsh yell” 
 
(ibid, p. 3). I too have so often felt like yelling during this research. In Chapter one I 
indicated that the idea for this research arose out of my growing sense of frustration 
with the representational politics of the field of mental health in Africa. Sadly, in 
delving into the ‘black box’ of knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ on 
the continent, my feelings of exasperation have magnified, rather than reduced. 
 
 
In this chapter, I pull together some of the key themes which emerged across the 
different sources of knowledge analysed. That is, the knowledge produced at all three 
locations tended to be underpinned by a very similar set of meaning-codes and 
knowledge politics, epistemologies which can be understood as situated within a 
problematic place. It is a problematic place because (albeit unintentionally) they tend 
to perpetuate the legacies of colonialism and of racism, buttress common forms of 
privilege, and are potentially incongruent with the ways of life and forms of 
meaning-making that commonly prevail amongst those actually affected by mental 
illness in Africa. Across the three sources of knowledge there were, however, various 
cracks and cleavages within the master narrative. That is, the shrill and somewhat 
singular voice of scholarly authority was at times softened by a chorus of more 
marginalised voices. In this chapter I explore the enabling potential of these voices 
for bringing about more decolonised models of scholarship on the ‘gap’ in mental 
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health care in Africa. Ultimately, these might represent better and potentially more 
 
productive alternatives, to somewhat inarticulate yelling. 
 
 
Dominance of the episteme of European Colonial Modernity 
 
 
“Modernity spread out from Europe like a gigantic inkblot, covering the world and bringing us all 
 
into the same cultural condition” 
 
(Connell, 2007, p. 54) 
 
 
One of the central arguments made in this thesis is that, although knowledge on the 
 
‘treatment gap’ is commonly assumed to be factual, when probed epistemologically, 
is heavily compromised in terms of Eurocentric content and orientation. In other 
words, I have demonstrated how the episteme of European Colonial Modernity has 
subtly and sometimes not so subtly, dictated the theory and research methodologies 
in this area. The epistemological authority of this gaze was indeed strikingly 
prominent and similar across the different sources of knowledge analysed, including 
the research, the fourteen national policies and the stories told by the majority of 
psychiatrists. In particular, I have demonstrated how two specific paradigms are 
playing a fundamental role in shaping thinking on the ‘gap’ in mental health care, 
which I referred to as the interrelated paradigms of evidence-based science 
(including biomedicine) and human rights. These particular conceptual frameworks, 
and associated underpinning assumptions and classification systems, were, 
however, ultimately black-boxed within the ubiquitous moral and scientific 
language of providing ‘access to care’, of promoting interventions ‘proven to work’ 
and of ‘advancing the dignity and liberties’ of the mentally ill. 
 
 
In this research I have been disrupting the apparent self-evidence of these dominant 
paradigms so that they might cease to be black boxed entities. In Chapter Four, I 
surfaced and put into historical perspective, the epistemological assumptions and 
overarching system of classification underpinning these two particular paradigms. In 
order to destabilise their historical inevitability, I unpacked how these ways of 
thinking arose out of, and in turn provided an ideological basis for, many of the 
socio-economic forms of organization and capillaries of power characterizing 17
th
 
and 18
th
 century Europe. In particular, I showed how the growing power afforded to 
them were deeply entangled with attempts in Europe to undermine the legitimacy of 
 
ecclesiastical and feudal doctrines, advance modern forms of capitalism and 
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and ultimately justify modernist Europe’s supposed ‘positional superiority’. In other 
words, the hegemonic status increasingly afforded to these paradigms can be 
understood as emanating from Enlightenment battles over the authorisation of 
knowledge and attempts to develop boundaries of socio-economic and political 
legitimacy. Ultimately, as Europe’s socio-economic and political changes of the 
17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries were consolidated in subsequent centuries, so too was the 
power and influence of these paradigms of thought. 
 
In the succeeding four chapters, which consisted of four separate, peer-reviewed 
publications, I unpacked how this episteme of European Colonial Modernity, and 
associated paradigms and system of classification, are strongly mediating knowledge 
on the ‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa. Drawing on a range of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and Postcolonial theory and research, I disturbed the 
magic of this epistemological order further. I showed how many of the underpinning 
epistemological assumptions of these paradigms, including those of rationalism, 
naturalism, universalism and objectivity, are based upon a host of questionable and 
contentious certainties. Moreover, I shed light on how the dominant form of 
classification system mediating these paradigms is based upon all sorts of false 
polarisations and essentialised categories: knowledge versus belief, fact versus 
fiction, objective versus subjective, disease versus illness, traditional versus modern, 
primitive versus civilized, rational versus the irrational, Africa versus the West. I 
explored how these assumptions and forms of ordering may be producing misleading 
accounts and promoting potentially inappropriate forms of practice. In particular, I 
argued that such ways of thinking may be incongruent with the forms of life and 
meaning-making that commonly prevail amongst individuals and families actually 
affected by mental illness in Africa. 
 
 
For example, in Chapter Eight, I unpacked how the psychiatrists tended to hold an 
understanding of mental illness as universally definitive, of human action as 
inherently rational, and of the goals of mental health care as inevitably entailing the 
eradication of the signs and symptoms of mental illness. I suggested that these 
assumptions may be obscuring the often enigmatic and diverse nature of mental 
illness, and insufficiently capturing the frequently complex and varied rationalities 
shaping service users’ needs, their aspirations and the therapeutic choices they make. 
Relatedly, in Chapters Five and Seven, I demonstrated respectively how both 
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research on scaling-up the provision of mental health care services and the national 
policies tend to view valid services and behaviours as those which are solely based 
on the principles of scientific evidence and individualised human rights. I explored 
how these ideas of legitimacy may be incompatible with, and potentially 
marginalising, the more localised expressions of suffering and value-hierarchies that 
commonly exist amongst people mental health care services are attempting to reach 
and help. Similarly, in Chapter Six I demonstrated that research on ‘help-seeking’ for 
mental illness tended to understand how and why people do and should behave in a 
way which denies change, complexity and multiplicity, as well as the movement of 
people and things in more than one direction. Ultimately, I argued that this may be 
masking, and ineffectively tapping into, the existence of considerably heterogeneous 
local practices and multifaceted forms of meaning-making. 
 
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, I had not intended, initially, to produce two separate 
analyses of research on the mental health ‘treatment gap’. And yet very quickly it 
became clear that research in this area was divided into two quite distinct focuses-
one on the provision of care and how services should be scaled-up, and the second on 
the uptake of services, or ‘help-seeking behaviour’, and how this can be enhanced. 
 
Although my analyses followed this split, now looking back, it is evident that this 
division in research focus aptly reflects some of the larger issues that are at stake 
with knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ in Africa. That is, research on 
the kinds of services that should be expanded remains almost entirely detached from 
research on how and why people might respond to mental illness, and vice versa. 
Ultimately, this schism sheds further light on the kinds of dissonances that appear to 
exist between thinking on what needs to be scaled-up, and the kinds of practices and 
understandings that may occur amongst, and be important to, those actually affected 
by mental illness. 
 
 
What should have emerged throughout my analyses is that the kinds of thinking and 
practices coming out of the episteme of European Colonial Modernity have 
undeniably enhanced and elongated the lives of many people, including in Africa. 
These advances cannot be overstated; there is no lip service here. For example, the 
randomized controlled trial, now at the heart of evidence-based medicine, has 
revolutionised the kinds of psychotropic drugs now available for treating a host of 
mental illnesses, and many people in Africa have benefitted from these (Patel and 
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Thornicroft, 2009; PLOS Medicine Editors, 2013). Similarly, interventions based on 
the principles of human rights have offered very real and important emancipatory 
potential for many minority groups in a diverse range of contemporary African 
settings (Lemarchand, 1992; Shivji, 2000; Werbner, 1995; Wilson, 2000). These 
sorts of advances and benefits should be genuinely recognised, celebrated and 
nurtured. 
 
 
At the same time, however, there is a lot about the episteme of European Colonial 
Modernity and associated forms of knowing and being that is problematic, and 
which I am therefore criticising and suggesting need to be transformed. In particular, 
I am refusing the overarching kind of classification embedded within this episteme, 
one which demarcates the world into homogenous entities and stark polarizations. 
This form of ordering is mediated by a host of false oppositions, which ultimately 
perpetuate the Eurocentric legacies of colonialism and of racism, and buttress 
particular kinds of power and privilege. It also insufficiently captures the plural and 
shifting nature of meaning-making and ways of being that frequently exist amongst 
people, including those affected by mental illness in Africa. Ultimately, this way of 
ordering the world has so often led to misleading accounts and inappropriate 
interventions. I am therefore rejecting this classification system and its false 
polarisations, and arguing for the need for more fluid epistemological schema and 
forms of ordering. 
 
 
At the same time, I am critiquing many of the epistemological assumptions 
embedded within the paradigms of evidence-based science and human rights, in 
particular, those of naturalism, universalism, objectivity and rationalism. That is, I 
am problematizing their premise of a reality which is naturally ‘out there’ and which 
operates according to the rational principles of cause and effect. Relatedly, I am 
rejecting the assumption of an inherently universal ‘nature’, one that is naturally 
shared by everyone, everywhere, across time and space. The world and its 
inhabitants (their minds, bodies, needs, desires, behaviours and so forth) are 
complex, unpredictable and context-dependent, and therefore cannot so easily be 
captured by predictive rules and universal laws. Similarly, I am arguing against the 
notion that the principles and methods of science are able to objectively and 
definitively capture and manage what is ‘out there’, and relatedly, that human rights 
principles represent impartial and universal moral codes. While these principles, 
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codes and methods may be meaningful and potentially helpful for explaining and 
managing certain phenomena, they are inevitably value-laden, contestable and 
limited. I am therefore rejecting many of the suspect epistemologies mediating the 
knowledge order of European Colonial Modernity, and arguing for forms of 
meaning-making which are based upon more desirable knowledge assumptions. 
 
 
Finally, and relatedly, I am also problematizing the dominance of this particular 
episteme, and the forms of power and privilege and exclusion and silencing such 
supremacy is perpetuating. That is, there are fundamental problems with the way in 
which this knowledge order has become an orthodoxy, establishing itself as the sole 
criterion of truth claims. Such authority perpetuates certain kinds of power and 
privilege. It also occludes ‘other’ forms of knowledge from entering the formally 
accredited academic canon, and ultimately suppresses those social groups whose 
practices are informed by such alternative knowledges. In other words, this episteme 
has become the gatekeeper of knowledge, policing the boundaries of legitimate ways 
of thinking and, by extension, valid forms of being. I am therefore rejecting the 
hegemony of this knowledge order, and arguing for forms of knowledge which are 
more hospitable to alternatives. 
 
 
Working otherwise: ‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship 
 
 
“Can we have social theory that does not claim universality for a metropolitan point of view, does not 
read from only one direction, does not exclude the experience and social thought of most of humanity, 
and is not constructed terra nullius?” 
 
(Connell, 2007, p. 47). 
 
 
So, the question is, how might we produce knowledge on the mental health 
 
‘treatment gap’ in Africa that is based upon more fluid forms of ordering, more 
desirable knowledge assumptions, and which is more open to alternative 
epistemological codes? Emerging over four hundred years ago, the European 
Colonial and Modernist gaze has become extraordinarily well-entrenched, making it 
very hard to think differently and to know alternatives well. The search for 
alternative modes of meaning-making, which are not necessarily defined by this 
gaze, is also a perilous endeavour. 
 
 
 
247 
One such pitfall that emerged in this thesis is when struggles with new vocabularies 
and forms of expression end up returning us to the old, static and essentialised view 
of Africa, instead of setting us on a new path to knowledge creation. This was 
demonstrated, for example, in Chapter Six through my analysis of a body of 
research which I termed the ‘indigenous-knowledge-system’ approach. Employing 
the concept of an ‘explanatory model’, this increasingly popular research tradition 
sought to challenge the Eurocentric assumptions dominating mental health research 
on help-seeking. According to this research, people in Africa have their own unique 
ways of understanding and treating mental illness which are distinct from Western 
biomedical paradigms. Researchers working within this tradition argued that these 
 
‘other’ ways of knowing and being should be the basis of mental health care 
provision, rather than the transfer of internationally standardised psychiatric 
treatments. As I demonstrated, although attempting to work against the dominant 
Eurocentric gaze, sadly this kind of research ultimately ended-up infusing new 
content into the very essentialist and polarised epistemological framework it sought 
to contest. 
 
 
Another potential danger around developing alternative forms of meaning-making 
which emerged is when such alternatives enter into the formal knowledge economy, 
but end up being absorbed into, and transformed by, the great imperialist archive. A 
pertinent example of this was the notion of Primary Health Care, as explored in my 
analysis of the national policies in Chapter Seven. Born out of the decolonization 
forces of the 1960s and the grass-roots public health initiatives being pioneered in 
low-and-middle income countries, this concept embodied an important portal for 
thinking about mental health care in new and potentially decolonized ways. 
However, as this idea became integrated into mainstream public health discourse, it 
was increasingly stripped of its more revolutionary sentiments and epistemologies. 
Ultimately, the outcome represented what Bruno Latour (1999) calls a “Servant 
Narrative”. As he articluates, “this ban on the master narrative is never very 
effective, because, in the back of our minds, no matter how firmly we are 
convinced of the radical multiplicity of existence, something surreptitiously gathers 
everything into one little bundle” (ibid, p. 212). In other words, despite its 
innovative potential, the concept of Primary Health Care was ultimately sucked 
back into the grand, Eurocentric knowledge tradition. 
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Another example of such absorption into, and potential corruption by, the hegemonic 
epistemological order emerged out of the ubiqutous talk of ‘collaboration’ between 
biomedical practitioners and what were referred to as ‘traditional’ healers. Calls for 
such partnerships featured prominently across the three sources of knowledge 
analysed. However, beneath the somewhat progressive rhetoric, such co-operation 
tended to emerge as essentially training and educating ‘traditional’ healers in 
biomedicine and human rights. Thus, from this perspective, which Green (2012) 
refers to as the “show us that your gods exist” kind of approach, if anything outside 
of science is to be considered legitimate, ultimately it must be ‘proven’ by the 
methods and principles of science. If it cannot be ‘verified’ in this manner, ultimately 
it must remain in the realm of unjustified and irrational belief. Relatedly, in Chapter 
Eight, I hinted at the fact that the concepts of ‘patient-centredness’, the ‘patient-
perspective’ and ‘cultural competence’ have undergone similar kinds of distortions 
and reductionisms as they have gained increased recognition within the formal 
knowledge economy. 
 
 
The point is then that there is an urgent need for boundary pushing within the modes 
of knowledge creation. However the conundrum is how to develop such alternatives 
without falling prey to the tentacles of Eurocentric power by recourse to a 
mythologised indigeneity or by being consumed by the imperial dominion. In 
Chapter Three, I suggested that Achille Mbembe’s (2002) idea of “African Modes of 
 
Self-Writing” and Raewyn Connell’s (2007) notion of “Southern Theory” might be 
helpful in this regard. According to these scholars, there is a need for the African 
continent to find its own styles and theories of expression. That is, to develop new, 
locally-grown and decolonized conceptual territories and vocabularies which are 
centred on our continent’s own issues and needs, or as Maldonado-Torres (2007, p. 
 
1) puts it, which are predicated on “populations whose identities, knowledges, and 
very existence have been systematically questioned or denied”. However, such forms 
of meaning-making need to be predicated upon the recognition of African identities 
and experiences as diverse, global and dynamic and which come forward as multiple 
forms of practices and knowledges. I have termed this kind of scholarship ‘Africa-
focused’. 
 
 
Importantly then, the development of such ‘Africa-focused’ forms of scholarship is 
not about unearthing or retrieving supposedly ‘authentic’ or ‘traditional’ forms of 
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knowledge. Nor is it about necessarily rejecting structures of thought which might 
originate from the geopolitical North. Indeed, throughout my research, I have drawn 
upon the works of European thinkers and a host of theories that might be understood 
as originating from the so-called ‘West’. It is thus imperative not to conflate the use 
of ‘Northern’ theory with Eurocentrism, as Mbembe (2002) and Connell (2007) so 
pertinently emphasise. As these scholars suggest, knowledge, wherever and by 
whomsoever it is produced, is potentially available for transgressive, emancipatory 
and counter-hegemonic use. Thus, regardless of where they originate, forms of 
knowledge can become ‘Africa-focused’. However, in order to do so, they need to be 
enmeshed with the heterogeneity of African realities, matrices and lexicons, and be 
shaped by these. In other words, it is about using whatever concepts and research 
tools that are appropriate to the multiplicity of issues, needs, questions and dilemmas 
facing the continent, regardless of where these tools might originate. Ultimately, 
 
‘Africa-focused’ knowledges are ‘fit for purpose’. Throughout this thesis I have 
placed scare-marks around the term ‘Africa-focused’ in an attempt to allude to the 
very specific and complex nature of my use of this term. That is, knowledges which 
are neither Afrocentric, nor Eurocentic, but ‘Africa-focused. 
 
 
For scholars such as Mbembe and Connell and others, what is therefore urgently 
needed is careful and critical thinking about what kinds of methodological processes 
and conceptual resources might help produce such models of scholarship. Obviously, 
there are likely to be multiple and varied tools of this kind, and it would be 
problematic to suggest that one or other is the correct one. This would be to proclaim 
some newly captured moral high ground, and ultimately risks setting up a new kind 
of knowledge orthodoxy that I have been arguing against. Rather, it is about opening 
up questions around what kinds of tools might hold promise for facilitating such 
potentially transformative, ‘Africa-focused’ models of meaning-making. Various 
possibilities emerged in this regard in my research. That is, seeping through the loud 
master narratives, there were somewhat softer and more marginalised voices that 
suggested particular avenues out of which new, decolonised forms of knowledge on 
the ‘gap’ in mental health care might be able to grow. It is these possible 
opportunities which I wish to unpack further in the remainder of this chapter. 
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Ethnographic articulations: Tapping into mess, complexity and heterogeneity 
 
 
“My plea is for another kind of science which reclaims the art of dealing with what is messy not as a 
defect but as what we have to learn to live and think in… something more similar to the slow 
knowledge of a gardener than to the fast one of the so-called rational industrial agriculture…” 
 
(Stengers, 2011, p. 12) 
 
 
One important chorus that was heard amongst the more muted voices in this thesis 
was that people’s mental health care needs and therapeutic itineraries are messy and 
shaped by a range of heterogeneous and multifaceted elements. Most importantly, 
what emerged was that the familiar kinds of enumerations and abstractions of 
evidence-based science are ultimately unable to deal with or adequately encapsulate 
all of these diversities and complexities. Thus, what this suggested is that producing 
more appropriate, ‘Africa-focused’ models of scholarship on the ‘gap’ in mental 
health care requires resources which might help us better see and think through the 
diverse, the fluid, the complex and the messy. As John Law (1999, p. 11) so 
eloquently writes: 
 
 
How to talk about something, how to name it, without reducing it to the fixity 
of singularity or simplicity? How to resist the singularities that are usually 
performed in the act of naming? How to defy the overwhelming pressures on 
academic production to render knowledge simple, transparent, singular, 
formulaic? 
 
 
One potentially promising tool which emerged in my research was critical 
ethnography. The ethnographic method, when done well, offers an important 
resource for imagining situated understandings, heterogeneous practices, and throws-
up correspondingly important questions related to micro and macro processes and 
their interrelations (Chua, High and Lau, 2008). Ethnography attends meticulously to 
details and specificities; to the apparent banality of ambivalent small things. Such an 
approach provides rich stories about the ways in which mental well-being are 
understood, practiced and conceptualized within specific contexts and situations. It 
foregrounds careful attention to the diverse and complex ways in which people make 
sense of daily life in the face of illness, and locates such sense-making and associated 
practices within larger economic, political and historical forces (Mol, 2006; 
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Strathern, 2008). Ultimately, as a particular method, ethnography generates a kind of 
complexity that rationalisation cannot flatten out or sanitise (Mol & Law, 2004). 
 
 
In Chapters Five and Six, I shed light on how a small body of mental health research 
is employing ethnographic methods to explore the lived experiences of individuals 
and families struggling with mental illness in various low-and-middle income 
countries. This research has shed light on the complex and diverse kinds of priorities 
and value-hierarchies that are significant to patients and their families, and which 
might shape the therapeutic choices they make. Yet as I and others (Horton, 2013, 
White & Sashidharan, 2014a,b) have argued, this kind of in-depth, ethnographic 
research is still scarce within the field of mental health research, particularly in 
Africa, and has so far remained a relatively untapped and marginalized resource 
within Global Mental Health research. 
 
 
What I suggested in Chapter Six, through my analysis of Read (2009, 2012) and 
Devisch et.al’s (2001) recent ethnographic research in Africa, is that what is at stake 
here is more complex than just the need for more in-depth, qualitative modes of 
understanding, although clearly this is required. Rather, what also matters are the 
underlying systems of classification which are mediating the research processes and 
shaping the nature of the knowledge outcomes. In other words, there is a need for 
more careful thought around how concepts are framed and entities are categorised, 
irrespective of whether one employs qualitative or quantitative approaches or a 
combination of the two. What was significant about both Read and Devisch’s and 
colleagues’ ethnographic research was that no rigid categories were used which 
smoothed out paradoxes, leakages and frictionalities. Rather, people were 
represented as moving between diverse healing modalities and as holding many 
overlapping and seemingly contradictory needs and priorities. The logic was one of 
multiplicity, with people seen to be living in a syncretic world in which both 
divinities and psychotropic medicines could be simultaneously combined. Moreover, 
different healing modalities were conceptualised as essentially intersecting, 
fragmentary and limited; as diverse entities filled with inevitable gaps and 
contradictions. These researchers thus transformed the ways in which cultural 
geneses and influences were configured, employing what can be seen as more partial 
and provisional forms of categorization. 
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As such, this research captures what Donna Haraway (1991, 1992) is getting at with 
her concept of articulation as an alternative to rigid classifications. Haraway (1991, 
p.321) is grappling with how we might “design classification systems that do not 
foreclose on rearrangements suggested by new forms of social and natural 
knowledge”. For her, the idea of articulation might present a malleable and more 
dynamic form of coding in comparison to classification. According to Haraway 
(1992, p. 324) “To articulate is to signify. It is to put things together, scary things, 
risky things, contingent things”. To articulate is thus to make links and alliances that 
are contingent and temporal, rather than fixed. It involves reordering the neat 
categories through which we understand reality, joining and putting together, for 
example, science and faith, Africa and Europe, modern and traditional, global and 
local. Ultimately, though such articulation, we might be taken into a world quite 
different from the one imagined by the epistemological order of European Colonial 
Modernity. As Haraway (1992, p. 324) describes: 
 
 
An articulated world has an undecidable number of modes and sites where 
connections can be made. The surfaces of this kind of world are not 
frictionless curved planes. Unlike things can be joined-and like things can be 
broken apart- and vice versa. Full of sensory hairs, evaginations, 
invaginations, and indentations, the surfaces which interest me are dissected 
by joints. 
 
 
Thus, what Donna Haraway, Read and Devisch and colleagues are all suggesting is 
that research which employs more provisional forms of coding might help us to shift 
the grounds on which questions are posed and recommendations are provided. These 
more tentative expressions or “friction-generating articulations” (Haraway, 1992, p. 
321) are underpinned by alternative sorts assumptions to those which are presumed 
in the episteme of European Colonial Modernity about the kinds of selves, objects 
and their relations, and how they can be known. Ultimately, in resisting bounded and 
totalizing accounts, these more conditional modes of expression hold great potential 
for articulating mental health and recovery in Africa through potentially more 
appropriate configurations and along new epistemic lines. 
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Critical phenomenology: Taking ‘other’ epistemological worlds seriously 
 
 
“The point is not to declare war on the conventions that bind us, the habits that enable us to be 
characterized. Instead, it is merely to place on the same level – that is, in adventure – all of our 
judgements, or our ‘as is well knowns,’ and thus to separate them actively from what gives them the 
power to exclude and to disqualify” 
 
(Stengers, 2014, p. 27) 
 
 
Another directly related tune that was heard amongst more marginalised voices in 
my research was that mental wellbeing and recovery frequently incorporate 
dimensions of life that are of a tacit, spiritual, emotional, experiential, and embodied 
nature. As with the messy and heterogeneous, these aspects emerged as similarly 
lying outside of a scientific metaphysical world and thus also not seguing easily into 
scientific schema. As such, if we are to develop more ‘Africa-focused’ forms of 
scholarship on mental health, we require tools which might help us better capture, 
and genuinely appreciate, these alternative ways of knowing and being on their own 
terms. In other words, how might we transform the dominant intellectual reflexes 
which compulsively relegate these ‘others’ to the realm of subjective belief, 
irrationality or hocus-pocus? 
 
What is at stake here encompasses more, and is more difficult than just tolerating 
 
‘alternatives’, or what Isabelle Stengers (2008) calls, ‘the curse of tolerance’, now so 
common amongst cosmopolitan multiculturalists (see also Latour 2004 who makes a 
similar argument). For Stengers (2008, p. 51), toleration is to be “part of a milieu that 
refuses ‘them’ the power to have us thinking and feeling, a milieu that claims it has 
no need or use for what they propose”. In grappling with how we might develop a 
different kind of intellectual milieu, Stengers (2012) talks about the need to “reclaim 
animism”. This is a particular kind of knowledge ecology which refuses the 
modernist and colonial intellectual heritage that “characterized its ‘others’ as 
animists’” (ibid, p. 1). To reclaim animism is, for Stengers, about discovering the 
capacity to honour experiences and forms of meaning-making which are “not 
ours…to have ‘them’ making us thinking and feeling and wondering” (ibid, p. 7). In 
other words, it is about considering how we might be touched by the divine and 
allow the gods, the spirits and the supernatural to enter into the archive of intellectual 
knowledge. As Stengers (ibid, p. 8), so eloquently puts, “We need to discover how to 
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be compromised by magic”. Ultimately, we require theoretical vocabularies for 
‘reclaiming animism’, for properly seeing, engaging with and being compromised by 
‘other’ ways of thinking and being on their own terms, and within their own 
metaphysical worlds. 
 
 
What emerged in my research is that phenomenology, and in particular the more 
critical tradition associated with French philosopher Merleau-Ponty (1962, 2004), 
might offer useful resources in this regard. Phenomenology has indeed been 
proposed by various critical medical anthropologists as a useful theoretical 
vocabulary for developing potentially transformative forms of clinical practice and 
research (for example Devisch, 2002, 2006; Devisch & Brodeur, 1999; Good, 1994; 
Jackson, 1996, 1998; Mimica, 2006, 2009; Weiss & Stanek, 2006). As Jackson 
(1996, p. 6) articulates, critical phenomenology seeks to “abandon the conceptual 
baggage inherited from colonial and imperial discourse” and holds great potential 
“for freeing us to experience other worlds from the ground up, as it were”. In Chapter 
Eight I explored phenomenology as a particular paradigm of thought, something I 
would like to expand upon here and in particular, the enabling potential of this 
approach for bringing about new, ‘Africa-focused’ forms of scholarship on mental 
health care in Africa. 
 
 
As highlighted in Chapter Eight, at its most basic level, phenomenology is the study 
of lived experience (Schwandt, 1994). It seeks to describe and understand the lived 
complexity of experience, giving equal importance and attention to all forms of 
human experience including the “active and passive modes, facts as well as fictions, 
the precarious as well as the certain, the idiosyncratic as well as the shared” 
 
(Jackson, 1996, p. 25). More specifically, phenomenology seeks to return to what 
Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. xi) calls the “things themselves”. The ‘things themselves’ 
are people’s lived experience, in their immediacy, before they are imbued with any 
particular theoretical explanation. These ‘things themselves’ in their entirety in turn 
make-up the phenomenological notion of the “Lebenswelt” or “life-world” 
 
(Romdenh-Romluc, 2011, p. 12). This ‘life-world’ is the everyday world that we live 
and experience and inhabit- that domain of “everyday immediate social existence and 
practical activity, with all its habituality, its crises, its vernacular and idiomatic 
character, its biographical particularities, its decisive events and indecisive 
strategies” (Jackson, 1996, p. 8). 
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Phenomenology is thus about accessing, articulating and understanding people’s life-
worlds, within their own epistemological rationalities. Phenomenology is therefore 
not chiefly interested in questions related to the rational or ontological position of 
people’s ideas and beliefs (Jackson, 1996, 1998). This is not to say that 
phenomenological enquiry discards the notions of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ (Carman, 
 
2008; Matthews, 2002). Rather, it undertakes what Jackson (1996, p. 10) terms a 
kind of “practical relativism” as it were, adjourning such questions temporarily. It is 
based on the assumption that beliefs can be significant and consequential, even if we 
consider them to be epistemologically superfluous. It is about taking these 
experiences seriously, trying to understand them in their own right (Carman, 2008). 
Ultimately, as Jackson (1996, p. 2) most aptly articulates, what phenomenology 
stands against is the “fetishization of the products of intellectual reflection” which 
identifies particular domains of experience and certain worldviews as legitimate 
means to accessing the ‘truth’, while disparaging or ignoring others. As such, 
phenomenology is about, even just momentarily, legitimizing all modalities of 
human experience and trying to make sense of them in their own right, without first 
and foremost evaluating them from a particular intellectual perspective. 
 
 
Now, in its more traditional sense, as articulated by Husserl (1972), the so-called 
founder of phenomenology, in order to adequately describe and understand the 
 
‘essence’ of directly experienced phenomena, one must “bracket” or “put in 
parentheses” all of one’s own conceptualization, common-sense biases and theories 
(Matthews, 2002, p. 26). Only then, Husserl argued, can one properly understand and 
appreciate the ‘things themselves’. This form of phenomenological reductionism or 
what Husserl called the “phenomenological epoche” was rejected by Merleau-Ponty 
(Carman, 2008, p. 39). Although highly influenced by Husserl’s thinking, French 
philosopher Merleau-Ponty saw this ‘epoche’ as idealistic and unattainable. He 
argued that it is not possible to obtain a kind of “absolute subjectivity” whereby one 
 
“separates out the world itself from the world as meaningful to me” (Matthews, 
 
2006, p. 17). We cannot totally withdraw our self and our ideas from the world, 
Merleau-Ponty argued, as we have an inescapable involvement and interdependency 
with the world. Rather, for Merleau-Ponty (1962), returning to the ‘things 
themselves’ requires that we try to loosen our ties, temporarily at least, from the 
dominant theoretical structures that shape how we look at the world. This loosening 
may in turn assist us with seeing and trying to understand the world with an attitude 
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of “wonder” and curiosity (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. viii). As he describes in the 
preface of Phenomenology of Perception: 
 
 
Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of 
consciousness as the world’s basis; it steps back to watch the forms of 
transcendence fly up sparks from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads 
which attach us to the world and thus brings them to our notice… it reveals 
that world as strange and paradoxical…in order to see the world and grasp it 
as paradoxical, we must break with our familiar acceptance of it… (ibid, p. 
xv). 
 
 
Phenomenology then, as Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. viii) conceives it, is a “manner or 
style of thinking” which can assist us in “relearning to look at the world” by making 
it ambiguous and perplexing and thus unsettling our received ways of knowing. For 
Merleau-Ponty, one of the main ‘intentional threads which attach us to the world’ is 
that of scientific schematization and logic. Thus, he argues that “returning to the 
 
‘things themselves’, is from the start a foreswearing of science” and its dominant 
conceptual systems and values (Merleau-Ponty, ibid, p. ix). Importantly, Merleau-
Ponty is not arguing that scientific knowledge should be abandoned. Rather, what 
should be challenged is the “dogmatism of science that thinks itself capable of 
absolute and complete knowledge” and which thinks itself “entitled to deny or rule 
out as illusory all forms of inquiry that do not start out from measurements and 
comparisons and, by connecting particular causes with particular consequences, end 
up with laws such as those of classical physics” (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 43). 
 
 
In an attempt to ‘challenge the dogmatism of science’ Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) 
phenomenology proposes a particular way of thinking about experience and 
meaning-making. For him, human understanding does not consist of indirect and 
passive ‘thought-like’ representations, sharply delineated from ‘reality’ (Matthews, 
2002). Rather, our sense of the world comes from the fact that we live and act and 
interact and feel and think and move within this world, or as Merleau-Ponty 
describes it, it emerges from our ‘being-in-the-world’. Moreover, this ‘being-in-the-
world’, according to him, is seldom a case of individuals acting alone, but is 
predominantly in situation, between people and in relation to others. That is, our 
understanding of ourselves and the world is “through and through compounded of 
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relationships”, always in a dialectical space of interaction with others (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, xiv). 
 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, ‘being-in-the-word’ also has a corporeal dimension. In other 
words, our bodily, non-cognitive dispositions and capacities incarnate our lived 
experiences and thus constitute our perceptual world. As Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 
162) puts it, “Our bodily experience… provides us with a way of access to the world 
and the object…We are in the world through our body…the body is a natural self, a 
grouping of lived-through meanings”. Thus experience and meaning is not solely 
sensory, nor intellectual, but also bodily. Finally, according to Merleau-Ponty, this 
 
‘being-in-the-world’ inevitably transcends our capacity to know and understand it 
fully. As he puts it, the world which we inhabit “lends itself to unending exploration; 
it is inexhaustible” (ibid, p. 378). Ultimately, our involvement with, and 
understanding of, the world are thus continually emerging or ‘becoming’, and thus 
always somewhat incomplete, temporal and indeterminate. 
 
 
This phenomenology developed by Merleau-Ponty may thus represent an alternative 
kind of conceptual framework to the dominant, Eurocentric ones. As suggested by 
Jackson (1996), this paradigm proposes a way of thinking about experience and 
meaning-making which transcends the labyrinth of dualisms and rationalistic 
assumptions purported by the episteme of European Colonial Modernity. That is, no 
polarizations are constructed between interior experiences and external objects; 
between the reasoning mind and the unreasoning body; between subjectivity and 
objectivity; between subject and the world; between self and others; between 
supposed facts and supposed subjective beliefs (Carman, 2008; Matthews, 2002). 
Rather, existence and understandings are “Both intentional and bodily, both sensory 
and motor, and so neither merely subjective nor objective, inner nor outer, spiritual 
nor mechanical” (Carman, 2008, p. 78). As such, his philosophy opens up the space 
for ways of knowing and dimensions of life that are constituted in, and articulated 
through, modalities that go against the totalizing grain- the bodily, the sensorial, the 
emotional, the sacred, the imaginary and the even fantastical (Devisch & Brodeur, 
1999). 
 
 
Moreover, this understanding of existence being a space of ‘inter’ resonates strongly 
with common conceptions of identity and agency in Africa which frequently 
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emphasise relatedness rather than individuality (See Nyamnjoh, 2002 for a nuanced 
analysis of the primacy afforded to ‘relatedness’ in many understandings of the 
world and subjectivity in Africa). Finally, at the heart of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology is the value of genuinely acknowledging our gaps, our blanks and 
our ultimate un-knowingness in understandings of ourselves and others. Ultimately, 
this recognition of the limits of our knowledge fundamentally interferes with the 
kinds of certainties that are so embedded in the epistemological order of European 
Colonial Modernity. 
 
 
As I demonstrated in Chapter Eight, the stories that were told by three particular 
psychiatrists, Jeff, Sheila and Kenneth, appeared to operate within this critical 
phenomenological tradition associated with Merleau-Ponty. Deeply embedded within 
this paradigm of thought, their thinking transcended many of the limitations of the 
master biomedical narrative and associated epistemologies. In undertaking the kind 
of ‘practical relativism’ associated with phenomenology, these psychiatrists were 
able to tap into, and sincerely appreciate, the many personal, emotional, moral, 
spiritual and socio-cultural dimensions of knowing and being that may be important 
to people affected by mental illness in Africa. Moreover, these three psychiatrists 
consistently acted against the rationalist fantasies of biomedicine, genuinely 
recognizing and incorporating into their practices, the inevitable partialness of 
medical science. In fact, much of their understanding related to the humility they 
have developed around what they know and what they can ultimately do. 
 
 
In appreciating the diverse and complex nature of human beings, and the limits of 
biomedicine, these three psychiatrists’ thinking around the ‘gap’ in mental health 
care was very different to the more dominant kinds of views. For them, there is an 
urgent need to rethink how people’s needs and motivations, and the ultimate goals of 
care are conceptualized in the first place. Moreover, according to them, thinking 
around the ‘gap’ in mental health care requires transforming the ways in which we 
understand, and potentially learn from, ‘other’ healing systems which may be based 
on different kinds of epistemologies to biomedicine. Possibly most importantly, for 
those three psychiatrists, there is a need for greater humility on the part practitioners. 
That is, for them, it is important for service providers to cultivate a particular way of 
being, one which engenders greater uncertainty and doubt. And this 
incomprehension, this acknowledgement of only partial understanding, needs to 
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become woven into service providers’ practices. So, what Jeff, Sheila and Kenneth 
were articulating is that thickening our knowledge and associated practices around 
the ‘gap’ in mental health care should be about less and not more, perhaps 
paradoxically, it is about fostering a gap in knowing. In other words, it is about those 
in current seats of power having less certainty, less conviction and greater admission 
of ignorance. Ultimately, it is through this uncertainty that a space is potentially 
opened for new forms of thinking and alternative sorts of practices to grow and 
become part of the clinical exchange. 
 
 
Moving from a knowledge monoculture to an ecology of knowledges 
 
 
 
“The critical strategic capacity to allow the comparative evaluation and growth of diverse knowledge 
traditions with differing epistemologies and ontologies, with differing ways of understanding and framing 
the world, may be humanity’s last hope for a future”. 
 
(Turnbull, 2009, p. 4) 
 
 
What is therefore clear is that there are more ways of seeing the world and 
expressing it than the gatekeepers of dominant knowledge producing systems would 
have us believe. If these other ways of knowing and being- the messy, the complex, 
the contingent, the tacit, the spiritual, the associative, the experiential, the visceral, 
the relational and so forth- are to possess any kind of power and influence, then 
something profound has to change within the centres of power themselves, and not 
only on their margins. That is, if we are to shift the epistemological privilege granted 
to Eurocentric forms of meaning-making to more ‘Africa-focused’ models of 
scholarship, then the canon of academic knowledge needs to be more democratic and 
epistemologically inclusive. This is indeed what various scholars are getting at when 
they assert the need for a “plural ecology of knowledge” (Nandy, 1989) a 
 
“polycentric global epistemology” (Maffie, 2009) or a “cosmopolitan ecology of 
knowledge” (De Sousa Santos et al., 2007). For such scholars, this kind of ecology 
of knowledge would be one which welcomes a wider range of knowledge practices 
and sources, is more “hospitable” to different iterations of reason and the reasonable, 
and ultimately enlarges its understanding of scholarly acceptability (Green 2009, p. 
4). 
 
The creation of a more open and hospitable knowledge archive is, however, a 
 
slippery task and inevitably faces the now widely debated and controversial issue of 
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relativism. That is, do appeals to knowledge diversity and inclusivity open the 
floodgates? Do we now live in a relativist world? Does this deny the possibility of 
choice, judgement or assessment, a kind of ‘anything goes’? In this thesis, I have 
argued that relativism is not a good option. For example, in my various analyses I 
shed light on the case of HIV/AIDS in South Africa to suggest that, within the 
context of very real suffering and limited healthcare resources, the dangers of taking 
a relativist stance are manifold. Relativism may also be somewhat of an 
epistemologically suspect position. For example, Donna Haraway (1999, p. 178) sees 
relativism as the “the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of 
objectivity”. According to her, relativism and universalism “are both ‘god-tricks’ 
promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully…both deny the 
stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective; both make it impossible to 
see well” (ibid). For Haraway, a relativist position ultimately precludes judgement 
and evaluation, and as such, cannot be advocated. 
 
 
Along similar lines, David Turnbull (2000) suggests that relativism is too weak an 
ethic, too strong an assertion of identity and a too unstable way of framing 
knowledge. For Turnbull, acknowledging epistemological diversity and rejecting that 
there are fixed or universal criteria for rationality, does not foreclose the possibility 
of assessment and criticism. As he suggests, no ways of knowing should be exempt 
from critical examination, deconstruction and interpretation. Thus, instead of 
accepting a single and transcendent rationality or being reduced to a feeble form of 
relativism, it is about taking as a question of research how we can work credibly, 
critically and ethically with diverse knowledge assemblages. That is, it is about 
fostering an intellectual project which engages with how we might rethink and 
rekindle the capacity to test knowledge and ways of knowing which do not 
straightforwardly disqualify nor valorise whatever does not fit the epistemological 
canon of modernity. Haraway (1999) envisions a similar kind of evaluative 
programme, one which she defines as “a power-sensitive conversation…which 
fosters a process of ongoing critical interpretation among ‘fields’ of interpreters and 
decoders” (ibid, p. 182) and which “privileges contestation, deconstruction, 
passionate construction, webbed connections, and hope for transformation of 
systems of knowledge and ways of seeing” (ibid, p. 178). 
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This kind of knowledge project is, however, almost non-existent in the field of public 
mental health. This is because the sorts of questions it explores are unrecognised 
within the metacodes shared by the majority of researchers, policymakers and 
practitioners alike. However, if we are to develop more ‘Africa-focused’ models of 
scholarship on mental health care, greater thought is required around how this kind 
of intellectual project and associated questions might be nurtured. Within fields of 
more critical social science scholarship, various researchers have started grappling 
with how different knowledges might be evaluated and potentially coexist. They 
have begun to develop certain useful conceptual resources in this regard, for example 
Berkes and Berkes’ (2009) “fuzzy logic”, Sillitoe and Marzano’s (2009) “linked 
spheres of knowledge”, Green’s (2009) “reflective equilibrium”, Elgin’s (2004) 
“felicitous falsehoods” and Turnbull’s (2000) “knowledge motley”. I am not going to 
delve into the specifics of these concepts here, as they are considerably complex and 
diverse. What I will emphasise, however, is that all of these scholars are in 
agreement that such an intellectual project necessitates starting-off from a place 
which recognises both the performative and representational nature of knowledge. 
That is, although knowledge systems may differ in their epistemologies, 
methodologies, logics and structures, it requires appreciating that they are all 
produced within specific social contexts and shaped by particular power relations and 
historico-political frameworks. It is only on this basis that it might be possible to 
compare and evaluate different knowledge traditions. 
 
 
Proceeding from this vantage point is certainly a tricky move for the modern thinker, 
as it requires changing so many of the metaphors and narratives that lie at the heart 
of stories about ‘reality’. It necessitates becoming familiar and comfortable with 
 
‘reality’, and knowledge about it, as comprising both verifiable evidence and faith, or 
as Latour (2010) has it, as simultaneously fetish and fact, a “factish”. This is 
difficult, as according to Latour (ibid, p. 11), “we Moderns, with our sciences and 
our technologies, our rights, our markets, and our democracies… are so convinced of 
the essential difference between facts and fetishes”. Indeed, if the findings from my 
research are anything to go by, cultivating such an intellectual project is likely to be 
an uphill struggle. But, its potential to nurture different, more ‘Africa-focused’ 
ecologies of knowledge on mental health care in Africa, I am convinced makes it 
worth the trouble. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
“What were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards” 
 
 
(Kuhn, 1962, p. 111) 
 
 
Let us end by returning to Annemarie Mol and her yelling. Despite her immense 
frustration at the caring professions, she concedes that “Yelling, for all its loudness, 
doesn’t carry very far” and poses the question “But what other repertoires of relating 
to suffering are there?” (Mol, 2001, p. 3). In this chapter I have put forward various 
thoughts in this regard, by suggesting certain concepts and methodological tools- 
 
‘African Modes of Self-Writing’, ‘Southern Theory’, ‘ethnographic articulations’, 
‘reclaiming animism’, ‘critical phenomenology’, ‘humility’, ‘ecologies of knowledge’ 
and ‘factishes’. These challenging and enticing concepts unsettle both Afro- and Euro- 
centricity and provide opportunities for new imaginings and understandings. 
Ultimately, they offer invitations to alternative kinds of questions and conversations 
on the ‘gap’ in mental health care in Africa, ones which might reflect different 
vitalities and speak to different notions of wellbeing and nurturing. 
 
 
Most certainly, current demands of the global knowledge economy pose several 
limitations for these alternative kinds of concepts and methodologies to enter into 
sites of potential power and influence. Economies of scale in government, in decision 
making by policy-makers, in assessments by donor agencies increasingly depend 
upon uncontroversial, policy-relevant forms of knowledge which are based on 
replicable methodologies and categorical schemas. Many of the problematic features 
of knowledge on the mental health ‘treatment gap’ are precisely those which make 
them attractive to governments and donor institutions. Indeed, to-date, novel research 
and practice-based approaches to mental health care, which are grounded in more 
local, experiential knowledge, have struggled to attract research funding (Bemme & 
 
D’souza, 2012; Beresford 2012; Kirmayer 2006). And to a large extent, more critical 
forms of scholarship continue to be marginalised in the public (mental) health arena, 
still relegated to a fairly well defined circuit of institutions and journals. As such, 
asking current seats of power to better live with, and think in, the provisional, the 
heterogeneous, the complex, the ambivalent and even the supernatural, may be a tall, 
if not naïve order. 
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However, if people’s needs and wants and desires, and associated behaviours, are 
only talked about in terms that are not relevant to their specificities and diversities, 
they will be submitted to regulations and rules that are foreign to them. Ultimately, 
as suggested by Mol, Moser and Pols (2010, p. 7) “This threatens to take the heart 
out of care- and along with this not just its kindness but also its effectiveness, its 
tenacity and its strength”. Thus, if we are to address the multi-layered processes that 
deprive so many people in Africa the opportunities for mental well-being, then 
significant changes need to take place with the dominant kinds of paradigms in this 
area. Fortunately, despite their power, paradigms are vulnerable and inevitably do 
change. That is, neither the ordering, nor the order is ever entirely closed. Thus, to 
end on a more positive note, it is possible that anomalies will grow and that which 
does not ‘fit’ will gain increased significance within the field of Global Mental 
 
Health. And this in turn might help to bring about a cultural, political and 
epistemological transformation, one in which to use Kuhn’s (1962, p. 111) analogy, 
 
“what were ducks before…are rabbits afterwards”. Ultimately this is the hope and 
the dream. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix one: Study information sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study Information Sheet 
 
Knowledge on the Mental Health Treatment Gap in Africa 
 
Investigator: Ms Sara Cooper 
Department of Social and Environmental Health 
Faculty of Public Health and Policy 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
15-17 Tavistock Place, London, WC1H 9SH 
United Kingdom 
Email: Sara.Cooper@lshtm.ac.uk; Tel: +27 7485 689 53 (SA)/ +44 7780041215 
(UK) 
 
My PhD research is exploring how the treatment gap for mental illness is being 
understood and addressed within post-colonial African contexts. You are one of a 
group of key individuals being asked to take part in my research. Before you decide 
whether or not you wish to take part, please read the following and contact me if you 
would like to discuss anything further. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of my study is to gain a better understanding of how the treatment gap 
for mental illness is being understood and addressed within post-colonial African 
contexts. I am doing this by examining contemporary knowledge on this topic at 
specific locations- research, policy and practice. The ultimate goal is to explore how 
theory, policy and attendant practice on the gap in mental health care in Africa 
might best be articulated and addressed. 
 
Why is this important? 
 
Over the last decade, there has been growing international concern about what is 
seen as a considerable number of people with mental health problems in Africa not 
receiving care. Current estimates reveal that as high as 90% of people with mental 
disorders in low-income countries in Africa are not receiving care. This situation, 
now referred to as the ‘large treatment gap’ has in turn become a central global 
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health issue within health agencies and policy worldwide, with a strong international 
drive to reduce this current treatment gap. An increasing number of mental health 
policies and interventions are thus being proposed and implemented in Africa, which 
are focusing on improving the access and uptake of mental health services as key 
strategies to reduce the mental health treatment gap. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
 
I am interested in hearing the personal stories and everyday experiences of 
psychiatrists who are working on the ground of public mental health care provision, 
in order to explore these professionals’ understandings around why people may or 
may not be getting and accessing the services they require. I wish to elicit these 
professionals’ views on key strategies for improving access and uptake of mental 
health services. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. It is completely up to you. Should you agree to take part, you are also free to 
withdraw from the study at any time, without having to give a reason. 
 
What will your participation involve? 
 
Your participation will consist of one interview, conducted by myself, Sara Cooper, a 
PhD student at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. The interview 
will take place at a time and location convenient to you, either in-person or on the 
phone. The length of the interview depends on your availability, but is anticipated to 
be no longer than 1½ hours . With your permission, the interviews will be audio-
recorded. 
 
What are the risks and benefits of taking part? 
Participation is voluntary. Talking about one’s personal experiences can be difficult. 
 
As such, you are free to refuse to speak about anything you do not wish to, and you 
can withdraw at any time from the interview, without giving any reason. After 
reading through this information sheet, you will be given the chance to ask questions 
before signing the consent form. 
 
You will be able to share your personal views and experiences of working in the 
public mental health sector, and in doing so, help me understand more about the 
complexities of meeting the support and help-seeking needs of people with mental 
health problems on a daily basis. 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
Any complaint about the way you have been dealt with during the study or any 
possible harm you might suffer will be addressed. If you have a concern about any 
aspect of this study, you should contact me using the details provided at the top of 
this sheet. 
 
If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can contact my 
supervisor at: Dr. Nicki Thorogood, LSHTM, Tavistock Place, London WC1H 9SH. 
Tel: + 44 20 7927 2430; Email: Nicki.Thorogood@lshtm.ac.uk 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All quotes and other information arising from your participation in this study will be 
anonymised, with any identifying information redacted from all transcripts and 
written observations. Data will be kept in a locked filing cabinet and if material is 
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held on a computer, this will be password protected. Only myself, and my supervisor, 
Dr. Nicki Thorogood [contact details above], will have access to the original data. 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
Interview data will initially contribute to my PhD thesis, and may later be written up 
for publication in academic and professional journals. With your permission, 
anonymous quotes may be used in my PhD thesis, and other subsequent reports and 
publications. 
 
Who is funding the research? 
The study has been funded by three PhD scholarships: 
 
1. Patrick and Margaret Flanagan Scholarship (Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown, South Africa)  
2. National Research Foundation (South Africa) Doctoral Abroad 
Scholarship (GN: 75987:2011)  
3. Oppenheimer Memorial Trust (OMT Ref. 19512/01) 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The research has been formally reviewed and approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee of both The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Ethics 
Committee [Ethics reference no. 6310] and the University of Cape Town [Ethics 
reference no. 162/2013]. 
 
Thank you for reading this form. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require 
any further information regarding the study. 
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Appendix two: Interview consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview Consent Form 
 
Knowledge on the Mental Health Treatment Gap in Africa 
 
Investigator: Ms Sara Cooper 
Department of Social and Environmental Health 
Faculty of Public Health and Policy, 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
15-17 Tavistock Place, London, WC1H 9SH 
United Kingdon 
Email: Sara.Cooper@lshtm.ac.uk; Tel: +27 7485 689 53 (SA)/ +44 7780041215 
(UK) 
 
I confirm that I have read, and that I understand, the Participant Information Sheet, 
and I am aware of what will be required of me if I take part in this study. I have had 
the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions about the study, and have 
had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time from the interview, without giving any reason. 
 
I consent to the interview being audio-recorded. I understand that I can turn off the 
recorder at any time during the interview and that I can refuse to answer any 
question posed by the researcher. I agree to allow the researcher to use the 
information gained by my participation in the research in reports and research 
publications, but understand that my privacy and confidentiality will be protected at 
all times and that my name will not be recorded. 
 
I give permission for anonymous quotes to be used in Ms. Cooper’s PhD thesis, and 
other subsequent reports and publications. 
 
I herein agree to take part in this study. 
 
 
…………………………………..………. ………………………….……………… 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) (SIGNATURE) 
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 …………………………………..………. 
 
(DATE) 
 
As the researcher for this study I confirm that I have explained to the participant 
named above, the nature and purpose of the study being undertaken. 
 
 
…………………………………..………. ………………………….……………… 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) (SIGNATURE) 
 
 
…………………………………..………. 
 
(DATE) 
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Appendix three: Interview topic guide 
 
 
1) Introduction- who I am, what my PhD is about, why I am interviewing you. 
 
2) Could you start off by telling me how you came to be working at XXX? 
 
3) Can you tell me what some of your roles and responsibilities are at XXX? 
 
4) Can you describe to me what a typical day at work usually entails for you? 
 
Lead: 
 
- Have you had any unusual days recently? 
 
5) Could you tell me about some of the personal and professional challenges 
you face working here? 
 
Lead: 
 
-   Similar or different kinds of issues in the past? 
 
6) Are you happy to talk about some of the patients you are currently seeing? 
 
Leads: 
 
- the kinds of issues the patient is presenting with? 
 
- how the patient understands their issues? 
 
- what forms of care you are employing? 
 
- whether you feel such forms of care are working? 
 
- whether the patient has consulted with any other kinds of care? 
 
7) Have you had any patient(s) recently which you found particularly 
challenging? 
 
Lead: 
 
- Any examples from the past? 
 
8) Have you had any experiences recently with a patient(s) that you found 
particularly positive? 
 
Lead: 
 
- Any examples from the past? 
 
9) Have you had any experiences recently with a patient(s) that you have found 
particularly memorable? 
 
Lead: 
 
- Any examples from the past? 
 
10) Is there anything else you would like to share with me? 
 
11) Thanks and debrief. 
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